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SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we address challenging social computing problems in per-
sonalized recommender systems and social media information mining. We tap into
probabilistic graphical models, including directed and undirected graphical models, to
model a large number of observed and unobserved variables as well as various depen-
dency relationships between variables, and develop efficient computation algorithms
that exploit the graph structure to solve the problems.
In recommender systems, we propose probabilistic graphical models for Collab-
orative Filtering (CF) algorithms in various problem settings, and solve them using
Belief Propagation (BP) algorithms that allow scalable and distributed implemen-
tations. Firstly, user similarities are computed in factor graphs. Then unknown
ratings are predicted in Pairwise Markov Random Fields (PMRFs). Further, when
online social networks of users are provided, a Bayesian Network (BN) recommen-
dation system is constructed based on user relations to improve recommendation for
cold-start users or users do not have sufficient ratings. To preserve user privacy, a
semi-distributed item-based CF system is developed, which employs semi-distributed
BP for item similarity computation in factor graphs, without disclosing ratings to the
server or other peer users. Finally, to protect CF recommender systems from shilling
attacks, a factor graph is proposed to jointly detect colluding spammers, which sig-
nificantly improves detection accuracy over classification algorithms based on a single
user’s rating patterns.
In social media information mining, to detect false information and keep track
of information credibility, we propose a generative probabilistic model to predict the
xii
credibility of events in Twitter-like social media using streaming tweets. The pro-
posed algorithm predicts credibility much faster than existing offline algorithms and
updates prediction online with newly observed tweets. Further, to identify suspicious
users that perform malevolent activities such as spamming and phishing, we pro-
pose a probabilistic PMRF model for predicting the trustworthiness of social media
users. The PMRF model improves prediction accuracy by taking into account user




This dissertation centers on the novel application of probabilistic graphical models on
two areas: (1) Personalized recommender systems; (2) Credible information mining.
1.1 Personalized Recommender Systems
The thriving of the Internet and online services has overwhelmed users with an ex-
plosive amount of information, e.g., hundreds of thousands of movies on Netflix.com
[4, 65]. The downside of the growth of this is that it is nearly impossible for users to
find the items, e.g., books and movies, that interest them. Recommender systems are
powerful tools for providing personalized recommendations of items that meet user
preferences, which improve user satisfaction and reduce user effort [95, 96]. Recom-
mender system algorithms can be generally classified into two categories: the content-
based approach and the Collaborative Filtering (CF) approach [3]. The content-based
approach requires explicit interest profiles for users and items, and makes recom-
mendations by matching user profiles with item profiles [11, 78, 86]. However, this
approach is difficult to apply in practice, because (i) users either do not like to dis-
close personal information, or are not completely aware about their interests, and
(ii) it is limited by content analysis techniques, e.g., it is difficult to explicitly de-
scribe multimedia content using features. Alternatively, the CF approach exploits
the past transactions and user ratings to predict user preferences on unseen items
[20, 44, 17, 100]. Many online service providers have adopted CF algorithms, e.g.,
Amazon.com and Netflix.com [65, 4]. In this dissertation, we mostly focus on CF
recommender systems.
As recommender systems are often used in large-scale e-commerce websites with
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hundreds of thousands of books and movies, there is a need to develop recommenda-
tion algorithms with high computational efficiency for large-scale deployments. Addi-
tionally, while personalized recommender systems at e-commerce websites have been
very successful, they are faced with important security and privacy challenges: Rec-
ommender systems are vulnerable to shilling attacks [58, 28, 77], where a group of
spammers are injected into the system and they collaborate to manipulate the rec-
ommendations; and users are increasingly concerned with online privacy [1, 92, 14,
24, 76], as they have to disclose their personal data to receive satisfactory recom-
mendation services, and they have no control over how their personal information
will be disseminated and used. Our work based on graphical models is also moti-
vated by the need to develop recommender systems suitable for privacy-preserving
implementation.
1.2 Credible Information Mining
Online social media services like Twitter greatly facilitate the dissemination of in-
formation [56, 16, 27, 30]. In Twitter, users can conveniently self-report activities
and stories happening around them by posting messages/statuses known as “tweets”
using personal computing devices like smart phones, and the tweets can be read and
retweeted by other users. The large number of social media users often results in a
large amount of social messages reporting real-world events [56]. Monitoring social
media streams, e.g., tweets in Twitter, becomes an effective way to detect events and
monitor emergent situations [98, 112, 71]. However, social media is also increasingly
exploited to spread rumors and false information [26, 74, 42, 93], e.g., fake images
during Hurricane Sandy [41]. False rumors in social media can potentially reach mil-
lions of people in short amount of time. Counter measures are thus needed to curb
false information from undermining the functionality and utility of social media.
2
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Figure 1: Illustration of probabilistic graphical models.
Moreover, due to the open nature of social media platforms, there are an increas-
ing number of malicious users or spammers [60, 118, 106, 126], who misuse social
networks to perform malevolent activities [21, 48] such as spamming, phishing, and
spreading computer viruses. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop algorithms
to effectively predict the trustworthiness of users in social networks, so as to identify
suspicious users and limit their activities or suspend their accounts.
1.3 Probabilistic Graphical Models
In all research thrusts in this dissertation, there are a large number of variables (e.g.,
user similarities in recommender systems), and there are also various relationships
between variables (e.g., users who rated a given item). To model the uncertainty in
unobserved variables and the relationships between different variables, we tap into
probabilistic graphical models [12, 52, 110, 38], which are graphs that represent ran-
dom variables as nodes and relationships between variables as edges between nodes,
compactly expressing joint probability distributions of many variables. Graphical
models allow us to decompose a highly complex system into many simpler parts with
edges connecting related parts, and their graphical structures provide a factorization
which often enables the design of computationally efficient algorithms [87, 54, 80, 122].
These properties make graphical models a very suitable framework for addressing our
research problems and developing efficient scalable algorithms.





Figure 2: A factor graph for the factorization of g(x1, x2, x3).
and undirected graphical models. In directed graphical models, also known as gen-
erative probabilistic models and Bayesian networks [12, 87, 62], a directed edge from
variable node x to y indicates that x causes y. As an example illustrated in Fig. 1a, a
fire breakout in a building (x = True) causes the fire alarm to sound (y = True), and
the joint probability of x and y can be expressed as P (x, y) = P (y|x)P (x). In undi-
rected graphical models, also known as Markov Random Fields (MRFs) [36, 37, 122],
an undirected edge connects two related variable nodes xi and xj. A simple pair-
wise MRF model is illustrated in Fig. 1b, which expresses the joint distribution as a
factorization
P (x1, x2, y1, y2) =
1
Z
ψ(x1, x2)φ1(x1, y1)φ2(x2, y2),
where ψ(xi, xj) and φj(xi, yi) are potential functions, and Z is a normalization factor.
Besides the two categories of probabilistic graphical models, a Factor Graph can be
used to represent the factorization of a joint distribution function as a bipartite graph
[54], where variable nodes and factor nodes represent variables and local functions,
respectively, and an edge connects a variable node to a factor node if and only if
the variable is an argument of the local function. For example, given the following
factorization of a function g(x1, x2, x3),
g(x1, x2, x3) = f1(x1, x2)f2(x2, x3)f3(x3),
the corresponding factor graph is shown in Fig. 2. Both directed and undirected
graphical models can also be represented as factor graphs.
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1.4 Dissertation Outline
In Chapter 2, we develop probabilistic graphical models and inference algorithms
for Collaborative Filtering (CF) recommender systems. Firstly, we propose to com-
pute user similarity on appropriately chosen factor graphs for the neighborhood CF
method. The key component for neighborhood methods is the computation of simi-
larities between users. There are several well-known similarity computation methods
including Vector Space Similarity (VSS) [19] and Pearson Correlation Coefficient
(PCC) [99]. However, the accuracy of those methods is not satisfactory. The pro-
posed factor graph approach improves the accuracy of the neighborhood method by
properly modelling the joint distribution of user similarities. Secondly, we propose
to predict unknown item ratings on Pairwise Markov Random Fields (PMRFs). The
neighborhood method is based on either user similarity or item similarity, whereas
the PMRF model allows to exploit both user similarity and item similarity for pre-
diction. For both factor graphs and PMRFs, we apply the Belief Propagation (BP)
algorithm which operates on the probabilistic graphical models to exploit the factor-
ization to perform inference efficiently. We evaluate the rating prediction accuracy of
the proposed algorithms using 100K MovieLens dataset.
In Chapter 3, we propose a Bayesian Network (BN) based social recommendation
algorithm to generate recommendations using implicit user preference propagation
over social networks. CF based recommender systems require users to provide his-
toric rating data, which is not suitable for new users or users who do not provide
sufficient number of ratings. In social networks, people are more likely to connect to
other people sharing similar interests, and they are influenced more by their social
connections [113]. By exploiting the social structure of users, social recommender
systems can make satisfactory recommendations even for cold-start users. We con-
struct the BN model based on the user relations on social networks, and develop an
Expectation Propagation (EP) message-passing algorithm. We evaluate the top-N
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recommendation performance on the Epinions dataset.
In Chapter 4, we propose a semi-distributed item-based CF approach to privacy-
preserving recommender systems. In traditional recommender systems, the recom-
mendation algorithm is run at the central server of the commercial websites or other
third party providers, and thus users have to disclose their personal information and
ratings to the server. Users’ rating data can be used to infer user demographics,
such as age and gender [114], and even uncover user identities and reveal sensitive
personal information with access to other databases [81]. Unfortunately, users have
no control over how their personal data will be disseminated and used [1]. Most ex-
isting privacy-preserving recommender systems are developed either by obfuscating
user data with random noise [91] or fake data [104] at the cost of recommendation
accuracy, or by encrypting user data using cryptographic techniques [24] which re-
quire careful key management. We propose a recommender system with an intrinsic
privacy-preserving property. We construct factor graphs for item similarity computa-
tion, and develop a semi-distributed BP algorithm without directly exposing user rat-
ings to the server or other peer users. We analyze the privacy of the semi-distributed
BP from an information-theoretic perspective, and also evaluate the recommendation
performance on the MovieLens dataset.
In Chapter 5, we propose a probabilistic factor graph model for detecting spam-
mers that launch shilling attacks on CF recommender systems. In shilling attacks, a
group of spammers collaborate to manipulate the recommendations for their benefit
[58], e.g., to recommend their products more often, by injecting spam ratings. Ex-
isting detection algorithms [28, 22] extract features from user ratings to detect the
spammers. Those algorithms suffer from low accuracy, as they only look at individual
user rating patterns. We propose a factor graph model that exploits the collaborative
spamming behaviors among spammers to jointly detect them. We evaluate the de-
tection performance using simulated shilling attacks on MovieLens dataset, and show
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that as the number of target items increases, the detection precision and recall of the
proposed algorithm improves significantly.
In Chapter 6, we propose social link recommendation algorithms using both pop-
ularity and similarity. Due to the huge number of users in social media, recommen-
dation algorithms are needed to help users automatically discover new social links
to follow/connect. Existing link recommendation algorithms focus on link structure
[64] or “weighted popularity”. They are suitable for purposes like establishing so-
cial connections. However, social media like Twitter are also adopted by users to
receive information that interests them. Hence, it is promising to exploit the simi-
larity between Twitter users for recommendation [75]. We propose two approaches
to exploiting both popularity and similarity: rank aggregation and popularity-biased
Bayesian personalized ranking. We evaluate the link prediction performance on real-
world online social network datasets, and show that the proposed algorithms can
combine the advantages of popularity-based and similarity-based algorithms to im-
prove performance.
In Chapter 7, we propose a generative probabilistic model for real-time event
credibility prediction in Twitter-like social media. While online social media ser-
vices greatly facilitate the dissemination of information, they are also increasingly
exploited to spread rumors and false information. Existing methods for assessing
event credibility in social media require various aggregation features extracted from a
set of tweets related to an event that are collected over a long period of time [26, 57].
This can cause significant delays in the credibility prediction task from the time the
event first takes place. We develop a fast online prediction algorithm using streaming
tweets based on a generative probabilistic model. We evaluate both the offline batch
prediction and online streaming prediction performance of the proposed model using
real social media events collected from Twitter. The results show that our model out-
performs other algorithms based on aggregation analysis, and the online streaming
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prediction performance quickly approaches that of the batch prediction with only a
few hundred tweets.
In Chapter 8, we propose a probabilistic Pairwise Markov Random Field (PMRF)
model for predicting the trustworthiness of social media users. Spammers misuse so-
cial networks to perform malevolent activities such as spamming and phishing. Thus,
effective algorithms are needed to identify suspicious users and limit their activities
or suspend their accounts. Existing works [106, 117, 60] introduced feature-based
classification methods that capture behavioural characteristics of individual users,
but they ignore the relationships between users. The establishment of bidirectional
connections between users often indicates some degree of similarity in their trust-
worthiness. The proposed PMRF model takes into account both user features and
social relationships. We evaluate the accuracy of the proposal algorithm for predict-
ing spammers using Twitter datasets. The results show that it outperforms other
classification algorithms using only features of individual users.
In Chapter 9, we conclude this dissertation and discuss future research.
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CHAPTER II
PROBABILISTIC GRAPHICAL MODELS FOR
COLLABORATIVE FILTERING
To tackle those challenges in recommender systems as discussed in Section 1.1 of
Chapter 1, we develop probabilistic graphical models and efficient inference algo-
rithms for Collaborative Filtering (CF) recommender systems. Firstly, we propose
to compute user similarity on appropriately chosen factor graphs [127]. Secondly,
we propose to represent a recommender system on a Pairwise Markov Random Field
(PMRF) to exploit both user similarity and item similarity for predicting unknown
ratings [6]. In both of the probabilistic inference problems, we compute the marginal
distributions of similarity/rating variables from their joint distributions given the ob-
served ratings. However, direct computation of the marginal distribution functions
is computationally prohibitive for large scale recommender systems. Factor graphs
and PMRFs express the factorization of the joint distribution functions. Therefore,
we apply the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm which operates on the probabilistic
graphical models to exploit the factorization to perform inference efficiently.
We assume a set of M users, denoted by U = {1, . . . ,M}, and a set of N items,
denoted by I = {1, . . . , N}, in the recommender system. Specifically, user u provides
feedback on item i in the form of rating rui. Let Ui denote the set of users who have
rated item i, and Iu denote the set of items rated by user u. Let R denote the set
of all collected observed ratings from users on items. The CF recommender system
takes as input the historic ratings in R, and generates rating predictions for an active
user u on unseen items in I\Iu.
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2.1 Similarity Inference on Factor Graphs
One of the major approaches for designing recommender systems is Collaborative
Filtering (CF) [2]. The CF approach takes as input the historic ratings on items
given by users, and predicts ratings on unseen items for each active user. It includes
model-based methods and memory-based methods. The model-based method gener-
ates rating predictions from a model learned from the collected historic ratings, but
the learning process is often time-consuming, which is not suitable for systems with
frequent updates. The memory-based method, a.k.a. the neighborhood method, can
be further divided into user-based and item-based methods. The user-based method
recommends to an active user new items favorably rated by other users with similar
tastes to the active user [95]. The item-based method on the other hand analyzes the
similarity between items using the aggregated user ratings, and recommends to an
active user new items that are similar to the items he liked in the past [99].
The key component for neighborhood methods is the computation of similarities
between users or items. In this work, we formulate the similarity computation as a
probabilistic inference problem of computing the marginal distributions of similarity
variables from their joint posterior distribution given the observed ratings [127]. To
efficiently solve this problem, we introduce a factorization of the joint distribution in
an appropriate chosen factor graph, and apply the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm
[54] that operates in the factor graph to exploit the factorization for efficient inference.
In addition, a complexity reduction technique is proposed to contain the exponential
increase in computational complexity caused by the high degree at the factor node in
our setup of recommender systems. This BP-based approach was motivated by the
successful application of BP for iterative decoding algorithms in error-control systems
[53]. BP is very efficient in computing marginal functions from global functions of
many variables. Moreover, BP can even be applied in situations where exact solutions
for marginal functions are computationally intractable, such as the iterative decoding
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of Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes and turbo codes. As we shall see, the
concerned problem in this work also belongs to such intractable cases.
The recent applications of BP to CF systems were also introduced in [105, 51, 8, 7].
[105] and [51] proposed message-passing algorithms for performing probabilistic low-
rank matrix factorization to represent users and items with low-dimension vectors.
[8] and [7] proposed to directly predict ratings in the factor graph, where probabilistic
messages on unknown ratings are iteratively exchanged, whereas in this work we focus
on inferring the similarities, based on which the unknown ratings are predicted by
the neighborhood method.
2.1.1 Background on Neighborhood-based Collaborative Filtering
The neighborhood method can be either user-based [95] or item-based [99]. To predict
the rating rui for user u on an unseen item i, the user-based algorithm sorts the users
in Ui according to their similarity to user u in descending order, and finds a subset of
top K most similar users, denoted by Nui, where |Nui| = K. We refer to Nui as the
neighbourhood of user u for predicting rating on item i, and K as the neighborhood
size. Then rui is predicted by
r̂ui = r̄u +
∑
v∈Nui suv × (rvi − r̄v)∑
v∈Nui |suv|
, (1)
where suv is the similarity between users u and v, and r̄u is the average rating by




j∈Iui sij × ruj∑
j∈Iui |sij|
, (2)
where sij denotes the similarity between items i and j, and Iui represents a subset of
K items in Iu that are deemed most similar to item i.
The similarity computation plays a pivotal role in determining the accuracy of the
neighborhood methods. There are several well-known similarity computation methods
including Vector Space Similarity (VSS) [19] and Pearson Correlation Coefficient
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(PCC) [99]. It is observed that PCC performs better than VSS, as PCC takes into
account the difference in average ratings. In the case of user similarity, PCC computes
suv between users u and v as
suv =
∑





where Iuv = Iu ∩ Iv denotes the subset of common items rated by both users u and
v. The item similarity can be similarly computed using PCC. The PCC algorithm
gains popularity as it is easy to implement and its computational complexity is low,
while providing reasonable recommendation performance. In the following, we will
develop a BP-based algorithm for similarity computation to improve the accuracy of
the neighborhood method, yet with a computational complexity comparable to that
of PCC.
2.1.2 Probabilistic Modeling of User Similarity
We focus on the similarity computation for the user-based neighborhood method,
which generates rating predictions via (1). Its extension to the item-based neighbor-
hood method can be likewise developed. To predict ratings for active user u using (1),
we need to first compute the user similarities between user u and other users. Let Su
denote the set of concerned user similarities for user u, Su = {suv : 1 ≤ v ≤M, v 6= u}.
We model suv as a discrete random variable that takes values from a predefined
alphabet set S with size L = |S|. We denote P (Su|R) as the joint posterior probability
distribution of all variables in Su given the evidence of observed ratings in R. Then
to compute the individual user similarity suv, we need to find its marginal posterior
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Similar notations are used for this type of sum throughout this paper. Unfortunately,




, which is exponential in
the number of users. We therefore propose to factorize the joint distribution P (Su|R)
into local functions on a factor graph, which allows the application of the efficient BP
algorithm for inferring marginal distributions.
2.1.2.1 Modeling Similarity via Factor Graphs
A factor graph is a bipartite graph that expresses the factorization structure of a func-
tion, where variable nodes and factor nodes represent variables and local functions,
respectively, and an edge connects a variable node to a factor node if and only if the
variable is an argument of the local function represented by the factor node [54]. To
construct a factor graph for P (Su|R), we first find a proper factorization of P (Su|R).
We notice that dependencies among user similarities are induced by user ratings on
the common items. Hence, for each item i ∈ Iu, we let Sui = {suv : v ∈ Ui\u} be
the subset of user similarities between user u and the users who have rated item i,
and use a local function fi (Sui) to model the dependencies among variables in Sui








fi (Sui) , (6)
where Z is a normalization constant.
Now we construct a factor graph Gu for P (Su|R) according to (6) as illustrated in
Fig. 3. Each variable suv is represented by a variable node v, and each local function
fi (Sui) is represented by factor node i. The variable nodes in Vi = Ui\u are connected
to factor node i via edges, and thus the degree at each factor node i is |Vi|.
The local function fi at factor node i is designed specifically for the eventual goal,
which is to predict ratings using (1). Assuming the rating rui on item i in Ui is
unknown, we predict rui as
r̂ui (Sui) = r̄u +
∑
v∈Vi suv(rvi − r̄v)∑
v∈Vi |suv|
. (7)
Note that (7) has a similar form to (1), except that the observed ratings on item i
from all users in Vi are used in (7), since user similarities are not determined yet. We











where Zi is a normalization constant, and σ
2 is a designing parameter which controls
the sensitivity of the function to the discrepancy between r̂ui (Sui) and the actual
rating rui. The factor node function fi here can be seen as a soft check constraint,
which checks the weighted average rating in (7) against the true rating rui for a given
configuration of user similarities in Suv. fi decreases as the discrepancy between r̂ui
and rui increases. It is insightful to compare our factor graph formulation to iterative
BP decoding of LDPC codes. Indeed, the factor node in our setup plays a similar
role as the check node in LDPC decoding.
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The local function fi at factor node i is designed specif-
ically for the eventual goal, which is to predict ratings using
(1). Assuming the rating rui on item i in Ui is unknown, we
predict rui as
r̂ui (Sui) = r̄u +
∑
v∈Vi suv(rvi − r̄v)∑
v∈Vi |suv|
. (7)
Note that (7) has a similar form to (1), except that the observed
ratings on item i from all users in Vi are used in (7), since user
similarities are not determined yet. We then define the factor











where Zi is a normalization constant, and σ
2 is a designing
parameter which controls the sensitivity of the function to
the discrepancy between r̂ui (Sui) and the actual rating rui.
The factor node function fi here can be seen as a soft check
constraint, which checks the weighted average rating in (7)
against the true rating rui for a given configuration of user
similarities in Suv . fi decreases as the discrepancy between
r̂ui and rui increases. It is insightful to compare our factor
graph formulation to iterative BP decoding of LDPC codes.
Indeed, the factor node in our setup plays a similar role as the
check node in LDPC decoding.
B. Iterative Message Passing for Similarity Computation
Our goal is to compute the marginal posterior probability
distribution P (suv|R) from P (Su|R) for each suv in Su. We
tap into the BP algorithm for efficient inference on the factor
graph. Due to loops in the constructed factor graph Gu, we need
to apply the “loopy” BP algorithm, which performs iterative
message exchanging between variable nodes and factor nodes.
Although its computed results are not exact, “loopy” BP has
shown great success in applications such as LDPC decoding, in
which the underlying factor graph also has loops, as it achieves
near optimal performance with linear complexity.
We define two types of messages following the principle of
the sum-product BP algorithm [4]: (i) The λ-message λi,v(suv)
sent from a factor node i to a variable node v, and (ii) the µ-
message µv,i(suv) sent from a variable node v to a factor node
i. The λ-messages and µ-messages are iteratively updated and
passed along edges in the factor graph. In the n-th iteration,
to compute λ
(n)
i,v (suv), factor node i multiplies local function
fi with all µ-messages received in the last iteration except the
one from the recipient variable node v, and sums out variables














i,v (suv) tells user v the likelihoods of suv =
s, ∀s ∈ S. It says given how similar other users’ ratings on
item i are to user u’s, how similar user v is to user u from
item i’s point of view.
Then the algorithm continues to update µ-messages using
the λ-messages generated in the current iteration. To obtain
µ
(n)
v,i (suv), variable node v computes the product of all incom-





























v,i from variable node v to factor
node i.
Fig. 2: Iterative message-passing on a factor graph.
Algorithm 1 Iterative message passing for similarity compu-
tation
• Initialization. µ(0)v,i (suv) = 1|S| and n = 0.
• Iterative message-passing:
(a) Update λ-message using (9);
(b) Update µ-message using (10);
(c) n = n + 1. Repeat (a) and (b) until conver-
gence.
• Compute marginal distributions of suv’s using (11).










where Fv denotes the set of factor nodes connected to variable
node v. Here, Fv = Iv ∩ Iu. The µ-message µ(n)v,i (suv) tells
item i the probabilities of suv = s, ∀s ∈ S. It says given how
similar user v is to user u from other items’ point of view,
how similar user v’s rating is to user u’s on item i.
In each iteration, the messages are computed for each node
in the factor graph. To check convergence of the algorithm,










where Zv is a normalization constant. The algorithm exits
iteration when P (suv|R)’s converge. Finally, we can estimate
user similarity suv from (11) according to various criteria. We
consider the minimum mean squared error criterion here, and
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Note that (7) has a similar form to (1), except that the observed
ratings on item i from all users in Vi are used in (7), since user
similarities are not determined yet. We then define the factor
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constraint, which checks the weighted average rating in (7)
against the true rating rui for a given configuration of user
similarities in Suv . fi decreases as the discrepancy between
r̂ui and rui increases. It is insightful to compare our factor
graph formulation to iterative BP decoding of LDPC codes.
Indeed, the factor node in our setup plays a similar role as the
check node in LDPC decoding.
B. Iterative Message Passing for Similarity Computation
Our goal is to compute the marginal posterior probability
distribution P (suv|R) from P (Su|R) for each suv in Su. We
tap into the BP algorithm for efficient inference on the factor
graph. Due to loops in the constructed factor graph Gu, we need
to apply the “loopy” BP algorithm, which performs iterative
message exchanging between variable nodes and factor nodes.
Although its computed results are not exact, “loopy” BP has
shown great success in applications such as LDPC decoding, in
which the underlying factor graph also has loops, as it achieves
near optimal performance with linear complexity.
We define two types of messages following the principle of
the sum-product BP algorithm [4]: (i) The λ-message λi,v(suv)
sent from a factor node i to a variable node v, and (ii) the µ-
message µv,i(suv) sent from a variable node v to a factor node
i. The λ-messages and µ-messages are iteratively updated and
passed along edges in the factor graph. In the n-th iteration,
to compute λ
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one from the recipient variable node v, and sums out variables
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item i are to user u’s, how similar user v is to user u from
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node i.
Fig. 2: Iterative message-passing on a factor graph.
Algorithm 1 Iterative message passing for similarity compu-
tation
• Initialization. µ(0)v,i (suv) = 1|S| and n = 0.
• Iterative message-passing:
(a) Update λ-message using (9);
(b) Update µ-message using (10);
(c) n = n + 1. Repeat (a) and (b) until conver-
gence.
• Compute marginal distributions of suv’s using (11).










where Fv denotes the set of factor nodes connected to variable
node v. Here, Fv = Iv ∩ Iu. The µ-message µ(n)v,i (suv) tells
item i the probabilities of suv = s, ∀s ∈ S. It says given how
similar user v is to user u from other items’ point of view,
how similar user v’s rating is to user u’s on item i.
In each iteration, the messages are computed for each node
in the factor graph. To check convergence of the algorithm,










where Zv is a normalization constant. The algorithm exits
iteration when P (suv|R)’s converge. Finally, we can estimate
user similarity suv from (11) according to various criteria. We
consider the minimum mean squared error criterion here, and
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(b) µ- essage µ
(n)
v,i from variable node v to
factor node i.
Figure 4: Iterative message-passing on a factor graph.
2.1.3 It rative Message Passing for Similarity Computation
Our goal is to compute the marginal posterior probability distribution P (suv|R) from
P (Su|R) for each suv in Su. We tap into th BP algorithm for efficient inference on
the factor graph. Due to loops in the constructed factor graph Gu, we need to apply
t e “loopy” BP algorith , which performs iterative message exchanging between
variable nodes and factor nodes. Although its computed results are not exact, “loopy”
BP h s shown great success in applications such as LDPC decoding, in which the
underlying factor graph also has loops, as it achieves near optimal performance with
linear complexity.
We define two types of messages following the principle of the sum-product BP
algor hm [54]: (i) The λ-message λi,v( uv) sent from a factor e i to a variable
n d v, and (ii) the µ-message µv,i(suv) sent from a var able node v to a factor node
i. The λ-messages and µ-messages are iteratively updated and passed along edges in
the factor graph. In the n-th iteration, to compute λ
(n)
i,v (suv), factor node i multiplies
l cal function fi with all µ-messages received in the last iteration except the one from
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Figure 4a illustrates the computation of λ-message λi,v(suv). The λ-message λ
(n)
i,v (suv)
tells user v the likelihoods of suv = s, ∀s ∈ S. It says given how similar other users’
ratings on item i are to user u’s, how similar user v is to user u from item i’s point
of view.
Then the algorithm continues to update µ-messages using the λ-messages gen-
erated in the current iteration. To obtain µ
(n)
v,i (suv), variable node v computes the










where Fv denotes the set of factor nodes connected to variable node v. Here, Fv =
Iv ∩ Iu. Figure 4b illustrates the computation of µ-message µv,i(suv). The µ-message
µ
(n)
v,i (suv) tells item i the probabilities of suv = s,∀s ∈ S. It says given how similar
user v is to user u from other items’ point of view, how similar user v’s rating is to
user u’s on item i.
In each iteration, the messages are computed for each node in the factor graph. To
check convergence of the algorithm, we compute the marginal probability distributions









where Zv is a normalization constant. The algorithm exits iteration when P (suv|R)’s
converge. Finally, we can estimate user similarity suv from (11) according to various
criteria. We consider the minimum mean squared error criterion here, and thus the
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Algorithm 1 Iterative message passing for similarity computation
• Initialization. µ(0)v,i (suv) = 1|S| and n = 0.
• Iterative message-passing:
(a) Update λ-message using (9);
(b) Update µ-message using (10);
(c) n = n+ 1. Repeat (a) and (b) until convergence.
• Compute marginal distributions of suv’s using (11).
• Compute suv ∈ Su using (12).
We summarize the iterative BP algorithm in Alg. 1.
2.1.4 Complexity Reduction
We analyze the complexity of the proposed BP-based algorithm in terms of number of
multiplications. The complexity to update a µ-message using (10) is only O (|Iu|), but




, which is exponential
in the degree of the factor node. From the construction process of the factor graph
Gu in Sec. 2.1.2.1, we know that Vi = Ui\u. Unfortunately, in recommender systems,
an item can be rated by over hundreds of users. Therefore, direct application of the
BP algorithm is not feasible. We thus propose to construct a new factor graph Ĝu
from Gu for complexity reduction as follows.
The key here is to reduce the degree of factor nodes. For a high-degree factor
node i, the variable nodes in Vi are divided into small groups of size D, resulting in
Gi = d |Vi|D e groups. We denote the subset of variable nodes in group k of factor node
i as V(k)i , 1 ≤ k ≤ Gi. For each variable node v ∈ Vi, we set an indicator v(k)i = 1




i = 1. Further, we connect
a separated factor node i(k) to variable nodes in V(k)i . We do the same for all other












(b) Multiple low-degree factor nodes in Ĝu
Figure 5: Illustration of complexity-reduction in the factor graph.
a factor graph is illustrated in Fig. 5. Let S(k)ui = {suv : v ∈ V(k)i }. The factor function
f
(k)
i of factor node i







































To better understand the proposed technique for complexity reduction, we provide
an intuitive explanation using user-item relations. We divide the users of item i into
multiple groups, and create a separated virtual item i(k) for each group k. Users in
V(k)i give the same ratings on item i(k) as the original item i, i.e., item i(k) can be
seen as a copy of item i, but only rated by group k. As in Sec. 2.1.2.1, now the















And from (15), we can construct a new factor graph which is exactly the complexity
reduction factor graph Ĝu.
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While the new factor graph Ĝu is not mathematically equivalent to the original
factor graph Gu, they share the same underlying principle, that is, they properly assign
probabilities for each configuration of user similarities by checking the weighted rating
against the true item rating via factor node functions (or, soft check node constraints).
Moreover, we can apply the similar iterative BP algorithm described in Sec. 2.1.3
with minor modifications. The new λ-message λ
(n)
i(k),v
(suv) sent from factor node i
(k)


















And the new µ-message µ
(n)
v,i(k)
















j = 1, j ∈ Iv ∩ Iu, 1 ≤ k ≤ Gj
}
.








by using (16), where the group size D is a small integer and is
adjustable, while the total number of λ-messages need to be updated remains the
same. The computational complexity with regard to µ-messages does not change.





, where M̄ is the average number of users of
one item, and N̄ is the average number of items rated by one user. Since the number
of items a user can consume is limited by his time and money, we assume N̄ is much
smaller than N , and we also assume M̄ grows in the order of M1−ε, where 0 < ε < 1.












2.2 Recommender Systems via PMRF
In this work, we solve the recommender system’s problem on a Pairwise Markov Ran-
dom Field (PMRF), where we model proper similarity relationships between items
and construct local evidences based on user similarity, using which we compute the
marginal probability distribution functions of the variables representing the unknown
ratings to be predicted. However, computing the marginal probability functions is
computationally prohibitive for large scale recommender systems. Therefore, we pro-
pose to utilize the BP algorithm to efficiently compute these marginal probability
distributions in linear complexity. The BP-based recommendation algorithm offers
a significant advantage on scalability while providing competitive accuracy for the
recommender systems.
The neighborhood method aggregates ratings either from other users of the same
item, known as user-based methods [95], or from other items rated by the active user,
known as item-based methods [99], to predict the unknown rating on an item by a
user. Since the user-based method ignores the information from item similarity, and
vice versa, the hybrid method is suggested in [111, 67] to combine both user similarity
and item similarity. Our proposed approach via PMRF also incorporates both.
Graphical formulations of CF recommender systems using random fields are also
studied in [108, 29]. In [108], the authors integrate content-based and CF methods on
a conditional Markov random field, where each vertex represents a rating, each edge
connects two ratings on the same item or two ratings by the same user, and a local
evidence node at each vertex encodes user and item profiles. It requires extensive
training to learn the model. In [29], the authors predict item ratings for one active
user on a single graph in each run, but they do not make use of user relations.
In [8, 7], the authors proposed recommender systems on a factor graph and intro-
duced a BP-based approach to solve for ratings. This approach was motivated by the








Figure 6: Illustration of the PMRF model for rating prediction.
But the factor graph solution, despite its good performance, only captures the user
similarities. By using PMRF, our work models item similarities as edges connecting
unknown item ratings and user similarities as local evidences.
2.2.1 Formulation of Recommender Systems on PMRF
Given an arbitrary user z (referred to as the active user), let Rz = {rzi : i ∈ I\Iz}
be the collection of variables representing the ratings on items to be predicted, where
Iz denotes the subset of items whose ratings are already observed. We assume that
the rating values are integers from the set Υ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We model the unknown
ratings Rz on a PMRF as illustrated in Fig. 6. For each item rating rzi to be predicted,
we assign a hidden node, or item variable node, shown as a hexagon, which takes
values from a set of discrete ratings in Υ. To incorporate ratings from other users,
we connect each item node i to a local evidence node yzi (observed node) shown as
a circle, which represents the average item rating from other users weighted by the
user similarities between other users and the active user as
yzi = r̄z +
∑
v∈Ûi szv(rvi − r̄v)∑
v∈Ûi |szv|
, (18)
where Ûi denotes a set of Kz users that are most similar to the active user z among
users who have rated item i. Further, the user similarity szv is computed on a factor
graph in Sec. 2.1. To model the compatibility between ratings on similar items, we
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use an edge to connect two items i and j if the similarity sij between them is above
a predefined threshold σth and one of them is among the top K most similar items
of the other. Here, we compute item similarities using the adjusted cosine similarity
measure [99] as follows
sij =
∑





where Uij = Ui ∩ Uj.
We define a local evidence function φi(rzi) to capture the dependency between rzi
and its local evidence yzi. φi(rzi) is a probability distribution over possible ratings in
Υ. There are many potential choices of designing φi(rzi). In this work, we distribute
the probability on the integer ratings in Υ close to yzi:
• If 1 ≤ yzi ≤ 5, byzicφi(rzi = byzic) + dyzieφi(rzi = dyzie) = yzi;
• If yzi < 1, φi(rzi = 1) = 1;
• If yzi > 5, φi(rzi = 5) = 1.
The local evidence function represents how one item should be rated according to the
local evidence in (18). We also define a compatibility function between two connected
item variable nodes i and j as
ψij(rzi, rzj) ∝ exp
{
−σ−2ij (rzi − rzj)2
}
(20)
where σij is adjusted according to similarity between items i and j. The compatibility
function penalizes the configuration of ratings on the pair of connect items if they
deviate from each other. The overall joint distribution of unknown item ratings
{rzi|i ∈ I\Iz} represented by the PMRF is













To efficiently infer the marginal distribution P (rzi|R), ∀i ∈ I\Iz, from P ({rzi, i ∈
I\Iz}|R), we employ the loopy BP message-passing algorithm where probabilistic
messages are iteratively exchanged between item nodes on PMRF. In the n-th itera-
tion, the message m
(n)












where Ni denotes the set of neighbor item nodes connected to node i. The message in
(22) represents how one item should be rated according to the items it is connected
to in PMRF. The m-messages are iteratively exchanged between item nodes. During
each iteration, the outgoing messages at each item node are updated using incoming
messages from the last iteration. Finally, every item i calculates its predicted rating
value as the expectation of the marginal probability distribution. We summarize the
BP algorithm for rating predictions in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Belief Propagation Algorithm over PMRF
• Initialization. Initialize mi,j(rzj) as m(0)i,j (rzj) = 1|Υ| , and set iteration counter
n = 1.
• Iterative message-passing until convergence.
– (1) Update m
(n)
i,j (rzj) at all item nodes using (22);
– (2) n = n+ 1. Repeat (1) until convergence.
• Compute marginal item rating probability:








rP (rzi = r).
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We further note that the beliefs are exact if the PMRF has no loops. However,
the graphical model for recommender systems has cycles. Due to the statistical
dependencies between the messages in this loopy case, the marginal probabilities of
the variables in Rz are approximations rather than exact values. However, it is shown
that BP often works well even in the loopy graphs [122].
For each active user, the complexity for computing user similarities between other
users and the active user on a factor graph is linear in the number of total users [127].
Then to predict all item ratings on a PMRF using BP, the complexity in terms of
multiplications is O (|Υ|NK2), where K is the item neighborhood size on PMRF,
which is a fixed parameter independent of M and N . Thus, the complexity is linear
in the total number of items, N . Further, the proposed algorithm converges quickly,
on the average in 10 iterations.
2.3 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms using the 100K MovieLens
dataset1. The dataset contains 100, 000 ratings, all integers from 1 to 5, on 1682 items
(movies) by 943 users, and each user has rated at least 20 items. We randomly divide
the users into two disjoint sets, 80% for training and 20% for testing. Specifically, for
each user in the test set, we only keep a subset of its ratings as known (15 ratings in
our setup), and use the rest of its ratings as test ratings.
2.3.1 Comparison of Neighborhood Methods
We compare the prediction performance of the user-based neighborhood method when
the user similarities are computed using our proposed algorithm in Sec. 2.1 and the
PCC algorithm [99], in terms of both Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean
1Available at: http://www.grouplens.org/node/73.
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(a) MAE versus the effective neighborhood size.






















(b) RMSE versus the effective neighborhood size.
Fig. 3: Rating prediction performance comparison.
TABLE I: Proposed algorithm with varying group size D when
S = {1, 2}.
Group size
MAE RMSE
K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
D = 3 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
D = 4 0.7487 0.7358 0.9548 0.9362
D = 5 0.7522 0.7370 0.9587 0.9379





, and thus the complexity of both algorithms is linear
in the number of users.
We also investigate the impacts of different parameters
on the proposed algorithm. In Table I, we show the results
of the proposed algorithm for varying group size D, where
we set S = {1, 2}, and σ = 0.5. It can be seen that
D = 4 achieves the best performance. It is also interesting
to notice that the performances under different D’s are close,
meaning the algorithm is not sensitive to the choice of D.
Since a large D dose not necessarily improve the performance
and it exponentially increases computational complexity for
generating λ-messages as discussed in Sec. III-C, it is wise to
start from a small integer when searching for a good D for
the algorithm.
In Table II, we show the results for different S, where
D = 3 and σ = 0.5. We denote SL = {s : 1 ≤ s ≤ L},
where s only takes integer values and thus |SL| = L. It can be
observed that the performances of the proposed algorithm for
different S’s are quite close, and S5 actually has slightly better
TABLE II: Proposed algorithm with varying S when D = 3.
S MAE RMSE
K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
S2 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
S5 0.7524 0.7375 0.9584 0.9381
S10 0.7532 0.7379 0.9590 0.9386
performance than S10. This is because a large alphabet set S
can causes overfitting, that is the computed user similarity is
biased towards the training ratings and dose not generalize well
on the test ratings.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a BP-based similarity computa-
tion algorithm for the neighborhood method in recommender
systems. In order to take advantage of BP to efficiently
compute the marginal distributions of similarity variables from
their joint posterior distribution, we introduced a proper factor-
ization of the joint distribution function, which was expressed
by an appropriate chosen factor graph. Since the resulting fac-
tor graph has loops, the “loopy” BP algorithm using iterative
message passing was applied. We also proposed a complexity-
reduction technique to contain the exponential increase in
computational complexity due to the high degree at the factor
node. The experimental results on 100K MovieLens dataset
showed that the proposed similarity computation algorithm
for the user-based neighborhood method achieves improved
accuracy over the popular PCC algorithm in terms of both
MAE and RMSE. Meanwhile, the computational complexity of
the BP-based algorithm is comparable to that of PCC, growing
linear in the number of users.
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(b) RMSE versus the effective neighborhood size.
Fig. 3: Rating prediction performance comparison.
TABLE I: Proposed algorithm with varying group size D when
S = {1, 2}.
Group size
MAE RMSE
K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
D = 3 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
D = 4 0.7487 0.7358 0.9548 0.9362
D = 5 0.7522 0.7370 0.9587 0.9379





, and thus the complexity of both algorithms is linear
in the number of users.
We also investigate the impacts of different parameters
on the proposed algorithm. In Table I, we show the results
of the proposed algorithm for varying group size D, where
we set S = {1, 2}, and σ = 0.5. It can be seen that
D = 4 achieves the best performance. It is also interesting
to notice that the performances under different D’s are close,
meaning the algorithm is not sensitive to the choice of D.
Since a large D dose not necessarily improve the performance
and it exponentially increases computational complexity for
generating λ-messages as discussed in Sec. III-C, it is wise to
start from a small integer when searching for a good D for
the algorithm.
In Table II, we show the results for different S, where
D = 3 and σ = 0.5. We denote SL = {s : 1 ≤ s ≤ L},
where s only takes integer values and thus |SL| = L. It can be
observed that the performances of the proposed algorithm for
different S’s are quite close, and S5 actually has slightly better
TABLE II: Proposed algorithm with varying S when D = 3.
S MAE RMSE
K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
2 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
S5 0.7524 0.7375 0.9584 0.9381
S10 0.7532 0.7379 0.9590 0.9386
performance than S10. This is because a large alphabet set S
can causes overfitting, that is the computed user similarity is
biased towards the training ratings and dose not generalize well
on the test ratings.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a BP-based similarity computa-
tion algorithm for the neighborhood method in recommender
systems. In order to take advantage of BP to efficiently
compute the marginal distributions of similarity variables from
their joint posterior distribution, we introduced a proper factor-
ization of the joint distribution function, which was expressed
by an appropriate chosen factor graph. Since the resulting fac-
tor graph has loops, the “loopy” BP algorithm using iterative
message passing was applied. We also proposed a complexity-
reduction technique to contain the exponential increase in
computational complexity due to the high degree at the factor
node. The experimental results on 100K MovieLens dataset
showed that the proposed similarity computation algorithm
for the user-based neighborhood method achieves improved
accuracy over the popular PCC algorithm in terms of both
MAE and RMSE. Meanwhile, the computational complexity of
the BP-based algorithm is comparable to that of PCC, growing
linear in the number of users.
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(b) RMSE versus the effective neighborhood size.
Figure 7: Rating prediction performance comparison of neighborhood methods.













where T is the set of all test ratings for users in the test dataset, rui is the actual
value of the rating provided by user u on the item i in the test dataset, and r̂ui is
the predicted rating value. Smaller RMSE and MAE errors mean better prediction
accuracy. Note that the RMSE metric is more sensitive to large errors than MAE.
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K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
D = 3 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
D = 4 0.7487 0.7358 0.9548 0.9362
D = 5 0.7522 0.7370 0.9587 0.9379
The results for the proposed algorithm and the PCC algorithm are presented in
Fig. 7, where for the proposed algorithm, the similarity values of suv are taken from
S = {1, 2}, σ in (8) is set as σ = 0.5, and the group size D (i.e., the maximum allowed
degree of factor node) is set as D = 4. We also show the results of the MovieAvg
algorithm, which simply predicts ratings as the average of past ratings of each item.
It can be observed from Fig. 7 that our proposed algorithm outperforms PCC in both
MAE and RMSE under different neighborhood sizes. When the neighborhood size
increases from 10 to 30 the performances of both algorithms improve, but the gain
from increasing neighborhood size quickly diminishes and finally the performance even
starts to degrade when reaching 50. This is because as neighborhood size increases,
ratings from users with smaller similarity to the active user are also included to predict
the rating, which corrupts the prediction from other users with higher similarity.
We also investigate the impacts of different parameters on the proposed algorithm.
In Table 1, we show the results of the proposed algorithm for varying group size D,
where we set S = {1, 2}, and σ = 0.5. It can be seen that D = 4 achieves the best
performance. It is also interesting to notice that the performances under different
D’s are close, meaning the algorithm is not sensitive to the choice of D. Since a
large D dose not necessarily improve the performance and it exponentially increases
computational complexity for generating λ-messages as discussed in Sec. 2.1.4, we
should start from a small integer when searching for a good D for the algorithm.
In Table 2, we show the results for different S, where D = 3 and σ = 0.5. We
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Table 2: Performance of proposed algorithm with varying S when D = 3.
S MAE RMSE
K = 10 K = 30 K = 10 K = 30
S2 0.7533 0.7373 0.9593 0.9380
S5 0.7524 0.7375 0.9584 0.9381
S10 0.7532 0.7379 0.9590 0.9386
Table 3: MAE performance comparison of PMRF and other PCC-based algorithms.





denote SL = {s : 1 ≤ s ≤ L}, where s only takes integer values and thus |SL| = L. It
can be observed that the performances of the proposed algorithm for different S’s are
quite close, and S5 actually has slightly better performance than S10. This is because
a large alphabet set S can causes overfitting, that is the computed user similarity is
biased towards the training ratings and dose not generalize well on the test ratings.
2.3.2 Performance of PMRF Recommender System
We evaluate the prediction performance of the PMRF-based recommender system.
We set the parameters as sth = 0.35, and adjust the compatibility between two







. The maximum number of similar items
each item connected to is set as K = 5. The local evidence is computed according to
(18), where the user similarities are computed on a factor graph as in Sec. 2.1 with
S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = 4 and σ = 0.5.
We compare the proposed PMRF-based algorithm with other neighborhood al-
gorithms using PCC [99] including the user-based PCC (User-PCC), the item-based
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PCC (Item-PCC), and the ensemble of user-based PCC and item-based PCC algo-
rithms (Ensemble-PCC) [67]. The MAE results are presented in Tab. 3, where KNE
denotes the neighborhood size. In the user-based method, KNE refers to the effective
number of similar users used, whereas in the item-based method, KNE refers to the
effective number of similar items used. In Ensemble-PCC, both the user-based and
the item-based algorithms use the same KNE, and their prediction outputs are com-
bined. In PMRF, KNE is the number of similar users used to compute local evidence
in (18). The results show that the proposed PMRF algorithm outperforms other
PCC-based neighborhood algorithms.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed probabilistic graphical models for collaborative filtering
recommender systems. Firstly, we proposed to compute user similarity on factors
graphs for the neighborhood CF method. We introduced a proper factorization of
the joint distribution function of similarity variables, which was expressed by an ap-
propriate chosen factor graph, and take advantage of BP to efficiently compute the
marginal distributions from their joint distribution. Since the resulting factor graph
has loops, the “loopy” BP algorithm using iterative message passing was applied.
We also proposed a complexity-reduction technique to contain the exponential in-
crease in computational complexity due to the high degree at the factor node. The
experimental results on 100K MovieLens dataset showed that the proposed similarity
computation algorithm for the user-based neighborhood method achieves improved
accuracy over the popular PCC algorithm in terms of both MAE and RMSE. Mean-
while, the computational complexity of the BP-based algorithm is comparable to that
of PCC, growing linear in the number of users.
Secondly, we solved the recommender system problem on a Pairwise Markov Ran-
dom Field (PMRF) incorporating both user similarity and item similarity. The BP
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algorithm was utilized to efficiently estimate the marginal probability distributions of
the item ratings via iterative message-passing between item nodes. The experimen-
tal results show that the proposed PMRF algorithm outperforms other PCC-based
neighborhood algorithms. The complexity of the proposed algorithm remains linear
per active user, making it very attractive for large-scale systems.
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CHAPTER III
RECOMMENDATION VIA IMPLICIT PREFERENCE
PROPAGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction and Related Works
In Collaborative Filtering based recommender systems, the active user will be recom-
mended items favorably rated by other users with similar tastes to the active user.
The user similarity can be estimated based on user profiles including detailed personal
information, but due to privacy concerns they are very difficult to obtain. Hence, most
collaborative recommender systems evaluate user similarity based on users’ historic
rating data. This causes the cold-start problem for new users or users who do not
provide enough ratings, i.e., the recommender systems cannot find similar users for
them.
Recently, with the thriving of online social networks (OSN), the social collabora-
tive recommendation has attracted significant attention. In social networks, people
are more likely to connect to other people sharing similar interests, and they are influ-
enced more by people they connect to, further fostering similarity to each other [113].
Hence, by exploiting the social structure of social networks, social recommender sys-
tems can make satisfactory recommendations even for cold-start users when provided
with their social connections. Moreover, social recommendation can also be con-
veniently incorporated with traditional collaborative filtering algorithms, improving
their recommendation performance, especially for cold-start users. In [69, 68, 50, 120],
social network was incorporated into matrix factorization methods, where the user
latent factors are learnt with social relations taken into account. All of them require
users’ explicit rating data.
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Today, people are increasingly concerned with their online privacy, adding new
challenges to the recommendation problem. Although rating data do not directly
tell personal details, it is still possible to infer user demographics, such as age and
gender, from their ratings [114], and even uncover user identities and reveal sensitive
personal information with access to other databases [81]. Therefore, users are not
willing to make their personal data accessible to the general public. Hence, when
designing collaborative recommendation systems, we need to take into account user
privacy. Several works proposed to obfuscate user ratings with random noise, e.g.,
perturbation [91] and differential privacy [72], or to disguise genuine user profiles
by adding extra fake data [104, 114]. However, such obfuscation techniques do not
completely prevent rating data leakage. Alternatively, recommender systems can
utilize only implicit data, e.g., whether a user has consumed an item or not, avoiding
exposing explicit user rating data.
In this chapter, we propose a social recommendation algorithm that exploits the
social network to generate recommendations using implicit user data [132]. We de-
velop a probabilistic Bayesian Network (BN) model for item consumption in the social
network, and infer the probability for each item to be selected by the active user given
the observed implicit user data. Then, the top-N items with the highest probabilities
are listed in the recommendation. Specifically, we propose an Expectation Propaga-
tion (EP) message-passing algorithm for approximate inference in the BN, based on
which we further develop an iterative EP algorithm that performs EP message-passing
for all users in a unified bipartite graph representation. We note that the original
algorithm is a central scheme, in which the user data are collected and processed by
a central authority. However, the algorithm can be easily adapted for distributed
implementation, where users only exchange messages with friends they are directly
connected to in social networks. This helps further protect user privacy, since users
only share data with their immediate friends.
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Previously, [49, 120] proposed social recommendation algorithms that can be com-
bined with traditional neighborhood methods. In [49] the authors proposed a random
walk approach TrustWalker, where the recommendation algorithm carries out random
walk over the social network to collect ratings from other users, and computes the
average ratings to generate recommendations for the active user. Obviously, user
ratings are revealed to all users connected to the social network. [120] proposed a
voting-based algorithm PureTrust, using only implicit user data. The algorithm col-
lects votes from users found via Breadth First Search (BFS) in the social network. In
contrast to [120], in our work we avoid direct information exchange between indirectly
connected friends. Further, if a user has not consumed an item, instead of simply
collecting a ‘0’ vote for that item, our work assigns a random binary variable to model
the willingness of the user to select that item, whose probability distribution depends
on his directly connected friends.
The Bayesian networks were applied to recommender systems in [19, 119]. In [19],
a Bayesian network is employed to model probabilistic item-based rating prediction,
where each node corresponds to an item and its parent nodes correspond to similar
items. In [119], the Bayesian network is also used to predict user ratings, but each
node corresponds to an user in the social network. Different from these approaches,
our work is interested in inferring the probabilities for items to be selected by users
using only implicit data.
3.2 Top-N Recommendation Using Social Networks
3.2.1 Problem Description
We assume a set of M users denoted by U = {1, . . . ,M} and a set of L items denoted
by I = {1, . . . , L} in the social recommender system. Let Ui denote the set of users
who have consumed item i, and Iu denote the set of items consumed by user u. Note
that user u may also provide explicit feedback on item i ∈ Iu in the form of rating
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rui, but users keep such explicit data private. We arrange the collection of observed
implicit data in a M × N matrix S, where for each user u we place a ‘1’ at the
intersection of the u-th row and i-th column if i ∈ Iu and leave the rest of the entries
unfilled. Further, we assume that there is a social network established among users,
where each user u is directly connected to a set of friends denoted by Tu. Let wuv
denote the trust value user u assigns to user v ∈ Tu, where larger trust value means
higher degree of trust. wuv can be some continuous value, e.g., wuv ∈ [0, 1], or can
be binary value, where ‘1’ indicates the existence of trust relations and ‘0’ indicates
unknown or no trust relations. Note that the trust relations are generally directed and
asymmetric. We can represent the social network in a directed graph G(V , E), where
V is the set of vertices representing users in U, and E is the set of edges representing
social relations between users. In Fig. 8 we illustrate the graphical representation of
a social network, where the weight on the edge is the trust value.
Given an active user z, the top-N recommendation task is to generate a list of N
items from I\Iz for user z. In this work, we focus on exploiting the social relations
for collaborative recommendation. We construct probabilistic Bayesian networks to
model the item consumption in the social network, and infer the probabilities for
items to be selected by the active user given the observed data in S. Then the top-N
items with the highest probabilities are recommended to the active user.
3.2.2 Social Network-Based Bayesian Network
We define a binary variable sui to represent whether or not item i is selected by user u,
sui = 1 if selected and sui = 0 otherwise. Hence, sui = 1 for item i ∈ Iu. However, for
other items i ∈ I\Iu, instead of simply setting sui = 0, we consider them as unknown,
since our goal is to recommend items from I\Iu to user u. We are interested in
inferring the probability distribution of sui, denoted by BEL(sui), ∀i ∈ I\Iu, given
the observed data in S. We make such inference following the fact that a user is most
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friends they are directly connected to in social networks. This
helps further protect user privacy, since users only share data
with their immediate friends. Previously, in [13] we developed
probabilistic factor graph models for similarity computation
in collaborative filtering recommender systems, and employed
Belief Propagation (BP) to perform inference efficiently. In
[14], we proposed privacy-preserving item-based collaborative
filtering, where users send out probabilistic messages on item
similarities without revealing personal rating data.
II. RELATED WORKS
Social networks have been exploited to enhance traditional
collaborative filtering recommender systems. In [3]–[6], the
social network was incorporated into matrix factorization
methods, where the user latent factors are learnt with social
relations taken into account. All of them require users’ ex-
plicit rating data. Besides, performing matrix factorization is
computationally intensive, which is not suitable for frequent
updates of the recommender system with new rating records.
[6], [7] proposed social recommendation algorithms that
can be combined with traditional neighborhood methods. In
[7] the authors proposed a random walk approach TrustWalker,
where the recommendation algorithm carries out random walk
over the social network to collect ratings from other users,
and computes the average ratings to generate recommendations
for the active user. Obviously, user ratings are revealed to all
users connected to the social network. [6] proposed a voting-
based algorithm PureTrust, using only implicit user data. The
algorithm collects votes from users found via Breadth First
Search (BFS) in the social network. In contrast to [6], in our
work we avoid direct information exchange between indirectly
connected friends. Further, if a user has not consumed an item,
instead of simply collecting a ‘0’ vote for that item, our work
assigns a random binary variable to model the willingness
of the user to select that item, whose probability distribution
depends on his directly connected friends.
The Bayesian networks were applied to recommender
systems in [15], [16]. In [15], a Bayesian network is employed
to model probabilistic item-based rating prediction, where each
node corresponds to an item and its parent nodes correspond
to similar items. In [16], the Bayesian network is also used
to predict user ratings, but each node corresponds to an user
in the social network. Different from these approaches, our
work is interested in inferring the probabilities for items to be
selected by users using only implicit data.
III. TOP-N RECOMMENDATION USING SOCIAL
NETWORKS
A. Problem Description
We assume a set of M users denoted by U = {1, . . . ,M}
and a set of L items denoted by I = {1, . . . , L} in the social
recommender system. Let Ui denote the set of users who have
consumed item i, and Iu denote the set of items consumed by
user u. Note that user u may also provide explicit feedback
on item i ∈ Iu in the form of rating rui, but users keep such
explicit data private. We arrange the collection of observed
implicit data in a M × N matrix S, where for each user u
we place a ‘1’ at the intersection of the u-th row and i-th











Fig. 1: Graphical representation of the social network.
Further, we assume that there is a social network established
among users, where each user u is directly connected to a
set of friends denoted by Tu. Let wuv denote the trust value
user u assigns to user v ∈ Tu, where larger trust value means
higher degree of trust. wuv can be some continuous value,
e.g., wuv ∈ [0, 1], or can be binary value, where ‘1’ indicates
the existence of trust relations and ‘0’ indicates unknown or
no trust relations. Note that the trust relations are generally
directed and asymmetric. We can represent the social network
in a directed graph G(V , E), where V is the set of vertices
representing users in U, and E is the set of edges representing
social relations between users. In Fig. 1 we illustrate the
graphical representation of a social network, where the weight
on the edge is the trust value.
Given an active user z, the top-N recommendation task is
to generate a list of N items from I\Iz for user z. In this
work, we focus on exploiting the social relations for collab-
orative recommendation. We construct probabilistic Bayesian
networks to model the item consumption in the social network,
and infer the probabilities for items to be selected by the active
user given the observed data in S. Then the top-N items with
the highest probabilities are recommended to the active user.
B. Social Network-Based Bayesian Network
We define a binary variable sui to represent whether or not
item i is selected by user u, sui = 1 if selected and sui = 0
otherwise. Hence, sui = 1 for item i ∈ Iu. However, for other
items i ∈ I\Iu, instead of simply setting sui = 0, we consider
them as unknown, since our goal is to recommend items from
I\Iu to user u. We are interested in inferring the probability
distribution of sui, denoted by BEL(sui), ∀i ∈ I\Iu, given
the observed data in S. We make such inference following the
fact that a user is most influenced by the friends he directly
connect to in the social network.
We denote by N (u,K) a subset of K users with the highest
trust values from user u’s friend set Tu. To determine N (u,K)
in scenarios where users do not explicitly specify trust values,
e.g., assuming one for all trusted users, we first compute wuv ,
∀v ∈ Tu, as
wuv = 1 +
|Iu ∩ Iv|
|Iu ∩ Iv|+ c
, (1)
where c > 0 is a constant. If user u has selected many items
in common with user v in the past, user u is supposed to have
high trust on user v. Given an active user z, to infer BEL(szi)
for item i, we construct a Bayesian network Gzi as illustrated
in Fig. 2. The root node at Layer 0 represents variable szi.
Its parent nodes at Layer 1 are denoted by Pzi = {svi : v ∈
N (z,K)}, which correspond to the friends of user z. Similarly,
Figure 8: Graphical representation of the social network.
influenced by the friends he directly connect to in the social network.
We denote by N (u,K) a subset of K users with the highest trust values from user
u’s friend set Tu. To determine N (u,K) in scenarios where users do not explicitly
specify trust values, e.g., assuming one for all trusted users, we first compute wuv,
∀v ∈ Tu, as
wuv = 1 +
|Iu ∩ Iv|
|Iu ∩ Iv|+ c
, (23)
where c > 0 is a constant. If user u has selected many items in common with user
v in the past, use u is supposed to have high trust on user v. Given an active user
z, to infer BEL(szi) for item i, we construct a Bayesian network Gzi as illustrated in
Fig. 9. The root node at Layer 0 represents variable szi. Its parent nodes at Layer
1 are denoted by Pzi = {svi : v ∈ N (z,K)}, which correspond to the friends of user
z. Similarly, for each node svi at Layer 1, we pla e its parent nodes at L yer 2. We
repeat this process until Layer D. According to the conditional independence in the
Bayesian network, each node sui is conditionally independent of other non-descendant
nodes, given the configuration of its parent nodes Pui. We describe the conditional
probability P (sui|Pui) as












Fig. 2: Bayesian network Gzi for active user z.
for each node svi at Layer 1, we place its parent nodes at
Layer 2. We repeat this process until Layer D. According to
the conditional independence in the Bayesian network, each
node sui is conditionally independent of other non-descendant
nodes, given the configuration of its parent nodes Pui. We
describe the conditional probability P (sui|Pui) as





where P (sui = 0|Pui) = 1− P (sui = 1|Pui).
C. Inference and Expectation Propagation
Before introducing the inference process, we specify the
observed and hidden variables in Gzi. Let Vi = {svi : v ∈ Ui}
be the set of observed variables for users who have consumed
item i. Then s = 1, ∀s ∈ Vi. Further, we assume the set
Lzi(D) of variables at Layer D are also observed. Specifically,
we set s = 0 for s ∈ Lzi(D) ∩ V̄i, where V̄i = {svi : v ∈
U\Ui}. We treat the rest of the variables in V̄i\Lzi(D) as
hidden variables whose values are unknown.
We employ the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm [17] to
perform inference. However, exact inference can be intractable
due to loops in the Bayesian network Gzi. We instead resort
to approximate inference by assuming a tree structure for Gzi.
Then inferring BEL(szi) is completed by passing probabilistic
messages along the edges from the variable nodes at Layer d to
the ones at Layer d − 1, starting from Layer D. Specifically,
we compute the message πa(sbi) sent to node sai at Layer








where α is a normalization factor such that
∑
s∈{0,1} πa(sbi =
s) = 1. Note that if sbi is observed as sbi = ŝbi, ŝbi ∈ {0, 1},
then πa(sbi = ŝbi) = 1 and πa(sbi) will not be updated.
πa(sbi) expresses the probability distribution of sbi, given the
new evidence acquired by sbi from incoming messages. Each
node sui in Gzi generates messages sent to its children nodes
once all messages from Pui have arrived at sui.





grows exponential with K . However, (3) can be simplified as
Si(Ū):
Si(U):
Fig. 3: Iterative EP in a unified bipartite graph Gi.
following. Substituting (2) into (3), we have












where we define ŵbq , wbq∑
y∈N(b,K) wby
, and denote E(·)
as expectation operation. Note that Eπb(sqi) is carried out
with respect to the distribution πb(sqi). By using (4), the
computational complexity of generating a single message is
reduced to O(K). Moreover, since Eπa(sbi) = πa(sbi = 1),





We hereafter refer to message passing using (5) as Expectation
Propagation (EP). Finally, when all messages from nodes Pzi
have arrived at szi, we compute BEL(szi) as




We would like to clarify that, the propagation of messages
between nodes is performed in a central server that collects
and processes user data. Hence, there is no actual exchanges
of messages between users in real world. However, the algo-
rithm can be readily adapted for distributed implementation as
explained in Sec. III-E.
D. Iterative Expectation Propagation
In Secs. III-B and III-C, we have shown that to infer
BEL(szi) for an active user z, we need to construct a Bayesian
network Gzi consisting of D layers of variable nodes. However,
the intermediate results during the inference process in Gzi
are not fully utilized. Indeed, there are significant amounts of
repeated computations when performing inference for different
users. In the following, we propose an iterative EP algorithm to
simultaneously compute {BEL(sui) : u ∈ U} of all users for
each item i in a single unified bipartite graph Gi that concisely
encodes all social connections.
We create a set of virtual users, denoted by Ū =
{1̄, . . . , M̄}, where each virtual user ū ∈ Ū is an image of
a unique user u ∈ U. We also assign a variable sūi for each
user ū. We represent the variables in Si(U) = {sui : u ∈ U}
and Si(Ū) = {sūi : ū ∈ Ū} as two rows of nodes as illustrated
in Fig. 3. Let N̄ (u,K) denote the set of images of users in
N (u,K). For each variable node sui ∈ Si(U), we connect to
it the image nodes P̄ui = {sv̄i : v̄ ∈ N̄ (u,K)} rather than its
Figure 9: Bayesian network Gzi for active user z.
3.2.3 Inference and Expectation Propagation
3.2.3.1 Inference
Before introducing the inference process, we specify the observed and hidden variables
in Gzi. Let Vi = {svi : v ∈ Ui} be the set ob erved variabl for users who have
consumed item i. Then s = 1, ∀s ∈ Vi. Further, we assume the set Lzi(D) of variables
at Layer D are also observed. Specifically, we set s = 0 for s ∈ Lzi(D) ∩ V̄i, wh re
V̄i = {svi : v ∈ U\Ui}. We treat the rest of the variables in V̄i\Lzi(D) as hidden
variables whose values are unknown.
We employ the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm [87] to perform inference. How-
ever, exact inference can be intractable due to loops in the Bayesian network Gzi. We
instead resort to approximate inference by assuming a tree structure for Gzi. Then
inferring BEL(szi) is c mplet by passing probabilistic messages along the edges
from the variable nodes at Layer d to the ones at Layer d − 1, starting from Layer
D. Specifically, we compute the message πa(sbi) sent to node sai at Layer d− 1 from








where α is a normalization factor such that
∑
s∈{0,1} πa(sbi = s) = 1. Note that if sbi
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is observed as sbi = ŝbi, ŝbi ∈ {0, 1}, then πa(sbi = ŝbi) = 1 and πa(sbi) will not be
updated. πa(sbi) expresses the probability distribution of sbi, given the new evidence
acquired by sbi from incoming messages. Each node sui in Gzi generates messages sent
to its children nodes once all messages from Pui have arrived at sui.




, which grows exponential with
K. However, (25) can be simplified as following. Substituting (24) into (25), we have












where we define ŵbq , wbq∑
y∈N (b,K) wby
, and denote E(·) as expectation operation. Note
that Eπb(sqi) is carried out with respect to the distribution πb(sqi). By using (26),
the computational complexity of generating a single message is reduced to O(K).





We hereafter refer to message passing using (27) as Expectation Propagation (EP).
Finally, when all messages from nodes Pzi have arrived at szi, we compute BEL(szi)
as




We would like to clarify that, the propagation of messages between nodes is per-
formed in a central server that collects and processes user data. Hence, there is no
actual exchanges of messages between users in real world. However, the algorithm
can be readily adapted for distributed implementation as explained in Sec. 3.2.3.3.
3.2.3.2 Iterative Expectation Propagation
In Secs. 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.1, we have shown that to infer BEL(szi) for an active user







Fig. 2: Bayesian network Gzi for active user z.
for each node svi at Layer 1, we place its parent nodes at
Layer 2. We repeat this process until Layer D. According to
the conditional independence in the Bayesian network, each
node sui is conditionally independent of other non-descendant
nodes, given the configuration of its parent nodes Pui. We
describe the conditional probability P (sui|Pui) as





where P (sui = 0|Pui) = 1− P (sui = 1|Pui).
C. Inference and Expectation Propagation
Before introducing the inference process, we specify the
observed and hidden variables in Gzi. Let Vi = {svi : v ∈ Ui}
be the set of observed variables for users who have consumed
item i. Then s = 1, ∀s ∈ Vi. Further, we assume the set
Lzi(D) of variables at Layer D are also observed. Specifically,
we set s = 0 for s ∈ Lzi(D) ∩ V̄i, where V̄i = {svi : v ∈
U\Ui}. We treat the rest of the variables in V̄i\Lzi(D) as
hidden variables whose values are unknown.
We employ the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm [17] to
perform inference. However, exact inference can be intractable
due to loops in the Bayesian network Gzi. We instead resort
to approximate inference by assuming a tree structure for Gzi.
Then inferring BEL(szi) is completed by passing probabilistic
messages along the edges from the variable nodes at Layer d to
the ones at Layer d − 1, starting from Layer D. Specifically,
we compute the message πa(sbi) sent to node sai at Layer








where α is a normalization factor such that
∑
s∈{0,1} πa(sbi =
s) = 1. Note that if sbi is observed as sbi = ŝbi, ŝbi ∈ {0, 1},
then πa(sbi = ŝbi) = 1 and πa(sbi) will not be updated.
πa(sbi) expresses the probability distribution of sbi, given the
new evidence acquired by sbi from incoming messages. Each
node sui in Gzi generates messages sent to its children nodes
once all messages from Pui have arrived at sui.





grows exponential with K . However, (3) can be simplified as
Si(Ū):
Si(U):
Fig. 3: Iterative EP in a unified bipartite graph Gi.
following. Substituting (2) into (3), we have












where we define ŵbq , wbq∑
y∈N(b,K) wby
, and denote E(·)
as expectation operation. Note that Eπb(sqi) is carried out
with respect to the distribution πb(sqi). By using (4), the
computational complexity of generating a single message is
reduced to O(K). Moreover, since Eπa(sbi) = πa(sbi = 1),





We hereafter refer to message passing using (5) as Expectation
Propagation (EP). Finally, when all messages from nodes Pzi
have arrived at szi, we compute BEL(szi) as




We would like to clarify that, the propagation of messages
between nodes is performed in a central server that collects
and processes user data. Hence, there is no actual exchanges
of messages between users in real world. However, the algo-
rithm can be readily adapted for distributed implementation as
explained in Sec. III-E.
D. Iterative Expectation Propagation
In Secs. III-B and III-C, we have shown that to infer
BEL(szi) for an active user z, we need to construct a Bayesian
network Gzi consisting of D layers of variable nodes. However,
the intermediate results during the inference process in Gzi
are not fully utilized. Indeed, there are significant amounts of
repeated computations when performing inference for different
users. In the following, we propose an iterative EP algorithm to
simultaneously compute {BEL(sui) : u ∈ U} of all users for
each item i in a single unified bipartite graph Gi that concisely
encodes all social connections.
We create a set of virtual users, denoted by Ū =
{1̄, . . . , M̄}, where each virtual user ū ∈ Ū is an image of
a unique user u ∈ U. We also assign a variable sūi for each
user ū. We represent the variables in Si(U) = {sui : u ∈ U}
and Si(Ū) = {sūi : ū ∈ Ū} as two rows of nodes as illustrated
in Fig. 3. Let N̄ (u,K) denote the set of images of users in
N (u,K). For each variable node sui ∈ Si(U), we connect to
it the image nodes P̄ui = {sv̄i : v̄ ∈ N̄ (u,K)} rather than its
Figure 10: Iterative EP in a unified bipartite graph Gi.
nodes. However, the intermediate results during the inference process in Gzi are not
fully utilized. Indeed, there are significant amounts of repeated computations when
performing inference for different users. In the follow ng, we propose an iterative EP
algorithm to simultaneously compute {BEL(sui) : u ∈ U} of all users for each item i
in a single unified bipartite graph Gi that concisely encodes all social connections.
We create a set of virtual users, denoted by Ū = {1̄, . . . , M̄}, where each virtual
user ū ∈ Ū is an image of a unique user u ∈ U. We also assign a variable sūi for each
user ū. We represent the variables in Si(U) = {sui : u ∈ U} and Si(Ū) = {sūi : ū ∈ Ū}
as two rows of nodes as illustrated in Fig. 10. Let N̄ (u,K) denote the set of images of
users inN (u,K). For each variable node sui ∈ Si(U), we connect to it the image nodes
P̄ui = {sv̄i : v̄ ∈ N̄ (u,K)} rather than its true parent nodes Pui. Similarly, we connect
each sūi ∈ Si(Ū) to Pui instead of P̄ui. Then all layers of all concerned Bayesian
networks are included in this unified representation Gi. To see this, we can consider
Si(Ū) and Si(U) respectively as Layer d+1 and Layer d, when messages are sent from
Si(Ū) to Si(U) along the directed edges, and as Layer d−1 and Layer d, when messages
are sent to Si(Ū) from Si(U). Hence, the EP message-passing in any multi-layer
Bayesian network can be carried out in Gi by iteratively passing messages between
Si(Ū) and Si(U). Moreover, we can simultaneously infer all {BEL(sui) : u ∈ U} in
Gi, reusing i termediate results and thus redu ing overall comput iona complexity.
Following (27), the messages exchanged between variable nodes Si(Ū) and Si(U)
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ŵv̄qEπv̄(sqi), ∀sv̄i ∈ Si(Ū). (30)
Note that passing messages using (29) and (30) for a total of D times is equivalent
to performing inference in D-Layer Bayesian networks shown in Fig. 9. We initialize
the messages as in Sec. 3.2.3. Assuming it starts from (29), we set Eπu(sv̄i) = 1 if
v ∈ Ui, and Eπu(sv̄i) = 0 otherwise. In addition, during iterations, we always set both
Eπu(sv̄i) and Eπū(svi) to one for v ∈ Ui.
The resulting iterative EP inference algorithm is executed for every item in I
in order to generate top-N recommendations. After obtaining {BEL(sui) : u ∈ U},
∀i ∈ I, for each user u, we rank the items in I\Iu in descending order of BEL(sui = 1),
and recommend the top-N items to user u. We observe that both steps (29) and (30)
have the computational complexity ofO(K). Then, the overall complexity of inferring
{BEL(sui) : u ∈ U}, ∀i ∈ I, is O(DLMK), when using the proposed iterative EP
algorithm to perform inference for all users simultaneously in the unified bipartite
graph with D steps of message passing for each item.
3.2.3.3 Distributed Implementation
The proposed EP message-passing algorithm is very suitable for distributed imple-
mentation. To acquire recommendations from the social network, an active user z
sends request to his directly connected friends N (z,K) for their information about
items. In addition, user z also sends a decremental counter C with initial value D to
its friends. If a friend v ∈ N (z,K) has consumed item i, he will send the message
Eπz(svi) = 1 back to the requester user z. Otherwise, user v first decreases the counter
C by 1, and if C is still greater than 0, he sends a request to his directly connected
friends N (v,K) for information on item i, along with the counter C, otherwise he
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sends the message Eπz(svi) = 0 back to user z. In cases that user v does send re-
quest to his friends, each friend u in N (v,K) repeats the same procedure as user v
undergoes. Suppose user u sends request to his friends. Then he waits for response
messages from N (u,K). Upon receiving all needed messages, user u generates the
message Eπv(sui) according to (27), which is then sent back to user v. After the re-
quester user z receives all messages from N (z,K), he calculates BEL(sui) according
to (28).
In the distributed implementation of message-passing, the users only exchange
messages with their directly connected friends in the social network. There is no need
for users to reveal their data to the public. Also, each user mixes the messages received
from his friends to generate a new message. Hence, it is difficult for users to extract
the original data of friends of his friends from the received messages. Therefore, user
privacy is further protected.
3.3 Experimental Results
We evaluate the top-N recommendation performance of the proposed EP algorithm
using the Epinions1 dataset prepared by [70]. The dataset consists of 49,290 users
and 139,738 items. A total of 664,824 ratings are given by users on items, and each
rating is an integer between 1 and 5. The dataset also includes 487,181 directed trust
statements with trust value one. We randomly select 20% users for testing, and the
rest for training. As in [49, 120], we define cold start users as users who have less
than 5 ratings. Of the testing users, 41.5% are cold start users (52.8% in the overall
dataset). For each user u in the testing set T, we withhold an item, denoted by Wu,
which has the maximum rating among items rated by this user. The performance of







where Iu(N) is the set of top-N items recommended to user u, and HIT (·) = 1
if Wu ∈ Iu(N) and HIT (·) = 0 otherwise. Given N , higher recall means better
performance.
We compare the performance of the proposed EP algorithm, the random walk
based TrustWalker algorithm [49], and the voting-based PureTrust algorithm [120].
Note that due to the sparsity of the dataset, the recalls are quite low for all simulated
recommendation algorithms when the number of recommended items is too small. In
Fig. 11, we present the recall results for these algorithms for top-N recommendations
when tested on (a) cold start users, and (b) all users. We set the neighborhood size K
as 10 for both EP and PureTrust, and set D of EP as 4. We also set c = 5 in (23). The
TrustWalker does not have a neighborhood size specification as it performs random
walks over all possible users. The results indicate that the proposed EP outperforms
the PureTrust algorithm. The achieved improvement for cold start users is 19% and
21% for top-100 and top-500 recommendations, respectively. The TrustWalker has the
worst results as similarly observed in [120]. This is because many rating predictions
generated by TrustWalker will have equal values, and the top-N items are selected
without considering their popularity, which include many rarely rated items that
have received one or two 5-ratings. As for computational complexity, to generate
recommendations for all users, the proposed iterative EP requires O(DLMK) as
discussed in Sec. 3.2.3.2, comparable to O(LMK) of PureTrust.
We further investigate the impacts of parameters K and D on the performance.
To better illustrate the effects, we report results for top-500 recommendations, con-
sidering the sparsity of the dataset. In Fig. 12, we provide the top-500 recall results
on cold start users under varying neighborhood size K. The results of EP are shown
for both D = 3 and 4. It can be seen that EP achieves better results than PureTrust
for all K from 10 to 100. In Fig. 13, we investigate the impact of D. We show the
top-500 recall results on cold start users for D from 2 to 5, when K = 10 and 20.
40
























EP (D = 4)
(a) Cold start users





















EP (D = 4)
(b) All users
Fig. 4: Comparison of recall results of top-N recommendations.
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Fig. 5: Top-500 recall versus neighborhood size.
on cold start users under varying neighborhood size K . The
results of EP are shown for both D = 3 and 4. It can be
seen that EP achieves better results than PureTrust for all K
from 10 to 100. In Fig. 6, we investigate the impact of D.
We show the top-500 recall results on cold start users for
D from 2 to 5, when K = 10 and 20. We observe that
increasing D from 2 to 4 improves recall, but then as D
increases further, the performance starts to saturate or even
drop. This is because increasing D too high would allow the
propagation of information from users that are further away
from the active user in the trust network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a message-passing based social
recommendation algorithm that exploits the social relations
between users in the social network to generate top-N rec-
ommendations, using only implicit user preference data. We
model the probabilities for items to be selected by the active

















EP (K = 20)
EP (K = 10)
Fig. 6: Top-500 recall versus D.
user in Bayesian networks constructed based on the social
network, and develop the EP message-passing algorithm to
perform approximate inference efficiently. We also propose an
iterative EP algorithm to carry out EP message-passing for
all users simultaneously in a unified bipartite graph repre-
sentation. Moreover, the proposed message-passing algorithm
is suitable for distributed implementation, where users only
exchange messages with their directly connected friends. The
experimental results on the Epinions dataset show that the
proposed EP algorithm achieves better top-N recommendation
performance in terms of recall than both the random walk
based and voting based social recommendation algorithms,
while its computational complexity is comparable to theirs.
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on cold start users under varying neighborhood size K . The
results of EP are shown for both D = 3 and 4. It can be
seen that EP achieves better results than PureTrust for all K
from 10 to 100. In Fig. 6, we investigate the impact of D.
We show the top-500 recall results on cold start users for
D from 2 to 5, when K = 10 and 20. We observe that
increasing D from 2 to 4 improves recall, but then as D
increases further, the performance starts to saturate or even
drop. This is because increasing D too high would allow the
propagation of information from users that are further away
from the active user in the trust network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
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recommendation algorithm that exploits the social relations
between users in the social network to generate top-N rec-
ommendations, using only implicit user preference data. We
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network, and develop the EP message-passing algorithm to
perform approximate inference efficiently. We also propose an
iterative EP algorithm to carry out EP message-passing for
all users simultaneously in a unified bipartite graph repre-
sentation. Moreover, the proposed message-passing algorithm
is suitable for distributed implementation, where users only
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We observe that increasing D from 2 to 4 improves recall, but then as D increases
further, the performance starts to saturate or even drop. This is because increasing
D too high would allow the propagation of information from users that are further
away from the active user in the trust network.
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results of EP are shown for both D = 3 and 4. It can be
seen that EP achieves better results than PureTrust for all K
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We show the top-500 recall results on cold start users for
D from 2 to 5, when K = 10 and 20. We observe that
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drop. This is because increasing D too high would allow the
propagation of information from users that are further away
from the active user in the trust network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a message-passing based social
recommendation algorithm that exploits the social relations
between users in the social network to generate top-N rec-
ommendations, using only implicit user preference data. We
model the probabilities for items to be selected by the active

















EP (K = 20)
EP (K = 10)
Fig. 6: Top-500 recall versus D.
user in Bayesian networks constructed based on the social
network, and develop the EP message-passing algorithm to
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We show the top-500 recall results on cold start users for
D from 2 to 5, when K = 10 and 20. We observe that
increasing D from 2 to 4 improves recall, but then as D
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drop. This is because increasing D too high would allow the
propagation of information from users that are further away
from the active user in the trust network.
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model the probabilities for items to be selected by the active
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Fig. 6: Top-500 recall versus D.
user in Bayesian networks constructed based on the social
network, and develop the EP message-passing algorithm to
perform approximate inference efficiently. We also propose an
iterative EP algorithm to carry out EP message-passing for
all users simultaneously in a unified bipartite graph repre-
sentation. Moreover, the proposed message-passing algorithm
is suitable for distributed implementation, where users only
exchange messages with their directly connected friends. The
experimental results on the Epinions dataset show that the
proposed EP algorithm achieves better top-N recommendation
performance in terms of recall than both the random walk
based and voting based social recommendation algorithms,
while its computational complexity is comparable to theirs.
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Figure 13: Top-500 recall versus D.
3.4 Conclu io
In this chapter, we proposed a Bayesian network based social recommendation algo-
rithm that exploits the social relations between users in the social network to generate
top-N recommendations, using only implicit user preference data. We constructed
Bayesian networks based on the social network to model the probabilities for items
to be selected by the active user, and developed the EP message-passing algorithm
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to perform approximate inference efficiently. We also proposed an iterative EP al-
gorithm to carry out EP message-passing for all users simultaneously in a unified
bipartite graph representation. Moreover, the proposed message-passing algorithm
is suitable for distributed implementation, where users only exchange messages with
their directly connected friends. The experimental results on the Epinions dataset
showed that the proposed EP algorithm achieves better top-N recommendation per-
formance in terms of recall than both the random walk based and voting based social





USING SEMI-DISTRIBUTED BELIEF PROPAGATION
4.1 Introduction
In traditional recommender systems, the recommendation algorithm is run at the
central server of the commercial websites or other third party providers, and thus
the users have to disclose their personal information, such as preferences, age and
gender, to the server in order to receive satisfactory recommendation services. This
raises the privacy issue, as users simply have no control over how their personal data
will be disseminated and used [1]. It is not uncommon that websites sell to other
parties such data, which are valuable for targeted advertising. As users become more
concerned about their online privacy, they are less willing to directly release their
personal information. Since detailed user profiles are difficult to obtain, most recom-
mender systems employ the CF recommendation approach which only relies on the
user ratings. However, it is still possible to infer from ratings user demographics, such
as age and gender, from their ratings [114], and even uncover user identities and reveal
sensitive personal information with access to other databases [81]. While personal-
ized recommendations at e-commerce websites have been very successful [4], users are
increasingly worried about online privacy [92]. Privacy-preserving CF recommender
systems are thus in urgent need. The challenge stems from the conflict between accu-
racy and privacy. That is, to provide recommendations that better match the user’s
tastes, the system needs to know more about the user.
Most privacy-preserving recommender systems are developed either by obfuscat-
ing user data with random noise [91] or fake data [104] at the cost of recommendation
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accuracy, or by encrypting user data using cryptography techniques [24] which re-
quire careful key management. In this work, we hope to build a recommender system
with intrinsic privacy-preserving properties. To achieve this goal, it is evident that
any communications between the server and users or between user peers should avoid
exposing user ratings. An interesting work in [59] utilized concordance measure for
computing user similarity required by the user-based CF algorithm, where compu-
tation is conducted between users without exposure of their ratings to each other,
but unfortunately, to collaboratively generate recommendation, users need to reveal
ratings to other users. We notice that user-based CF relies on direct collaboration
among users, i.e., a user needs to know what other people like to find out what he
might like, whereas item-based CF exploits the consistency in an individual user’s
taste, i.e., if a user likes an item, he might also like other items similar to it. We
consider item-based CF a better choice for privacy-preserving recommender systems.
The accuracy of the item-based CF system depends on the measure of item similar-
ity, which has to be estimated based on ratings on items, and further, subject to the
privacy constraint.
In this chapter, we introduce a semi-distributed Belief Propagation (BP) approach
to privacy-preserving item-based CF recommender systems [128, 130]. Firstly, we for-
mulate the item similarity computation, a key step of item-based CF, as a probabilistic
inference problem on a proper factor graph, which can then be efficiently solved us-
ing BP. Then we develop a semi-distributed architecture for BP, where probabilistic
messages on item similarity are exchanged between the server and users, without dis-
closing user ratings to the server or other peer users. We further propose a cascaded
BP scheme to address the practical issue that only a subset of users are available for
BP during one time slot. Each user locally generates rating predictions by averag-
ing his own ratings on items weighted according to their similarities to other unseen
items. Hence, the proposed item-based CF algorithm preserves user privacy in both
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item similarity computation and rating prediction. We analyze the achieved privacy
of the semi-distributed BP from a information-theoretic perspective. We also propose
a method that reduces the computational complexity of BP at the user side. Through
experiments on the MovieLens dataset, we show that our algorithm achieves superior
accuracy.
4.1.1 Related Works
Recently, privacy-preserving information processing and data mining techniques have
been widely studied. In [116], the authors proposed distributed online learning with
intrinsic privacy-preserving properties, where local parameters at each participating
user are updated based on local data sources, and parameters are periodically ex-
changed among a small subset of neighbors, and they showed that malicious users
cannot reconstruct the subgradients of other users. In [97], the authors applied ho-
momorphic encryption to privacy-preserving distributed aggregation of energy con-
sumption metering data in smart grids. A number of works also investigated privacy-
preserving information processing in semi-distributed or centralized cloud computing.
[125] proposed privacy-preserving back-propagation neural network learning via cloud
computing, where private data of each party are first encrypted before being uploaded
to the cloud, and operations over ciphertexts are supported via doubly homomorphic
encryption. [25] addressed multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted data in cloud
computing using secure inner product computation.
There are existing works on both centralized and distributed privacy-preserving
recommendation systems. The privacy-preserving techniques that have been applied
to centralized systems mainly include data obfuscation and cryptography approaches.
The data obfuscation approach is to obfuscate user ratings with random noise before
releasing them to the server, e.g., differentially private recommender system [72] and
46
the perturbation technique [91]. In [104, 114], the authors proposed to disguise gen-
uine user profiles by adding extra fake data. However, obfuscation and random noise
undermine accuracy, and users have to sacrifice more privacy for better recommenda-
tion. In [102], the authors proposed a data perturbation approach based on differential
privacy with accuracy guarantees.
The cryptography approach encrypts users data using advanced cryptography
techniques to hide user information, e.g., item ratings, from the recommender server,
which only operates on the encrypted user data [35, 34]. In particular, [34] pro-
posed an item-based privacy-preserving recommender system with homomorphic en-
cryption, where the server maintains an item-item similarity model, and generates
rating predictions blindly by performing homomorphic operations on the encrypted
ratings. However, the authors assumed the similarity model is known a priori, and
did not provide any privacy-preserving solution for that. Besides, key management
required by cryptography tools could be demanding in practice. [82] applied the
garbled circuits cryptographic technique to matrix factorization collaborative filter-
ing, where a third-party crypto-service provider is required for private computation.
[13] discussed practical implementations of privacy-preserving collaborative filtering
deployed in cloud computing infrastructures.
Alternatively, distributed privacy-preserving recommender systems let users store
data in their devices. [76] presented a personal collaborative filtering recommender
running on the user side. Each user stores his data locally, and constructs an item-item
similarity model using the cosine similarity measure by incrementally incorporating
ratings from other neighbour users in a peer-to-peer (P2P) environment. The quality
of the locally constructed similarity model depends on the set of neighbours a user
can find and contact. The best performance is achieved by using ratings from all
common users of two items to evaluate the item similarity, which is much harder
to implement in P2P architectures than in a centralized CF system. Moreover, the
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user privacy is not guaranteed as users need to share their ratings with each other.
An attacker can easily mimic the behaviour of genuine users to acquire their personal
data. As in centralized systems, cryptography [24] and obfuscation techniques [14] can
be applied to distributed systems to avoid disclosing data to other users. A client-side
content-based mobile shopping recommender was proposed in [88], where user data,
e.g., historical purchases, are locally stored on users’ devices, e.g., smartphones, and
each device runs its own content-based recommendation algorithm to find products
that match the user’s profile based on product descriptions. However, the complete
product catalog can be challenging for mobile devices to process, and incurs significant
data traffic as well. In [63], the authors proposed social connection recommendation
in mobile social networking, where matching user attributes are computed via secure
multi-party computation (SMC) techniques based on secret sharing.
4.1.2 Background on Item-based CF
Assuming there areM users andN items in a recommender system, let U = {1, . . . ,M}
represent the set of all users, and I = {1, . . . , N} represent the set of all items. A
user u expresses his opinion on item i in the form of rating rui which takes values
from a finite discrete set Γ = {r|1 ≤ r ≤ T, r = 1, 2, . . .}, e.g, Γ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. We
arrange the collection of all ratings in an incomplete M×N matrix R, with rui at the
intersection of u-th row and i-th column. The entries of unknown ratings are unfilled.
Let Iu denote the subset of items rated by user u, and Ui denote the subset of users
who have rated item i. The task of a recommender system is to predict the ratings
for an active user u on the subset of unseen items I\Iu. Throughout this chapter, we
focus on the item-based CF recommendation algorithm [99].
To predict the rating rui for user u on an unseen item i, the algorithm sorts the
items in Iu according to their similarity to item i in descending order, and finds a
subset of top K most similar items, denoted by Nui, where |Nui| = K. We refer to Nui
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as the neighbourhood of item i from user u’s perspective, and K as the neighborhood
size. Then rui is predicted by
r̂ui =
∑
j∈Nui sij × ruj∑
j∈Nui |sij|
, (32)
where sij is the similarity between items i and j. The accuracy of the algorithm de-
pends on the measure of item similarity sij, which is computed based on the observed
ratings on items. The user-based CF algorithm uses a similar formula to (32), but
based on ratings from other users.
Several well-known methods for item similarity computation include Cosine Sim-
ilarity (CS), Pearson Correlation Similarity (PCS), and Adjusted Cosine Similarity
(ACS) [99]. Yet, all of those mentioned methods directly operate on ratings from
different users, which requires users to disclose ratings to the server or other users.
We will introduce a semi-distributed BP algorithm for item similarity computation
with intrinsic privacy-preserving property.
4.2 Modelling Item Similarity on Factor Graphs
4.2.1 Probabilistic Problem Formulation
We model the similarity sij between items i and j as a discrete random variable that
takes values from a predefined set S. The total number of possible values is L = |S|.
Let Si = {sij : 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i} be the set of item similarities between item i and
other items. We denote by P (Si|R) the joint posterior probability distribution of Si.
To obtain sij, we need the marginal posterior probability distribution of sij, which
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Figure 14: The factor graph Gi for item similarity.
However, direct computation using (34) is not appealing, because it must be per-
formed by a central server, and thus users are required to disclose their ratings to the




. We instead resort
to the factor graph to express the factorization of P (Si|R), and apply the efficient
sum-product BP algorithm to infer the marginal posterior probability distributions.
More importantly, as will be described in Sec. 4.3, the BP algorithm can be car-
ried out in a semi-distributed manner, so that the part of computation that requires
knowledge of user ratings can be locally performed by the user, eliminating the need
to disclosing user ratings.
4.2.2 Modelling with Factor Graphs
We first find a proper factorization for P (Si|R). For each user u ∈ Ui, we denote
Sui = {sij : j ∈ Iu\i} as the set of item similarities between item i and other
items user u has rated, and use a local function fu(Sui) to model the dependencies








where Z is a normalization constant. We construct a factor graph Gi for the factor-
ization in (35) as illustrated in Fig. 14, where there are |Si| variable nodes and |Ui|
factor nodes. Each sij ∈ Si is represented by variable node j in Gi, and each local
function fu(Sui) is represented by factor node u. The subset of variable nodes for Sui
50
are connected to factor node u via edges. Let Uij denote the set of common users
of items i and j, Uij = Ui ∩ Uj. Hence, variable node j is connected to |Uij| factor
nodes in Gi. Essentially, if a user u has rated item i and other items in Iu\i, then
this user has a belief on the similarity sij, ∀j ∈ Iu\i, from his perspective. The factor
graph allows users’ beliefs be exchanged and aggregated following the principle of
sum-product message passing. To solve for all item similarities {Si : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, a
total of N such factor graphs need to be constructed.
The local function fu(Sui) determines how user u estimates item similarity based
on his own ratings. It should be properly designed with regard to the eventual goal
to predict ratings using (32). For a user u who has rated item i, we assume for now
rating rui is unknown, and let Îu = Iu\i. Given a configuration of item similarities in
Sui, user u predicts rui as
r̂ui(Sui) =
∑
j∈Îu sij × ruj∑
j∈Îu |sij|
. (36)
Note that (36) has a similar form to (32). Then user u checks r̂ui(Sui) against the











where Zu is a normalization constant, and σ is a designing parameter that controls
the sensitivity of fu (Sui) to the discrepancy between r̂ui(Sui) and rui. We note that
fu (Sui) decreases with increasing discrepancy.
4.2.3 BP for Similarity Computation
We describe the sum-product BP algorithm to infer the marginal posterior distribu-
tion P (sij|R), ∀sij ∈ Si, on the factor graph Gi, without worrying about privacy.
Later in Sec. 4.3.1, we will introduce the semi-distributed implementation of BP for
privacy, yet with no impacts on the computed similarities. Since the constructed
factor graph has loops, we apply the loopy BP algorithm that iteratively exchanges
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-messages received from neighbor factor nodes connected to
variable node as
(9)
where is a normalization constant. Finally, based on themar-
ginal posterior distribution , the item similarity can
be estimated in various ways. We consider using the minimum
mean squared error criterion, for which the optimal estimated
is given by the expectation
(10)
We summarize the BP algorithm for computing on factor
graph in Alg. 1.
Alg. 1 BP on for computing item similarity .
• Initialize all messages as and
, and set iteration .
• Iterative message passing until convergence.
• Update all -messages using (7);
• Update all -messages using (8);
• . If not convergent, repeat (a) and (b).
• Compute marginal posterior probability distributions
of using (9).
• Compute item similarity using (10).
IV. SEMI-DISTRIBUTED PRIVACY-PRESERVING CF
Our goal is to build a privacy-preserving recommender
system. Specifically, we would like to preserve user privacy
for both item similarity computation and recommendation
generation. In the following, we introduce the semi-distributed
architecture of the proposed BP algorithm for item similarity
computation without exposing user ratings, and the user-side
recommendation generation as well.
A. Semi-Distributed BP
From Section III-C, we know that the messages exchanged
between factor nodes and variable nodes are probabilistic state-
ments on item similarity, and such messages do not directly re-
veal user ratings. However, the user rating data are used to com-
pute for generating -messages using (7). Hence, the
Fig. 3. Illustration of message passing at iteration . (a) The -message
. (b) The -message .
key to preserve user privacy is to compute -messages at the
user side. The -messages can be generated at a central server by
performing multiplication operations on received -messages.
This leads to the semi-distributed implementation of the BP al-
gorithm. As wewill see next, the computation follows the BP al-
gorithm described in Section III-C, and thus the semi-distributed
BP does not impact the computed results.
The architecture of the semi-distributed BP is shown in Fig. 2.
The message passing on graph is carried out by exchanging
messages between the server and the users. Users locally store
their personal ratings, and generate -messages according to
(7) without disclosing their ratings to the server or other users.
User sends the -message to the server in the format
shown in Table I, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server is responsible for gen-
erating -messages. To compute the -message , the
server checks if all -messages from users in
have been received. The server then performs multiplication op-
erations on the -messages to generate -messages according to
(8), and sends the -message to user in the format
shown in Table II, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server checks the convergence
of messages, and obtains the item similarity after convergence
using (10). Although we have applied synchronous BP here,
asynchronous BP can be readily used, where messages are up-
dated whenever newmessages arrive. Indeed, round-robin asyn-
chronous BP converges at least as fast as synchronous BP [17].
(a) The λ-message λ
(n)
u,j (sij).
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-messages received from neighbor factor nodes connected to
variable node as
(9)
where is a normalization constant. Finally, based on themar-
ginal posterior distribution , the item similarity can
be estimated in various ways. We consider using the minimum
mean squared error criterion, for which the optimal estimated
is given by the expectation
(10)
We summarize the BP algorithm for computing on factor
graph in Alg. 1.
Alg. 1 BP on for computing item similarity .
• Initialize all messages as and
, and set iteration .
• Iterative message passing until convergence.
• Update all -messages using (7);
• Update all -messages using (8);
• . If not convergent, repeat (a) and (b).
• Compute marginal posterior probability distributions
of using (9).
• Compute item similarity using (10).
IV. SEMI-DISTRIBUTED PRIVACY-PRESERVING CF
Our goal is to build a privacy-preserving recommender
system. Specifically, we would like to preserve user privacy
for both item similarity computation and recommendation
generation. In the following, we introduce the semi-distributed
architecture of the proposed BP algorithm for item similarity
computation without exposing user ratings, and the user-side
recommendation generation as well.
A. Semi-Distributed BP
From Section III-C, we know that the messages exchanged
between factor nodes and variable nodes are probabilistic state-
ments on item similarity, and such messages do not directly re-
veal user ratings. However, the user rating data are used to com-
pute for generating -messages using (7). Hence, the
Fig. 3. Illustration of message passing at iteration . (a) The -message
. (b) The -message .
key to preserve user privacy is to compute -messages at the
user side. The -messages can be generated at a central server by
performing multiplication operations on received -messages.
This leads to the semi-distributed implementation of the BP al-
gorithm. As wewill see next, the computation follows the BP al-
gorithm described in Section III-C, and thus the semi-distributed
BP does not impact the computed results.
The architecture of the semi-distributed BP is shown in Fig. 2.
The message passing on graph is carried out by exchanging
messages between the server and the users. Users locally store
their personal ratings, and generate -messages according to
(7) without disclosing their ratings to the server or other users.
User sends the -message to the server in the format
shown in Table I, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server is responsible for gen-
erating -messages. To compute the -message , the
server checks if all -messages from users in
have been received. The server then performs multiplication op-
erations on the -messages to generate -messages according to
(8), and sends the -message to user in the format
shown in Table II, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server checks the convergence
of messages, and obtains the item similarity after convergence
using (10). Although we have applied synchronous BP here,
asynchronous BP can be readily used, where messages are up-
dated whenever newmessages arrive. Indeed, round-robin asyn-
chronous BP converges at least as fast as synchronous BP [17].
(b) The µ-message µ
(n)
j,u .
Figure 15: Illustration of message passing at iteration n.
messages between factor nodes and variable nodes along the edges until convergence
[54]. As in the sum-product principle, there are two types of messages passed on Gi:
(i) The λ-message λu,j(sij) sent fr m a factor node u to a variable node j, and (ii)
the µ-message µj,u(sij) sent from a variable node j to a factor node u.
We illustrate th message passing in Fig. 15. In each iteration, each node (fac-
tor node or variable node) in the factor graph generates and sends messages to the
neighbor nodes connected to it, based on incoming messages. In iteratio n, factor
node u generates the λ-message λ
(n)
u,j (sij) sent to variable node j by computing the
product of local factor function fu(sui) w th all µ-me sag s received in the previous
iteration from neighbor variable nodes of factor node u, excluding the message from












The λ-m ssage λ
(n)
u,j (sij) is a list of the beliefs on the similarity sij = s, ∀s ∈ S,
perceived from user u’s perspective, given the current collective knowledge of the
similarity between other items in Îu\j and item i.
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Variable node j generates the µ-message µ
(n)
j,u (sij) sent to factor node u as the
product of all incoming λ-messages received in the current iteration from all factor










where Fj denotes the set of factor nodes connected to variable node j. Here in graph
Gi, Fj = {u : u ∈ Uij}. The µ-message µ(n)j,u (sij) is a list of beliefs on the similarity
sij = s, ∀s ∈ S, which is generated by aggregating beliefs from other users in Uj\u
on the similarity sij.
After convergence, the marginal posterior distribution P (sij|R) is computed at
variable node j as product of all λ-messages received from neighbor factor nodes









where Zij is a normalization constant. Finally, based on the marginal posterior distri-
bution P (sij|R), the item similarity sij can be estimated in various ways. We consider
using the minimum mean squared error criterion, for which the optimal estimated sij




s× P (sij = s|R) . (41)
We summarize the BP algorithm for computing Si on factor graph Gi in Alg. 3.
4.3 Semi-Distributed Privacy-Preserving CF
Our goal is to build a privacy-preserving recommender system. Specifically, we would
like to preserve user privacy for both item similarity computation and recommenda-
tion generation. In the following, we introduce the semi-distributed architecture of
the proposed BP algorithm for item similarity computation without exposing user
ratings, and the user-side recommendation generation as well.
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Algorithm 3 BP on Gi for computing item similarity Si.
• Initialize all messages as λ(0)u,j(sij = s) = 1L and µ
(0)
j,u(sij = s) =
1
L
, ∀s ∈ S, and
set iteration n = 1.
• Iterative message passing until convergence.
(a) Update all λ-messages using (38);
(b) Update all µ-messages using (39);
(c) n = n+ 1. If not convergent, repeat (a) and (b).
• Compute marginal posterior probability distributions of sij ∈ Si using (40).
• Compute item similarity sij ∈ Si using (41).
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-messages received from neighbor factor nodes connected to
variable node as
(9)
where is a normalization constant. Finally, based on themar-
ginal posterior distribution , the item similarity can
be estimated in various ways. We consider using the minimum
mean squared error criterion, for which the optimal estimated
is given by the expectation
(10)
We summarize the BP algorithm for computing on factor
graph in Alg. 1.
Alg. 1 BP on for computing item similarity .
• Initialize all messages as and
, and set iteration .
• Iterative message passing until convergence.
• Update all -messages using (7);
• Update all -messages using (8);
• . If not convergent, repeat (a) and (b).
• Compute marginal posterior probability distributions
of using (9).
• Compute item similarity using (10).
IV. SEMI-DISTRIBUTED PRIVACY-PRESERVING CF
Our goal is to build a privacy-preserving recommender
system. Specifically, we would like to preserve user privacy
for both item similarity computation and recommendation
generation. In the following, we introduce the semi-distributed
architecture of the proposed BP algorithm for item similarity
computation without exposing user ratings, and the user-side
recommendation generation as well.
A. Semi-Distributed BP
From Section III-C, we know that the messages exchanged
between factor nodes and variable nodes are probabilistic state-
ments on item similarity, and such messages do not directly re-
veal user ratings. However, the user rating data are used to com-
pute for generating -messages using (7). Hence, the
Fig. 3. Illustration of message passing at iteration . (a) The -message
. (b) The -message .
key to preserve user privacy is to compute -messages at the
user side. The -messages can be generated at a central server by
performing multiplication operations on received -messages.
This leads to the semi-distributed implementation of the BP al-
gorithm. As wewill see next, the computation follows the BP al-
gorithm described in Section III-C, and thus the semi-distributed
BP does not impact the computed results.
The architecture of the semi-distributed BP is shown in Fig. 2.
The message passing on graph is carried out by exchanging
messages between the server and the users. Users locally store
their personal ratings, and generate -messages according to
(7) without disclosing their ratings to the server or other users.
User sends the -message to the server in the format
shown in Table I, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server is responsible for gen-
erating -messages. To compute the -message , the
server checks if all -messages from users in
have been received. The server then performs multiplication op-
erations on the -messages to generate -messages according to
(8), and sends the -message to user in the format
shown in Table II, where the -entry vector stores the values
of . The server checks the convergence
of messages, and obtains the item similarity after convergence
using (10). Although we have applied synchronous BP here,
asynchronous BP can be readily used, where messages are up-
dated whenever newmessages arrive. Indeed, round-robin asyn-
chronous BP converges at least as fast as synchronous BP [17].
Figure 16: Architecture of semi-distributed BP.
4.3.1 Semi-Distributed BP
From Sec. 4.2.3, we know that the messages exchanged between factor nodes and
variable nodes are probabilistic state ents on item similarity, and such messages do
not directly reveal user rati gs. However, the user rating data are used to compute
fu(Sui) for generating λ-messages using (38). Hence, the key to preserve user privacy
is to compute λ-messages at the user side. The µ-messages can be generated at a
central server by perfor ing multiplication operations on received λ-messages. This
leads to the semi-distributed implementation of the BP algorithm. As we will see
next, the computation follows the BP algorithm described in Sec. 4.2.3, and thus the
semi-distributed BP does not impact the computed results.
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Table 4: The format of λ-messages.
Graph i User u Item j Iteration n L-entry vector
−→
λ
The architecture of the semi-distributed BP is shown in Fig. 16. The message
passing on graph Gi is carried out by exchanging messages between the server and the
users. Users locally store their personal ratings, and generate λ-messages according
to (38) without disclosing their ratings to the server or other users. User u sends the
λ-message λ
(n)
u,j (sij) to the server in the format shown in Table 4, where the L-entry
vector
−→
λ stores the values of λ
(n)
u,j (sij = s), ∀s ∈ S. The server is responsible for
generating µ-messages. To compute the µ-message µ
(n)
j,u (sij), the server checks if all
λ-messages λ
(n−1)
u,j (sij) from users in Uj have been received. The server then performs
multiplication operations on the λ-messages to generate µ-messages according to (39),
and sends the µ-message µ
(n)
j,u (sij) to user u in the format shown in Table 5, where
the L-entry vector −→µ stores the values of µ(n)j,u (sij = s), ∀s ∈ S. The server checks
the convergence of messages, and obtains the item similarity after convergence using
(41). Although we have applied synchronous BP here, asynchronous BP can be
readily used, where messages are updated whenever new messages arrive. Indeed,
round-robin asynchronous BP converges at least as fast as synchronous BP [33].
Table 5: The format of µ-messages.
Graph i User u Item j Iteration n L-entry vector −→µ
The computation of all item similarities in {Si : 1 ≤ i ≤ N} requires N factor
graphs, with Si computed using factor graph Gi. We introduce three protocols for
coordinating the message passing on different graphs: the serial protocol, the paral-
lel protocol, and the pipeline protocol. In the serial protocol, the message passing
on factor graphs is performed in a serial manner, that is at any time, all generated
messages belong to one factor graph, and unless inference on that graph is finished,
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no messages on other factor graphs are generated. Alternatively, we can adopt the
parallel protocol. If the bandwidth of the communication channel between users and
the server is sufficient, and if the user’s computational capability allows, message
passing on multiple factor graphs can be performed in parallel to accelerate the infer-
ence process. The pipeline protocol, which is a combination of the serial and parallel
protocols, is favorable when the delay in the network is large. While waiting for the
messages on one factor graph to arrive, users can compute messages on other factor
graphs and continue to send them to the server, so as to increase throughput and
make more efficient use of computational resources as well.
Aside from the semi-distributed implementation, a fully distributed implemen-
tation is also possible. For example, [10] proposed a distributed BP-based trust
management algorithm for P2P networks. Users directly send λ-messages to other
users instead of to the server, and also generate µ-messages locally using received
λ-messages, without relying on the server. However, there is a significant increase in
communication overhead, considering that a λ-message λu,j(sij) needs to be sent to
each of the users in Uj, as they require this λ-message for updating µ-messages. More-
over, for each item a user has rated, he needs to find out other users who also have
rated that item, i.e., the graph must be known by the users. Further, since the item
similarity is locally computed by users, and user u ∈ Ui only obtains {sij : j ∈ Îu}, the
users need to share with each other the item similarities. Thus, a more sophisticated
protocol needs to be developed for a fully distributed system.
4.3.2 Cascaded BP
The semi-distributed BP architecture in Sec. 4.3.1 requires that all users be active and
participate in BP message propagation at the same time. Yet, in practical scenarios,
it is difficult to meet this stringent requirement due to various reasons, e.g., some
users may not be active temporally. To address this challenge, we adapt the original
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BP architecture to perform BP in cascade. Rather than wait until all users become
active, we can perform BP on the subgraph constructed based only on the subset of
users active during the current time slot, and store the inferred knowledge for use
in the next time slot. Let U(1),U(2), . . . ,U(t) denote the available subsets of users at
time slots 1, 2, . . . , t, respectively. We construct G(t)i based on U(t) at each time slot t,
and perform inference in G(t)i . To incorporate the knowledge from the previous graph
G(t−1)i into G(t)i at time slot t, we introduce the priors P (sij|G(t−1)i ), ∀sij ∈ Si, where
P (sij|G(t−1)i ) is the marginal distribution of sij computed from G(t−1)i . With these








f,j (sij)× P (sij|G
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i ). (42)












f,j (sij)× P (sij|G
(t−1)
i ). (43)
Note that P (sij|G(t−1)i ) is actually computed by the server in the previous graph G(t−1)i ,
and hence it is directly available for the server. The computation of λ-messages at the
user side is still the same as (38). Hence, during cascaded BP, the priors are always
directly computed and used at the server side.









We will also update sij at each time slot of the cascaded BP. This allows us to generate
recommendations using the most up-to-date item similarity.
4.3.3 User-Side Recommendation
Thus far, we have focused on the item similarity computation using the semi-distributed
BP algorithm. To complete the privacy-preserving item-based CF recommender sys-
tem, it remains to specify the recommendation generation. As introduced in Sec. 4.1.2,
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Compute and store item similarity.
User
Store personal rating data;
Generate λ-messages;
Generate recommendations.
the item-based CF computes rating prediction for user u on item i using (32), which
takes as its input the past ratings of user u and item similarities. To avoid revealing
user ratings, users would then locally generate rating predictions. Since the item
similarities are obtained at the server side in the semi-distributed BP algorithm, the
server should send to users the required item similarities. To predict ratings on all
unseen items in I\Iu, user u only needs item similarities in {sij : i ∈ I\Iu, j ∈ Iu}. Af-
ter computing rating predictions, users can locally store the item similarities received
from the server for future uses, and only update them periodically. We summarize
the functions of the server and users in Table 6.
It is worth noting that in addition to preserving privacy, user-side recommenda-
tion also enhances user trust in e-commerce. Traditionally, centralized recommender
systems owned by the commercial websites can manipulate the recommendations in
various ways for revenue. A website might place the items with the highest prof-
its on top of the recommendation list, or even employ recommendations as tools
for advertisement of new products. This trust issue is well addressed by user-side
recommendation, where users locally generate recommendations on their personal
computers.
4.3.4 Accuracy and Communication Overhead
Assuming all users participate in BP, the semi-distributed architecture does not com-
promise the accuracy. Basically, we let users locally conduct the computations that
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require private rating data, but all computations are carried out exactly as in a cen-
tralized approach in Sec. 4.2.3, and the user-side recommendation generates rating
predictions using exactly (32). When not all users are available for BP at the same
time slot, we can apply the cascaded BP scheme to improve performance over time.
We will present performance evaluation later in Sec. 4.6.
The proposed algorithm incurs additional communication overhead. In the semi-
distributed BP on graph Gi, for each user u ∈ Ui, there are |Iu| λ-messages and
|Iu| µ-messages exchanged between the server and use u in each iteration. And the
server needs to send a total of |Iu|(N − |Iu|) item similarities to user u for user-side
recommendation. Whereas in the centralized approach, only the generated recom-
mendations need to be sent to the user.
4.4 Information-Theoretic Privacy Analysis
We analyze the achieved privacy of the proposed algorithm for item-based CF by
charactering the information leakage from the information-theoretic perspective. Ac-
cording to Sec. 4.3, the λ-messages and µ-messages are exchanged between the server
and users, which can cause privacy degradation.
4.4.1 User Privacy Loss Due to λ-Messages
The λ-message λu,j(sij) in (38) is sent from user u to the server. Suppose the server
tries to infer information from λ-messages about user u’s ratings on items. We charac-
terize the upper bound of information-theoretic privacy loss. To simplify the analysis,





λu,j(sij = 1) < λu,j(sij = 2) if |ruj − rui| < δui
λu,j(sij = 1) ≥ λu,j(sij = 2) if |ruj − rui| ≥ δui
(45)
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where δui > 0 is a parameter whose value is determined by ratings ruh on other items
h ∈ Îu\j and the messages µh,u(sih), ∀h ∈ Îu\j. Since the server does not have direct
access to user ratings, δui is unknown to it. To derive an upper bound, we assume that
δui is close to 1 with large probability, as the empirical results in [99] show that the
item-based rating prediction method generates a rating with absolute error less than
1 on average using datasets with similar rating scale to Γ. Using this prior knowledge




ruj = rui if λu,j(sij = 1) < λu,j(sij = 2);
ruj 6= rui if λu,j(sij = 1) ≥ λu,j(sij = 2).
(46)
We define the total privacy of user u, i.e., his rating information unknown to the
server, as




= |Iu| log |Γ|, (47)
where H(·) denotes entropy. Note that we have assumed that user u rates different
items independently, and the user rating on each item takes values from Γ with equal
probabilities.
Next we compute the privacy loss ∆I(λu,j(sij)) as the reduction of unknown in-
formation of user u’s ratings after the server observes λu,j(sij)
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= H({ruk|k ∈ Iu\j}).
Hence,
∆I(λu,j(sij)) = H({ruk|k ∈ Iu})−H (ruj|λu,j(sij), rui)
−H({ruk|k ∈ Iu\j})
= H(ruj)−H(ruj|λu,j(sij), rui). (49)
Specifically, for the two cases in (46), we have:
(1) If λu,j(sij = 1) < λu,j(sij = 2)
∆I1(λu,j(sij)) = H(ruj)−H(ruj|ruj = rui, rui)
= log |Γ|; (50)
(2) If λu,j(sij = 1) ≥ λu,j(sij = 2)
∆I2(λu,j(sij)) = H(ruj)−H(ruj|ruj 6= rui, rui)
= log |Γ| − log(|Γ| − 1). (51)
The expected privacy loss per λ-message can be given by
E {∆I(λu,j(sij))} = ∆I1(λu,j(sij))P (ruj = rui)
+ ∆I2(λu,j(sij))P (ruj 6= rui)
= log |Γ| − |Γ| − 1|Γ| log(|Γ| − 1), (52)
where P (ruj = rui) is the probability that user u rates items i and j with the same
rating, P (ruj = rui) =
1
|Γ| and P (ruj 6= rui) = 1− P (ruj = rui).
Taking into account all λ-messages from user u on graph Gi, we can compute the
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log |Γ| − |Γ| − 1|Γ| log(|Γ| − 1)
)
. (57)
As one example, suppose user u has rated 20 items with the rating scale Γ =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. His total privacy is Hu = 46.44 bits, and the expected privacy loss due
to λ-messages on one graph is 8.02 bits.
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4.4.2 Total User Privacy Lost to the Server
In the previous analysis, we focused on the privacy loss due to messages on a single
graph, but each user may participate in as many graphs as the number of items he
rated, e.g., user u may send λ-messages on the set of graphs {Gi|i ∈ Iu}. We are
interested to know the total privacy loss of user u as a result of participating in
multiple graphs. However, it is not simply the sum of privacy loss on all graphs, since
the λ-messages on different graphs are not independent and thus there is significant
redundancy in the revealed information. We next derive an upper bound of the total
privacy loss.
Suppose the server is intelligent, and by combining the pairwise relationships
between item ratings of user u inferred from λ-messages on multiple graphs using
(46), it can divide the unknown ratings of user u in to |Γ| groups, where the items
in each group g have the same rating rg ∈ Γ while items in different groups have
different ratings. Let Gg denote the set of items in group g, then ruk = rg, ∀k ∈ Gg.
The unknown information of item ratings in each group g is








The unknown information of item ratings in all groups can be derived as
H
(




= H(r1, r2, . . . , r|Γ|)
= H(r1) +H(r2|r1) + . . .+H(r|Γ||r1, r2, . . . , r|Γ|−1)
= log |Γ|+ log(|Γ| − 1) + . . .+ log 1
= log(|Γ|!). (59)
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Hence, the total privacy loss of user u is
∆Itotalu = |Iu| log |Γ| − log(|Γ|!). (60)
In the example of 20 rated items with |Γ| = 5, the privacy loss is 39.53 bits versus
the total privacy of 46.44 bits. However, without knowing exactly the rating of each
group, the server will not be able to launch effective attacks against users to reveal
sensitive personal information [114, 81]. Yet, the users are suggested to randomly
participate in only a subset of graphs to better preserve their privacy.
4.4.3 User Privacy Lost to Other Users Due to µ-Messages
The µ-messages are sent from the server to users, and no direct messages are ex-
changed between users. Suppose a curious user u tries to extract from µ-messages
information about ratings of other users. We notice that µj,u(sij) in (39) mixes the
λ-messages from multiple users, but does not contain any information about who
are the source users that send those λ-messages. Thus, even if user u can extract
any information from µ-messages, he does not know whom the information should be
related to.
Nevertheless, we are interested in characterizing the amount of information a
curious user can extract from µ-messages about ratings of other users, assuming the
server colludes with some curious users and provides the graph structure information
of Gi to them. We compute the upper bound of the rating information of other users
a curious user u can infer about from the received µ-message µj,u(sij), as well as the
privacy of a particular user lost to user u.
From (39), we know that µj,u(sij) is the product of λ-messages from multiple
users in Uij\u. To simplify analysis, we consider the worst case of privacy loss where
µj,u(sij) is consistent with each λ-message λv,j(sij), i.e., user u can infer about λ-
messages as follows
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(1) If µj,u(sij = 1) < µj,u(sij = 2):
λv,j(sij = 1) < λv,j(sij = 2);
(2) If µj,u(sij = 1) ≥ µj,u(sij = 2):
λv,j(sij = 1) ≥ λv,j(sij = 2).
With the inferred λ-messages, user u can further infer about the ratings from other
users in Uij\u. The inference process is the same as described in Sec. 4.4.1. Hence,
the upper bound of the rating information of other users extracted from µ-message











= (|Uij| − 1)
(
log |Γ| − |Γ| − 1|Γ| log(|Γ| − 1)
)
. (62)
The privacy of user v lost to a curious user u are essentially caused by the µ-
messages on graph Gi that mix λ-messages from user v and are forwarded to user u










log |Γ| − |Γ| − 1|Γ| log(|Γ| − 1)
)
, (63)
where Îuv = Îu ∩ Îv denotes the set of common items rated by users u and v.
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4.5 Complexity Analysis and Reduction
The computational complexity of the BP algorithm is determined by the computation
of λ-messages and µ-messages. While the complexity of generating a µ-message using





where L = |S|, which is exponential in the degree of the factor node, i.e., the number
of items user u has rated. Unfortunately, in recommender systems, a user can rate over
hundred of items. We thus propose a complexity reduction technique by controlling
the degree of the factor node.
We randomly divide the variable nodes in Îu at factor node u into small groups
of size D where D is a small integer. There are Gu = d|Îu|/De such groups. Let D(k)u
denote the size of group k, D
(k)
u = D for 1 ≤ k ≤ Gu− 1 and D(k)u = |Îu| −D(Gu− 1)
for k = Gu. Let I
(k)
u denote the variable nodes in group k. We set an indicator
j
(k)
u = 1 if j ∈ I(k)u and j(k)u = 0 otherwise. Since each variable node j ∈ Îu only




u = 1. Let S(k)ui = {sij : j ∈ I(k)u } denote the
variable nodes in group k of Îu. Assuming independence of variable nodes in different










u is the local function of variables in group k. Hence, we modify the factor
graph Gi accordingly to obtain a new factor graph Ĝi for complexity reduction. Instead
of connecting all variable nodes in Îu to one factor node u, we connect a separate factor
node u(k) to the group of variable nodes in I
(k)
u .
A more intuitive understanding is that, user u first randomly divides the items in
Îu into multiple groups of size D, and decides item similarity on the basis of groups,
as if items in different groups were rated independently by user u. Since variable
node j is associated with item j, the variable nodes in Îu are grouped exactly as the
grouping among items.
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The local function at factor node u(k) can be similarly derived as (37). Assuming




j∈I(k)u sij × ruj∑
j∈I(k)u |sij|
. (65)





















u is a normalization constant.
On the new factor graph Ĝi, we apply the BP algorithm described in Sec. 4.2.3.
The λ-messages and µ-messages are exchanged between the new factor nodes and
variable nodes. The λ-message λ
(n)
u(k),j
(sij) sent from factor node u
(k) to variable node














And the µ-message µ
(n)
j,u(k)












where F̂j = {v(k) : v ∈ Uij, j(k)v = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ Gv}.









by using (67). Meanwhile, the total number of λ-messages need to be
generated from user u’s perspective in each iteration remains |Îu|, which is the same
as in Gi. There is no change in complexity regarding the µ-messages. The overall





, where N̄ is the average number of items rated by one user,
and M̄ is the average number of users of one item. Since the number of items a user
can consume is limited by his time and money, we can assume N̄ is much smaller than
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N . As for M̄ , we assume M̄ grows in the order of M1−ε, where 0 < ε < 1. Then we










The complexity reduction part can be easily integrated into the semi-distributed
BP architecture in Sec. 4.3. Indeed, the complexity reduction is for reducing the com-
putational burden of the users, and users can locally perform the required grouping.
Also, the grouping information is not needed at the server side for BP. The server
does not need to know from which group of user u the λ-message is generated, since
only one λ
(n)
u,j (sij) message is generated by user u that is destined to variable node j
on graph Gi. Meanwhile, at the user side, user u can easily recover the group infor-
mation “k” from the received message µ
(n)
j,u (sij) by looking up for k with j
(k)









Therefore, the grouping step is transparent to the server. The computational




, regardless of N and M , and
users can autonomously adjust D according to the availability of local computation
resources and power.
4.6 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the accuracy of the proposed privacy-preserving item-based CF algorithm
on the 100K MovieLens dataset1, which consists of 100, 000 ratings on 1682 items
(movies) by 943 users. Each rating is an integer between 1 and 5. We randomly
divide the dataset into two disjoint sets: a training set containing 80% of the ratings,
and a test set containing the rest 20% of the ratings. The ratings in the training set
are used as memory for the item-based CF algorithm to compute item similarities and
predict unknown ratings. We compare the predicted ratings with the actual ratings
1Available at: http://www.grouplens.org/node/73.
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Table 7: MAE performance comparison of various item-based CF algorithms under
different neighborhood size K with Nc = 3.
Algorithms
Nc = 3 (Ppred = 74%)
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
PCS 0.8839 0.8486 0.8370 0.8326 0.8418
ACS 0.7812 0.7585 0.7609 0.8029 0.9278
CS 0.7567 0.7601 0.7676 0.7751 0.7812
Proposed 0.7512 0.7437 0.7486 0.7557 0.7632
Table 8: MAE performance comparison of various item-based CF algorithms under
different neighborhood size K with Nc = 8.
Algorithms
Nc = 8 (Ppred = 67%)
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
PCS 0.8839 0.8486 0.8370 0.8326 0.8418
ACS 0.7812 0.7585 0.7609 0.8029 0.9278
CS 0.7567 0.7601 0.7676 0.7751 0.7812
Proposed 0.7512 0.7437 0.7486 0.7557 0.7632
in the test set to evaluate the accuracy of the recommendation algorithms in terms















where r̂ui is the predicted rating, and rui is the actual rating in the test set denoted
by T. The smaller the MAE and RMSE, the better accuracy. Note that RMSE is
more sensitive to large errors than MAE. In the experiments in Secs. 4.6.1 and 4.6.2,
we assume all users are active and participate in BP during the same time slot. In
Sec. 4.6.3 we examine the performance of the cascaded BP where only a subset of
users are active during each time slot.
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Table 9: RMSE performance comparison of various item-based CF algorithms under
different neighborhood size K with Nc = 3.
Algorithms
Nc = 3 (Ppred = 74%)
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
PCS 1.0993 1.0562 1.0435 1.0392 1.0560
ACS 0.9896 0.9622 0.9671 1.0473 1.2712
CS 0.9754 0.9791 0.9876 0.9942 0.9992
Proposed 0.9680 0.9543 0.9580 0.9637 0.9703
Table 10: RMSE performance comparison of various item-based CF algorithms under
different neighborhood size K with Nc = 8.
Algorithms
Nc = 8 (Ppred = 67%)
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30 K = 40 K = 50
PCS 1.0993 1.0562 1.0435 1.0392 1.0560
ACS 0.9896 0.9622 0.9671 1.0473 1.2712
CS 0.9754 0.9791 0.9876 0.9942 0.9992
Proposed 0.9680 0.9543 0.9580 0.9637 0.9703
4.6.1 Performance Comparison
We compare our proposed privacy-preserving algorithm with other item-based CF
algorithms using the well-known similarity measures, including the CS, PCS and ACS
methods as introduced in Sec. 4.1.2. In all cases, rating predictions are generated by
(32). We assume no privacy requirement is imposed on other algorithms, so the CS,
PCS and ACS measures are directly applied to original rating data, and thus their
results are not compromised by privacy techniques such as obfuscation. In particular,
the presented results of the CS measure represent the best achievable performance of
the distributed personal recommender system proposed in [76], as the item similarity
between two items is computed based on the complete rating vectors associated with
them in R, rather than computed in an incremental manner as in [76].
The PCS and ACS methods compute the item similarity sij between two items
i and j using the ratings from the set of their common users Uij = Ui ∩ Uj. We
denote by Nc the minimum number of common users required for computing the
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item similarity sij using PCS and ACS. If |Uij| < Nc, then neither item i nor item
j will be used to predict each other’s ratings. Let Ni be the set of all valid items
for item i under Nc. To predict ratings on item i for user u, the neighborhood Nui
used in (32) is formed from the set of items in Nui = Ni ∩ Iu. In addition, given a
required neighborhood size K, if |Nui| < K, we simply say the unknown rating rui in
the test set T is unpredictable by the PCS and ACS. We denote TK as the subset of
all predictable ratings in T at neighborhood size K. Note that TK changes with Nc,
since Nc impacts Ni. For fair comparison of different algorithms, we apply the same
Nc to all evaluated algorithms.
In Tables 7, 8 and 9, 10, we examine the MAE and RMSE performance of various
algorithms. The parameters of the proposed algorithm are set as D = 4, S = {1, 2},
and σ = 0.5. We show the results for Nc = 3 and 8 with K varying from 10 to 50
in steps of 10. Under each Nc, to fairly compare the performance of different K’s,
all results are obtained on the same subset of test ratings T50, and the percentage of
ratings in T used for evaluation is
Ppred = |T50|/|T| × 100%.
Our proposed algorithm achieves superior performance compared to other algorithms
in terms of both MAE and RMSE. As K increases from 10, the performance of
the proposed algorithm, as well as PCS and ACS algorithms, first improves but then
degrades when K becomes too large, because ratings from neighbor items with smaller
similarity to the active item, on which the rating is predicted, corrupt the prediction
accuracy. Thus, to achieve the best performance, a proper neighborhood size K
should be chosen. The computational complexity cost of our algorithm to solve for





N and M as discussed in Sec. 4.5, whereas for the CS method the complexity is
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size should be chosen. The computational complexity cost
of our algorithm to solve for the similarities between item and
other items on graph is for large and
as discussed in Section VI, whereas for the CS method the com-
plexity is , and for PCS and ACS, the complexity is
. Finally, as we will see next, the performance of
our algorithm can be further improved if a higher degree is
used, but at the cost of increased computational complexity at
users.
B. Impact of Parameters
In the following experiments, we investigate the impact of
the parameters , and on the performance of our proposed
algorithm. We always set and evaluate the proposed al-
gorithm on . In Fig. 5, we investigate the influence of group
size on the accuracy of the proposed algorithm, where we fix
other parameters as , and . It can be seen that
increasing slightly improves accuracy. However, since the
computational complexity at user side is , which is
exponential in , users need to wisely choose according to
their computational capability. In Fig. 6, we show the results for
different 's, where and . The performance
Fig. 6. Impact of on MAE of the proposed algorithm.
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slightly degrades if is too small or too large, since for a small
, the curve of the factor function (6) quickly flattens out with
respect to , while for a large , the curve becomes too
flat. But overall, the algorithm is not sensitive for large dynamic
ranges of .
In Table VI, we show the results of the proposed algorithm
for different 's, where ,
and . We observe that and achieve their best
performance when , but actually provides better ac-
curacy than . This is because large could cause overfitting,
that is the obtained item similarity is strongly biased towards the
memory data, and does not generalize well when used for pre-
diction. Meanwhile, the computational complexity
at user side significantly increases with , depending on
.
Figure 17: Impact of D on MAE of the proposed algorithm.
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.
Figure 18: Impact of σ on MAE of the proposed algorithm.
4.6.2 I pact of Parameters
In the following experiments, we investigate the impact of the parameters D, σ, and S
on the performance of our proposed algorithm. We always set Nc = 3 and evaluate the
proposed algorithm on T50. In Fig. 17, we investigate the influence of group size D on
the accuracy of the proposed algorithm, where we fix other parameters as S = {1, 2},
and σ = 0.5. It can be seen that increasing D slightly improves accuracy. However,




, which is exponential
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Table 11: Impact of S on MAE of the proposed algorithm.
S MAE
K = 10 K = 20 K = 30
S2 0.7546 0.7471 0.7513
S5 0.7504 0.7500 0.7545
in D, users need to wisely choose D according to their computational capability. In
Fig. 18, we show the results for different σ’s, where D = 3 and S = {1, 2}. The
performance slightly degrades if σ is too small or too large, since for a small σ, the
curve of the factor function (37) quickly flattens out with respect to |r̂ui − rui|, while
for a large σ, the curve becomes too flat. But overall, the algorithm is not sensitive
for large dynamic ranges of σ.
In Table 11, we show the results of the proposed algorithm for different S’s, where
Sl = {1, 2, . . . , l},∀l ∈ {2, 5}, D = 3, and σ = 0.5. We observe that S2 and S5 achieve
their best performance when K = 20, but S2 actually provides better accuracy than
S5. This is because large l could cause overfitting, that is the obtained item similarity
is strongly biased towards the memory data, and does not generalize well when used





significantly increases with L = |Sl|, depending on D.
4.6.3 Cascaded BP
We now investigate the more challenging scenarios where only a subset of users are
available for BP at a given time slot. Firstly, we consider applying the basic BP
algorithm without introducing priors, i.e., the inferred knowledge from previous time
slots are not incorporated. The parameters are set as S = {1, 2}, D = 3, σ = 0.5, and
K = {10, 20, 30}. In Fig. 19, we show the MAE results with the percentage of par-
ticipating users ranging from 10% to 100%. The performance degrades significantly
as the percentage of users decreases. Thus, relying only on the users available at the
current time slot is not satisfactory.
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C. Cascaded BP
We now investigate the more challenging scenarios where
only a subset of users are available for BP at a given time slot.
Firstly, we consider applying the basic BP algorithm without
introducing priors, i.e., the inferred knowledge from previous
time slots are not incorporated. The parameters are set as
, and . In Fig. 7, we
show the MAE results with the percentage of participating users
ranging from 10% to 100%. The performance degrades signif-
icantly as the percentage of users decreases. Thus, relying only
on the users available at the current time slot is not satisfactory.
Next, we apply the cascaded BP proposed in Section IV-B.
In the experiment, the users are randomly divided into 5 subsets
with equal sizes, i.e., only 20% of users can participate in BP
at each time slot. In Fig. 8, we show the MAE performance
versus the number of elapsed time slots, where at each time slot
the updated item similarity results are used to predict ratings.
We also show the results of the original BP algorithm with all
users participating at the same time slot. We can see that as the
number of elapsed time slots increases, the MAE performance
improves. After 5 time slots, the performance of the cascaded
BP approaches that of the original BP algorithm with all users.
Therefore, incorporating knowledge from previous time slots
can effectively improve the performance.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
Recently, privacy-preserving information processing and
data mining techniques have been widely studied. In [20],
the authors proposed distributed online learning with intrinsic
privacy-preserving properties, where local parameters at each
participating user are updated based on local data sources,
and parameters are periodically exchanged among a small
subset of neighbors, and they showed that malicious users
cannot reconstruct the subgradients of other users. In [21], the
authors applied homomorphic encryption to privacy-preserving
distributed aggregation of energy consumption metering data
in smart grids. A number of works also investigated pri-
vacy-preserving information processing in semi-distributed or
Fig. 8. MAE performance of cascaded BP.
centralized cloud computing. [22] proposed privacy-preserving
back-propagation neural network learning via cloud computing,
where private data of each party are first encrypted before being
uploaded to the cloud, and operations over ciphertexts are
supported via doubly homomorphic encryption. [23] addressed
multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted data in cloud
computing using secure inner product computation.
There are existing works on both centralized and distributed
privacy-preserving recommendation systems. The privacy-pre-
serving techniques that have been applied to centralized systems
mainly include data obfuscation and cryptography approaches.
The data obfuscation approach is to obfuscate user ratings with
random noise before releasing them to the server, e.g., differ-
entially private recommender system [24] and the perturbation
technique [10]. In [6], [11], the authors proposed to disguise
genuine user profiles by adding extra fake data. However, ob-
fuscation and random noise undermine accuracy, and users have
to sacrifice more privacy for better recommendation. In [25], the
authors proposed a data perturbation approach based on differ-
ential privacy with accuracy guarantees.
The cryptography approach encrypts users data using ad-
vanced cryptography techniques to hide user information, e.g.,
item ratings, from the recommender server, which only operates
on the encrypted user data [26], [27]. In particular, [27] pro-
posed an item-based privacy-preserving recommender system
with homomorphic encryption, where the server maintains an
item-item similarity model, and generates rating predictions
blindly by performing homomorphic operations on the en-
crypted ratings. However, the authors assumed the similarity
model is known a priori, and did not provide any privacy-pre-
serving solution for that. Besides, key management required by
cryptography tools could be demanding in practice. [28] applied
the garbled circuits cryptographic technique to matrix factoriza-
tion collaborative filtering, where a third-party crypto-service
provider is required for private computation. [29] discussed
practical implementations of privacy-preserving collaborative
filtering deployed in cloud computing infrastructures.
Figure 19: MAE versus percentage of participating users.
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We now investigate the more challenging scenarios where
only a subset of users are available for BP at a given time slot.
Firstly, we consider applying the basic BP algorithm without
introducing priors, i.e., the inferred knowledge from previous
time slots are not incorporated. The parameters are set as
, and . In Fig. 7, we
show the MAE results with the percentage of participating users
ranging from 10% to 100%. The performance degrades signif-
icantly as the percentage of users decreases. Thus, relying only
on the users available at the current time slot is not satisfactory.
Next, we apply the cascaded BP proposed in Section IV-B.
In the experiment, the users are randomly divided into 5 subsets
with equal sizes, i.e., only 20% of users can participate in BP
at each time slot. In Fig. 8, we show the MAE performance
versus the number of elapsed time slots, where at each time slot
the updated item similarity results are used to predict ratings.
We also show the results of the original BP algorithm with all
users participating at the same time slot. We can see that as the
number of elapsed time slots increases, the MAE performance
improves. After 5 time slots, the performance of the cascaded
BP approaches that of the original BP algorithm with all users.
Therefore, incorporating knowledge from previous time slots
can effectively improve the performance.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
Recently, privacy-preserving information processing and
data mining techniques have been widely studied. In [20],
the authors proposed distributed online learning with intrinsic
privacy-preserving properties, where local parameters at each
participating user are updated based on local data sources,
and parameters are periodically exchanged among a small
subset of neighbors, and they showed that malicious users
cannot reconstruct the subgradients of other users. In [21], the
authors applied homomorphic encryption to privacy-preserving
distributed aggregation of energy consumption metering data
in smart grids. A number of works also investigated pri-
vacy-preserving information processing in semi-distributed or
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centralized cloud computing. [22] proposed privacy-preserving
back-propagation neural network learning via cloud computing,
where private data of each party are first encrypted before being
uploaded to the cloud, and operations over ciphertexts are
supported via doubly homomorphic encryption. [23] addressed
multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted data in cloud
computing using secure inner product computation.
There are existing works on both centralized and distributed
privacy-preserving recommendation systems. The privacy-pre-
serving techniques that have been applied to centralized systems
mainly include data obfuscation and cryptography approaches.
The data obfuscation approach is to obfuscate user ratings with
random noise before releasing them to the server, e.g., differ-
entially private recommender system [24] and the perturbation
technique [10]. In [6], [11], the authors proposed to disguise
genuine user profiles by adding extra fake data. However, ob-
fuscation and random noise undermine accuracy, and users have
to sacrifice more privacy for better recommendation. In [25], the
authors proposed a data perturbation approach based on differ-
ential privacy with accuracy guarantees.
The cryptography approach encrypts users data using ad-
vanced cryptography techniques to hide user information, e.g.,
item ratings, from the recommender server, which only operates
on the encrypted user data [26], [27]. In particular, [27] pro-
posed an item-based privacy-preserving recommender system
with homomorphic encryption, where the server maintains an
item-item similarity model, and generates rating predictions
blindly by performing homomorphic operations on the en-
crypted ratings. However, the authors assumed the similarity
model is known a priori, and did not provide any privacy-pre-
serving solution for that. Besides, key management required by
cryptography tools could be demanding in practice. [28] applied
the garbled circuits cryptographic technique to matrix factoriza-
tion collaborative filtering, where a third-party crypto-service
provider is required for private computation. [29] discussed
practical implementations of privacy-preserving collaborative
filtering deployed in cloud computing infrastructures.
Figure 20: MAE performance of cascaded BP.
Next, e apply he cascaded BP proposed in Sec. 4.3.2. In the experiment, the
users are randomly divided in o 5 subse s with qual sizes, i.e., only 20% of users
can participate in BP at each time slot. In Fig. 20, we show the MAE performance
versus the number of elapsed time slots, where at each time slot the up ated item
similarity results are used to predict ratings. We also how the results of th origin l
BP algorithm with all users partici ating at the s me time lo . We can see that as
the number of elapsed ti slots increases, the MAE perform nce impro es. After 5
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time slots, the performance of the cascaded BP approaches that of the original BP
algorithm with all users. Therefore, incorporating knowledge from previous time slots
can effectively improve the performance.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a semi-distributed BP approach to item-based CF rec-
ommender system that preserves user privacy. The proposed algorithm computes
item similarity by exchanging probabilistic messages between the server and users
without directly exposing user ratings. To address the issue that only a subset of
users participate in BP at one time slot, we proposed the cascaded BP scheme which
accumulates the inferred knowledge from the previous time slots. With the computed
similarities, a user then locally generates rating predictions as the weighted average
of his own ratings on items. Through information-theoretic analysis, we showed that
the proposed semi-distributed BP algorithm effectively preserves user privacy. In
addition, we proposed a complexity reduction technique for efficient computation at
the user side. The experimental results on the MovieLens dataset demonstrated that
the BP algorithm with all users participating at the same time slot achieves superior
performance, and the cascaded BP algorithm can improve performance as the number
of elapsed time slots increases.
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CHAPTER V
A FACTOR GRAPH APPROACH TO SHILLING
ATTACK DETECTION
5.1 Introduction and Related Works
Recommender systems are increasingly employed by e-commerce websites, e.g., Ama-
zon.com and Netflix.com, to provide personalized recommendations to users. Collab-
orative Filtering (CF) is so far the most popular recommendation algorithm, which
relies on historic ratings given by users on items to make recommendations. Unfortu-
nately, this approach is vulnerable to the so called “shilling” attacks [58], in which a
group of spam users collaborate to manipulate the recommendations for their benefits,
e.g., to recommend their products more often.
To protect the recommender systems against such attacks, one of the major ap-
proaches is to detect the spam users and remove them from the system. A number
of detection algorithms have been proposed in the literature. Earlier work in [28]
introduced several metrics for detecting the rating patterns of spam users. Then in
[22], the authors improved the detection accuracy over [28] by including more model-
specific features for classification. However, those feature-based algorithms suffer
from low accuracy, as they only look at individual user rating patterns. In [73], the
authors exploited the statistical properties of spam users, e.g., covariance, to perform
detection via variable selection using Principle Component Analysis (PCA-VarSel).
PCA-VarSel is very effective when spam users have low covariance, e.g., when they
rate items randomly selected from all items, because genuine users have high covari-
ance since they mostly rate only the popular items. However, it was shown in [47]
that PCA-VarSel easily fails if spam users also selectively rate only those popular
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items.
All the existing works focused extensively on rating patterns of users and detected
spammers individually. In this work, we develop a probabilistic factor graph model
that exploits the collaborative spamming behaviors among spammers to jointly detect
them [129]. We use the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm to perform inference
efficiently.
5.2 Shilling Attack Detection
5.2.1 Attack Models
The shilling attack includes two general classes: push attacks and nuke attacks. In
push attacks, the spam users collaboratively promote the target items by rating them
high, whereas in nuke attacks, the spam users demote the target items by rating
them low. In addition, to effectively affect the recommendations made to the genuine
users, each spam user also rates a set of filler items to increase similarity with those
genuine users. Some well-known shilling attack models include Random attacks and
Average attacks [58]. In Random attacks, the set of filler items are rated randomly
on a distribution learnt from the ratings in the dataset, whereas in Average attacks,
each filler item is rated around the average rating of this individual item, making the
spam users more similar to the genuine users. Hence, the Average attack is more
effective than the Random attack. Moreover, in both attack models, the set of target
items are given the highest allowed rating for push attacks and the lowest rating for
nuke attacks.
5.2.2 Probabilistic Modeling of Attack Detection
We assume there are a set of M users denoted by U = {1, . . . ,M} and a set of N
items denoted by I = {1, . . . , N} in the system. Let rui denote user u’s rating on item
i, and R denote the set of all observed ratings in the system. The set of users who
have rated item i is denoted by Ui, and the set of items rated by user u is denoted by
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Iu. For each user u, we assign a binary variable mu, where mu = 1 if user u is a spam
user and mu = 0 otherwise. Similarly, for each item i, we assign a binary variable ti,
where ti = 1 if item i is a target and ti = 0 otherwise. Let M = {mu : 1 ≤ u ≤ M}
and T = {ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ N}. We denote by P (M, T |R) the joint posterior probability
distribution ofM and T given the observed ratings in R. To identify spam users, we
need to find the marginal distributions of P (mu|R), ∀u ∈ U. P (mu|R) can be directly





P (M, T |R). (69)




, which is exponential in the
total number of users and items. In the following, we propose a proper factorization of
P (M, T |R), and employ the efficient Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm that operates
in a factor graph to infer P (mu|R), ∀u ∈ U.
We begin by describing the local functions that P (M, T |R) factorizes into. Since
spam users collaboratively work together to influence the ratings on target items, the
local dependency among spam users is induced by their ratings on target items. Let
Mi = {mu : u ∈ Ui, rui = ra}, where ra denotes the maximum rating in cases of push
attacks and the minimum rating in cases of nuke attacks. The reader may focus on
push attacks, as the method and results hold for the nuke attacks as well. Hence, we
introduce the local function fi (Mi, ti|R) to model the local probabilistic dependency
among variables in {Mi, ti}. Given a configuration ofMi, we can compute the rating















where the first term in the absolute operator is the average rating on item i, including
all ratings, and the second term is the unbiased average rating after removing ratings
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from spam users. Based on (70), we express fi (Mi, ti|R) as
fi (Mi, ti|R) =
1
1 + exp ((−1)1−tiαt (∆ri (Mi)− δr))
, (71)
where αt < 0 and δr > 0, and both are adjustable scalars. Given a configuration of
Mi, if the rating bias ∆ri (Mi) exceeds δr, this function assigns a larger value for
ti = 1 than for ti = 0, and vice versa.
We also introduce a local factor function for each variable in M and T , so as to
incorporate the local information extracted from each individual user and item. Let
gu(mu|R) be the local function for mu ∈ M. gu(mu|R) can be designed to take into
account the rating patterns of individual users, such as those user features introduced
in [22]. Here, for the purpose of illustration, we consider the use of a single feature φu
of user u. A simple probabilistic discriminative classifier [18] based solely on feature
φu can be given in the following form
gu(mu|R) =
1
1 + exp ((−1)1−muβ1(φu − τ1))
, (72)
where β1 and τ1 are design parameters.
Likewise, we define a local factor function hi(ti|R) for each ti ∈ T . We notice
that the ratings of target items are more likely to have large variances than those
of normal items, due to the eccentric ratings from spam users. Let ϕi denote the
variance in ratings of item i. Similar to gu(mu|R), we define hi(ti|R) as follows
hi(ti|R) =
1
1 + exp ((−1)1−tiβ2(ϕi − τ2))
, (73)
where β2 and τ2 are design parameters.
Based on the local functions, we can express the factorization of P (M, T |R) as
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Figure 21: The factor graph for attack detection.
5.2.3 BP-based Inference in A Factor Graph
A factor graph is a bipartite graph that expresses the factorization structure of a func-
tion, where variable nodes and factor nodes represent variables and local functions,
respectively, and an edge connects a variable node to a factor node if and only if the
variable is an argument of the local function associated with the factor node [54]. We
illustrate the factor graph that expresses the factorization of P (M, T |R) by (74) in
Fig. 21. Specifically, user variable mu is represented by node mu, and item variable
ti is represented by node ti in Fig. 21. Each factor function in (74) is represented by
a factor node. We connect each factor node gi to item variable node ti, and connect
each factor node hu to user variable node mu. Also, we connect each factor node fi
to the user variable nodes in Mi and the item variable node ti.
To infer the marginal distributions P (mu|R), ∀u ∈ U, we apply BP in the factor
graph to exploit the factorization for efficient inference. Since the constructed factor
graph has loops, we cannot apply the standard BP algorithm for exact inference. We
thus resort to loopy BP, which performs iterative message passing between variable
nodes and factor nodes along the edges in the factor graph [54].
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5.2.4 Complexity Reduction
While the BP algorithm can be much more efficient than direct computation using
(69), the computational complexity for generating messages at the factor node is
exponential in the degree of the factor node. This computational burden can be





for generating a message. Since in recommender systems an item can
be rated by over hundreds of users, it renders the BP algorithm almost practically
infeasible. Hence, we propose a complexity reduction technique by reducing the degree
of factor node fi as follows.
We randomly divide the user variable nodes in Mi into Gi = d|Mi|/De groups,
where D is a small integer. LetM(k)i denote the set of user variable nodes in group k,
andMik be the size of group k, whereMik = D for 1 ≤ k < Gi, andMik = |Mi|modD
for k = Gi. Assuming independence among groups, we can approximate (74) using













































where Ûi = {u : u ∈ Ui, rui 6= ra}, R̂i =
∑
u∈Ûi rui, and wik = Mik/|Mi|. Note that
we allocate R̂i, the sum of ratings from Ûi, to each group in proportion to the group
size. Similarly as in Sec. 5.2.3, we construct a new factor graph for (75) and apply the
















We evaluate the performance of the proposed BP-based attack detection algorithm
using the 100K MovieLens dataset1. The dataset contains 100, 000 ratings, all integers
from 1 to 5, on 1682 items (movies) by 943 users. We treat the original users in the
dataset as genuine users. To launch shilling attacks, a number of spam users are
injected into the system. The ratio of spam users to genuine users is set as 1
10
. Each
spam user randomly selects a set of filler items from the top 50% most popular items
according to the number of ratings each item receives, similar to [47]. We refer to the
ratio of filler items to all items as filler size. We consider the Average attack model
described in Sec. 5.2.1, since it is more effective than the Random attack. The rating
on each filler item follows a normal distribution with standard deviation σ, and its
mean is set as the average rating received by the filler item. Finally, a set of items
are selected as targets in the attack. For the push attack, each target item has an
average rating between 1 and 3, whereas for the nuke attack, each target item has
an average rating between 3 and 5. We assume all spam users have the same set of
targets.
We evaluate the performance of the attack detection algorithms in terms of Pre-
cision and Recall metrics, which are computed as follows
Precision =
|D ∩ S|
|D| and Recall =
|D ∩ S|
|S| ,
where D and S denote the sets of detected spam users and true spam users, respec-
tively. We compare the performance of various detection algorithms, including the
proposed BP algorithm, the PCA-VarSel algorithm in [73], and the feature-based
algorithm using (72).
To assess the detection performance, the PCA-VarSel algorithm described in [73]
1Available at: http://www.grouplens.org/node/73.
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sorts the users in ascending order of their contribution to the principle components
(PCs) obtained from PCA analysis, and selects the top-Md listed users as spam users.
For easy comparison and fairness, in the proposed BP algorithm, we likewise sort
users in descending order of P (mu = 1|R), and also select the top-Md users as spam
users. Similarly, in the feature-based algorithm, we select the top-Md users ranked in
descending order of gu(mu = 1|R). In our experiments, we set Md as the number of
true spam users injected into the system, so the Precision and Recall are equal.
In the proposed BP algorithm, we adopt the MeanVar feature introduced in [22]






where r̄i is the average rating of item i, and Īu = {i : rui = ra, i ∈ Iu}. The MeanVar
feature is particularly effective for detecting spam users in Average attacks.
5.3.2 Results and Discussion
In Fig. 22, we present the results for detecting spam users in Push attacks, where
we have set the parameters of the proposed BP algorithm as αt = −3 and δr = 0.35
in (71), β1 = −1 and τ1 = 0.5 in (72), β2 = 1 and τ2 = 1.5 in (73), and the group
size D = 8 for complexity reduction described in Sec. 5.2.4. The results show that
the performance of the proposed BP algorithm improves significantly as the number
of targets increases, reaching almost 100% precision when there are enough number
of targets, whereas the other algorithms do not exhibit such improvement. This
verifies that the proposed algorithm can effectively exploit the target items to detect
spam users with high accuracy. Since the BP algorithm also incorporates the output
gu(mu|R) of the feature-based algorithm as illustrated in Fig. 21, we would like to
examine the case when the performance of the feature-based algorithm is very poor.
In Fig. 22c, the detection precision of the feature-based algorithm is only around
20% after we set σ = 0.7. Interestingly, we observe a threshold phenomenon for
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(a) Filler size = 5% and σ = 0.6



























(b) Filler size = 10% and σ = 0.6



























(c) Filler size = 10% and σ = 0.7
Figure 2: Detection precision versus number of targets in Push attacks.



























Figure 3: Detection precision
versus number of targets in Nuke
attacks. Filler size = 10% and
σ = 0.7.




























(a) Detection precision of spam users
versus number of targets




























(b) Detection precision of target items
versus number of targets
Figure 4: Detection performance in Push attacks under varying filler
sizes. σ = 0.6.
tion results for both spam users and target items in Fig. 4a
and Fig. 4b, respectively. Here, to evaluate the detection
performance for the target items, we infer P (ti|R) from (6)
and select the top-Nt items ranked in descending order of
P (ti = 1|R), where Nt is set as the number of true targets.
Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As
the filler size increases, the BP algorithm suffers from per-
formance loss for small numbers of targets. This is because
the BP algorithm relies on information from target items,
but the noise information from the filler items corrupts the
useful information. Indeed, we can see in Fig. 4b that the
detection precision for target items drops with increasing
filler size. However, when there are enough target items to
suppress the noise information, the BP algorithm still can
achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that in
practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
algorithm can be enhanced with feature-based algorithms
that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
4. CONCLUSION
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the
shilling attacks, we proposed a BP-based algorithm for de-
tecting spam users in a probabilistic inference framework.
Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on
users’ rating patterns, the proposed algorithm further ex-
ploits the target items. Considering the computational com-
plexity for inference, we developed a factorized probabilistic
model for attack detection and applied BP to perform in-
ference efficiently. The proposed detection algorithm can
also conveniently incorporate the existing algorithms for en-
hanced performance. We showed through experiments that
the proposed BP algorithm significantly improves detection
accuracy as the number of target items increases. We also
observed that its performance degrades with increasing filler
sizes. In the future work, we will develop more robust algo-
rithms to deal with more sophisticated attack scenarios.
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Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As
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the BP algorithm relies on information from target items,
but the noise information from the filler items corrupts the
useful information. Indeed, we can see in Fig. 4b that the
detection precision for target items drops with increasing
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suppress the noise information, the BP algorithm still can
achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that in
practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
algorithm can be enhanced with feature-based algorithms
that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
4. CONCLUSION
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the
shilling attacks, we proposed a BP-based algorithm for de-
tecting spam users in a probabilistic inference framework.
Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on
users’ rating patterns, the proposed algorithm further ex-
ploits the target items. Considering the computational com-
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tion results for both spam users and target items in Fig. 4a
and Fig. 4b, respectively. Here, to evaluate the detection
performance for the target items, we infer P (ti|R) from (6)
and select the top-Nt items ranked in descending order of
P (ti = 1|R), where Nt is set as the number of true targets.
Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As
the filler size increases, the BP algorithm suffers from per-
formance loss for small numbers of targets. This is because
the BP algorithm relies on information from target items,
but the noise information from the filler items corrupts the
useful information. Indeed, we can see in Fig. 4b that the
detection precision for target items drops with increasing
filler size. However, when there are enough target items to
suppress the noise information, the BP algorithm still can
achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that in
practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
algorithm can be enhanced with feature-based algorithms
that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
4. CONCLUSION
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the
shilling attacks, we proposed a BP-based algorithm for de-
tecting spam users in a probabilistic inference framework.
Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on
users’ rating patterns, the proposed algorithm further ex-
ploits the target items. Considering the computational com-
plexity for inference, we developed a factorized probabilistic
model for attack detection and applied BP to perform in-
ference efficiently. The proposed detection algorithm can
also conveniently incorporate the existing algorithms for en-
hanced performance. We showed through experiments that
the proposed BP algorithm significantly improves detection
accuracy as the number of arget items increases. We also
observed that its performance degrades with increasing filler
sizes. I the future work, we will develop more robust algo-
rithms to deal with m re sophisticated attack scenarios.
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and select the top-Nt items ranked in descending order of
P (ti = 1|R), where Nt is set as the number of true targets.
Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As
the filler size increases, the BP algorithm suffers from per-
formance loss for small numbers of targets. This is because
the BP algorithm relies on information from target items,
but the noise information from the filler items corrupts the
useful information. Indeed, we can see in Fig. 4b that the
detection precision for target items drops with increasing
filler size. However, when there are enough target items to
suppress the noise information, the BP algorithm still can
achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that in
practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
algorithm can be enhanced with feature-based algorithms
that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
4. CONCLUSION
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the
shilling attacks, we proposed a BP-based algorithm for de-
tecting spam users in a probabilistic inference framework.
Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on
users’ rating patterns, the proposed algorithm further ex-
ploits the target items. Considering the computational com-
plexity for inference, we developed a factorized probabilistic
model for attack detection and applied BP to perform in-
ference efficiently. The proposed detection algorithm can
also conveniently incorporate the existing algorithms for en-
hanced performance. We showed through experiments that
the proposed BP algorithm significantly improves detection
accuracy as the number of target items increases. We also
observed that its performance degrades with increasing filler
sizes. In the future work, we will develop more robust algo-
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Figure 23: Detection precision versus number of targets in Nuke attacks. Filler size
= 10% and σ = 0.7.
the BP algorithm, that is the BP algorithm has 0% precision when the number of
targets is small, but when the number of targets exceeds a certain number, the BP
algorithm provides almost 100% precision. This is because as the number of targets
increases, the information gained from target items becomes dominant and corrects
the results of the feature-based algorithm. Note that in practical implementations,
we can incorporate into the BP algorithm more advanced feature-based algori hms
for better performance. We have also performed experiments for Nuke attacks, and
similar results can be observed, so we only present one set of those results in Fig. 23.
In Fig. 24, we investig te the impact of the filler size on the performance of the
BP algorithm. We show the detection results for both spam users and target items
in Fig. 24a and Fig. 24b, respectively. Here, to evaluate the detection performance
for the target items, we infer P (ti|R) from (74) and select the top-Nt items ranked
in descending order of P (ti = 1|R), where Nt is set as the number of true targets.
Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As the filler size increases,
the BP algorithm suffers from performance loss for small numbers of targets. This
is because the BP algorithm relies on information from target items, but the noise
information from the filler items corrupts the useful information. Indeed, we can see
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Note that the existing algorithms only detect spam users. As
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achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that in
practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
algorithm can be enhanced with feature-based algorithms
that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
4. CONCLUSION
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the
shilling attacks, we proposed a BP-based algorithm for de-
tecting spam users in a probabilistic inference framework.
Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on
users’ rating patterns, the proposed algorithm further ex-
ploits the target items. Considering the computational com-
plexity for inference, we developed a factorized probabilistic
model for attack detection and applied BP to perform in-
ference efficiently. The proposed detection algorithm can
also conveniently incorporate the existing algorithms for en-
hanced performance. We showed through experiments that
the proposed BP algorithm significantly improves detection
accuracy as the number of target items increases. We also
observed that its performance degrades with increasing filler
sizes. In the future work, we will develop more robust algo-
rithms to deal with more sophisticated attack scenarios.
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practice a higher cost is incurred for attackers to increase the
filler size while decreasing the target number. Also, the BP
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Figure 24: Detection performance in Push attacks under varying filler sizes. σ = 0.6.
in Fig. 24b that the detection precision for target items drops with increasing filler
size. However, when there are enough target items to suppress the noise information,
the BP algorithm still can achieve high detection precision. It is worth noting that
in practice highe cost i incurred for attackers to increase the fill r size while
decreasing the target number. Also, the BP algorithm can be enhanced with feature-
based algorithms that deliver high detection accuracy for large filler sizes.
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5.4 Conclusion
To protect the collaborative filtering systems against the shilling attacks, we proposed
a BP-based algorithm for jointly detecting spam users in a probabilistic inference
framework. Different from the existing algorithms that rely solely on users’ rating pat-
terns, the proposed algorithm further exploits the colluding spammers’ collaborative
spamming behaviors towards target items. Considering the computational complexity
for inference, we developed a factorized probabilistic model for attack detection and
applied BP to perform inference efficiently. The proposed detection algorithm can
also conveniently incorporate the existing algorithms for enhanced performance. We
showed through experiments that the proposed BP algorithm significantly improves
detection accuracy as the number of target items increases. We also observed that its
performance degrades with increasing filler sizes. In the future work, we will develop
more robust algorithms to deal with more sophisticated attack scenarios.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPLOITING POPULARITY AND SIMILARITY FOR
SOCIAL LINK RECOMMENDATION
6.1 Introduction
Twitter is a popular on-line platform for social networking and information sharing.
Twitter users can follow other users to receive messages, or tweets, from them. How-
ever, given the limited attention and time, most users would like to follow only the
most relevant users. Due to the huge number of users in Twitter, recommendation
algorithms are needed to help users automatically discover new interesting users to
follow.
Many existing link recommendation algorithms for social networks are developed
with focus on the link structure [64]. The simplest example is to recommend the most
popular users with the largest number of connections. Other common algorithms first
weigh each link by some importance score, and rank the nodes according to the sum of
importance scores of their links, e.g., the PageRank algorithm [84]. Twitter provides
the user recommendation service called WTF (“Who To Follow”) [41], which was built
on SALSA (Stochastic Approach for Link-Structure Analysis) [61], a random-walk
algorithm similar to PageRank. We generally refer to those algorithms as “popularity”
or “weighted popularity” based algorithms.
Yet, unlike other social networks such as Facebook, besides to establish social
connections, many Twitter users follow other users to receive information interesting
to them. Hence, it is promising to exploit the similarity between Twitter users for
recommendation, i.e., to recommend other users similar to the followees already fol-
lowed by the follower, or to recommend other users who are similar to the follower.
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In [43], the authors proposed a content-based algorithm that match user interests by
directly analyzing the texts of user tweets. In [75], the authors proposed a collabora-
tive filtering algorithm using the matrix factorization technique to learn latent user
interests from the user feedbacks, e.g., to follow a user or not.
Indeed, a recent study has shown that popularity and similarity are the two impor-
tant factors that drive the growth of a variety of networks including the Internet and
social networks [85]. In this work, we compare various popularity-based algorithms
and similarity-based algorithms for Twitter user recommendation, and propose two
approaches to exploiting both popularity and similarity [131]. The first approach
is to employ rank aggregation techniques [32]; the second approach is to adapt the
collaborative filtering algorithms to incorporate popularity in addition to similarity.
6.2 Popularity versus Similarity
In this section, we describe various popularity-based algorithms and similarity-based
algorithms.
6.2.1 Problem Description
To recommend new users for the follower to follow, the recommendation algorithm
generates a personalized ranked list of users. However, due to the huge number of
users in Twitter, it is too costly to compute a ranking of network-wide users for
making personalized recommendations to each follower. Many algorithms instead
recommend users from the local network that centers around the follower [41]. The
empirical study in [124] revealed that 90% of new links in Twitter-like microblogging
networks go to users two hops away from the follower, i.e., followees of the follower’s
followees.
As such, in the rest of this paper, we focus on recommending users from 2-hop
users for the follower. We denote the follower whom to recommend users for as source
s, the set of its initial followees as F1, and the set of all followees of F1 as F2. We
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also denote F+(s) as the subset of F2 that source s follows as network grows. The




For the popularity based or weighted popularity based algorithms, we consider Adamic-
Adar score [64] and SALSA [61]. Adamic-Adar score is a simple and effective measure
for link recommendation. We adopt it for Twitter user recommendation, and compute






where P(u) denotes the set of followers of user u, andR(z) denotes the set of followees
of user z.
In the SALSA algorithm, we construct a bipartite graph G by assigning F1
as “hubs” and F2 as “authorities”. The algorithm performs two distinct forward-
backward random walks starting from the “authorities” side or the “hubs” side. The










where ai and hk denote the scores of authority node i and hub node k, respectively,
and (k, i) denotes an edge in bipartite graph G. The users in F2 (“authorities”) are
ranked by the authority scores.
6.2.2.2 Similarity-based algorithms
For the similarity-based algorithms, we focus on the collaborative filtering recom-
mendation algorithms using the observed follower-followee relationship between users
as implicit feedback, including the neighborhood method and the MF-BPR (Matrix
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Factorization with Bayesian Personalized Ranking) method [94]. The basic principle
is to recommend to source s the followees of the F1 users who share similar interests
with source s. Using the terms of traditional user-item recommender systems, the
set of “users” corresponds to U = {s} ∪ F1, and the set of “items” corresponds to
F2. Moreover, the established follower-followee relationships between U and F2 are
considered as observed implicit feedback on “items” in F2 from “users” in U . The
collaborative filtering approach exploits the collective implicit feedbacks to generate
recommendations.
In the neighborhood method, we compute the similarity between source s and
other users u ∈ F1 using Jaccard’s coefficient as
J(s, u) =
|F+(u) ∩ F+(s)|
|F+(u) ∪ F+(s)| (78)





J(s, u)R(u, i), (79)
where R(u, i) = 1 if u follows i and R(u, i) = 0 otherwise.
The MF-BPR method learns a model for correctly ranking pairs of users in F2.
It is assumed that if user u follows user i but not user j, ∀i, j ∈ F2, then user u
prefers user i over j. We represent such relationship as (u, i, j). The training data is
created as D = {(u, i, j)|i ∈ F+(u), j ∈ F2\F+(u)}. We associate each user u with a
K-dimensional latent vector wu, and each i ∈ F2 with a K-dimensional latent vector
vi. Let W and V represent the collections of all wu and all vi, respectively. The
probability that user u prefers i over j is defined as




where X(u, i) = 〈wu,vi〉, and 〈, 〉 indicates the dot product. We further introduce a
normal distribution N (0, λ−1IK) as the prior distribution for each wu and vi, where
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λ > 0 and IK is a K×K identity matrix. The latent vectors are learnt by maximizing






P (i >u j|W,V )P (W )P (V ). (81)
We apply the stochastic gradient-descent algorithm with bootstrap sampling as in
[94] to solve this optimization problem. The latent vectors are updated for triple
(u, i, j) ∈ D with learning rate µ as follows




















To recommend users for source s, we compute X(s, i), ∀i ∈ F2, and rank the users in
descending order of X(s, i).
6.3 Link Recommendation Using Popularity and Similarity
We propose two approaches to exploiting both popularity and similarity: rank ag-
gregation and popularity-biased collaborative filtering. The rank aggregation ap-
proach combines the recommendation results of the popularity-based algorithm and
the similarity-based algorithm, while each individual algorithm generates recommen-
dations independently. It is worth noting that the scores predicted by different rec-
ommendation algorithms can be very different in both the range and the form, which
are not suitable for aggregation, and hence we only consider order-based rank aggre-
gation that combines the rankings which can be easily derived by sorting users by the
predicted scores.
The popularity-biased collaborative filtering approach directly adapts the original
collaborative filtering algorithms to incorporate popularity in addition to similarity.




Rank aggregation combines several ranking lists to generate a “consensus” ranking.
It has been widely applied in Web search and document retrieval, e.g., meta-search
engines and multi-criteria search. There are various rank aggregation algorithms such
as Borda’s method, median rank aggregation, and Markov chain methods. We choose
the Markov chain method for its superior performance. In particular, we focus on the
MC3 method among the four Markov chain methods proposed in [32].
Suppose we have two ranked lists of users denoted by τ1 and τ2, which are gen-
erated using the popularity-based algorithm and the similarity-based algorithm, re-
spectively. The Markov chain rank aggregation method assigns a unique state to
each of the users, and specifies the transition matrix as follows: If the current state
is user i, randomly pick a ranking list τ with probabilities P (τ = τ1) = α and
P (τ = τ2) = 1−α, then uniformly pick a user j from τ , and go to j if j >τ i else stay
in i. Here, j >τ i means the list τ ranks j closer to the top than i. Let Tk represent
the transition matrix for the Markov chain derived from individual ranking list τk,






|F2| , if j >τk i
1− |{j|j>τk i}||F2| , if j = i
0, otherwise
(85)
The transition matrix T of the rank aggregation Markov chain can be written as
T = αT1 + (1− α)T2. (86)
The aggregated ranking is obtained by ranking users according to the stationary
probabilities of the Markov chain, which can be computed by solving
T>π = π, s.t.
∑
i∈F2
πi = 1, πi > 0 (87)
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where π denotes the stationary probability vector.
By varying the parameter α between 0 and 1, we can bias the aggregation rank
towards similarity or popularity, with α = 0 for similarity and α = 1 for popularity.
Further, α can be personalized for individual users to better predict their behavior
and thus meet individual preferences.
6.3.2 Popularity-biased Collaborative Filtering
We adapt the two cases of the neighborhood method and the matrix factorization
method, which are the most popular collaborative filtering recommendation algo-
rithms, for popularity-biased collaborative filtering. It should be noted that the spe-
cific techniques proposed here might not be directly applicable to other collaborative
filtering algorithms, as they may have very different prediction models. Neverthe-
less, we stress the viability and benefits of incorporating popularity into collaborative
filtering link recommendation.
6.3.2.1 The popularity-biased neighborhood method
The neighborhood method predicts the score on user i ∈ F2 for source s using (79),
where the feedback R(u, i) from user u in F1 (set as 1 for following i and 0 for
not following i) is weighted by the similarity of user u to source s. However, the
similarity computed using the Jaccard’s coefficient assigns zero to users who do not
have common followees with the source. To bias the neighborhood method towards
popularity, we modify the similarity measure as follows
Jp(s, u) =
|F+(u) ∩ F+(s)|+ c
|F+(u) ∪ F+(s)| , (88)
where c > 0 ensures that every user u ∈ F1 is counted with Jp(s, u) > 0. In this way,
the popular users who are followed by many users in F1, though not necessarily highly
similar to the source, can have a higher predicted score than other users followed by
only a few users with high similarity to the source.
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6.3.2.2 The popularity-biased MF-BPR method
The MF-BPR method represents each user i ∈ F2 using a latent vector as described
in Sec. 6.2.2.2. The similarity of user interests is modelled by the angle between
latent vectors. We now adapt the model to also incorporate the popularity of each
user by the length, or magnitude, of the latent vector. We assume a prior distribution
N (γ1, λ−1IK) for the latent vectors, where 1 denotes a vector with all entries one, and
randomly initialize the latent vectors following the normal distribution N (γ1, βIK),
where γ needs to be chosen relatively large. Using the stochastic gradient descent
learning algorithm, the latent vectors are updated for triple (u, i, j) ∈ D as follows




− 2λ(wu − γ1)
)
, (89)




− 2λ(vi − γ1)
)
, (90)
vj ← vj + µ
( −wu
1 + eX(u,i)−X(u,j)
− 2λ(vj − γ1)
)
. (91)
The latent vector vi of user i is updated through (90), where the angle between vi and
wu is expected to be small, as they are both close to the vector γ1 if γ is relatively
large. Hence, vi increases in length after each update. As popular users are updated
more often in the stochastic optimization process, their associated latent vectors will
have larger length.
The score on user i ∈ F2 by source s is predicted by
X(s, i) = 〈ws,vi〉 = cos θsi|ws||vi|, (92)
where θsi is the angle between ws and vi, which reflects the similarity of interests
between user i and source s. Moreover, with the popularity-biased MF-BPR method,
the magnitude |vi| is large for popular users. Therefore, both similarity and popu-




In this section, we compare the empirical performance of all recommendation algo-
rithms on the Twitter dataset and the Tencent Weibo dataset. Tencent Weibo is a
Twitter-like online microblogging service widely used in China. The Twitter dataset
is downloaded from Twitter.com using the Twitter API. The Tencent Weibo dataset
is a subset of the dataset provided by KDD Cup 2012 Track 11. The source users are
selected such that they have at least 100 followees. For each source user, we use its
earliest 50 followees as the initial set F1, and construct the set F2 from the followees
of F1. The statistics of the two datasets are shown in Table 12, where the number of
F2 users is the total of F2 users from all source users, and the number of edges refers
to the total number of follower-followee relationships between users.
In the experiment, we use 70% of the subset of F2 followed by each source user
for training, 15% for validation, and 15% for testing. To reduce computational com-
plexity, we further prune the F2 users that are followed by less than 5 users, as they
are very unlikely to be followed by the source users. The metrics used for evaluat-
ing recommendation performance are AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve) and P@10
(Precision at top 10). The AUC metric measures the algorithm’s overall ability to
rank positive instances above negative instances, whereas the P@10 metric empha-
sizes more on the quality of the top 10 recommended instances. We report results of
all algorithms on the testing set.
1http://www.kddcup2012.org/c/kddcup2012-track1
Table 12: Statistics of the two datasets.
Dataset # of sources # of F2 users # of edges
Twitter 158 3,195,481 6,822,720
Tencent 200 22,904 195,760
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Table 13: Popularity versus similarity.
Algorithms
Twitter dataset Tencent dataset
AUC P@10 AUC P@10
Adamic-Adar 0.7822 0.0144 0.7351 0.0934
SALSA 0.7458 0.0258 0.7168 0.1757
Neighborhood 0.6498 0.0186 0.6253 0.1326
MF-BPR 0.6363 0.0196 0.6730 0.1459
6.4.1 Popularity versus Similarity
We first compare the performance of the popularity-based algorithms (Adamic-Adar
and SALSA) and the similarity-based algorithms (Neighborhood and MF-BPR) as
shown in Table 13. The parameters of the MF-BPR algorithm are set as K = 20,
λ = 0.01 and µ = 0.001. The results show that the popularity-based algorithms
generally achieve better AUC than the similarity-based algorithms. However, the
similarity-based algorithms have quite good P@10 performance. Overall, combining
the results suggests that while Twitter users tend to follow popular users, they also
like to follow users with similar interests to them. Hence, there is a trade-off between
popularity and similarity.
6.4.2 Combining Popularity and Similarity
For the rank aggregation approach, we experiment with different combinations of
popularity-based and similarity-based algorithms, including AA & Neighb (Adamic-
Adar & Neighborhood), AA & MF-BPR (Adamic-Adar & MF-BPR), SLS & Neighb
(SALSA & Neighborhood), and SLS & MF-BPR (SALSA & MF-BPR). The pa-
rameter α is selected independently for each individual user such that the AUC is
maximized on the validation set for that user.
For the popularity-biased collaborative filtering approach, we evaluate the Pop-
Neighb (Popularity-biased Neighborhood) algorithm and the Pop-MF-BPR (Popularity-
biased MF-BPR) algorithm. The parameter c is set to 1 for Pop-Neighb, and the
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Table 14: Performance of algorithms combining popularity and similarity.
Algorithms
Twitter dataset Tencent dataset
AUC P@10 AUC P@10
AA & Neighb 0.7873 0.0155 0.7458 0.1365
AA & MF-BPR 0.7835 0.0227 0.7540 0.1519
SLS & Neighb 0.7493 0.0247 0.7156 0.1746
SLS & MF-BPR 0.7606 0.0309 0.7392 0.1862
Pop-Neighb 0.7746 0.0186 0.7236 0.1657
Pop-MF-BPR 0.7940 0.0536 0.7734 0.1818
parameters for Pop-MF-BPR are set as γ = 1 and β = 0.01, while other parameters
are set the same as in the original MF-BPR algorithm.
The results in Table 14 show that the popularity-biased MF-BPR algorithm
achieves the best performance in terms of both AUC and P@10. Comparing the
results of rank aggregation algorithms with those of the individual algorithms in Ta-
ble 13, we can see that rank aggregation can combine the advantages of the popularity-
based algorithm and the similarity-based algorithm. The popularity-biased neighbor-
hood method also improves over the original neighborhood method. In summary, the
evaluation results confirm that combining popularity and similarity can improve the
overall recommendation performance in terms of AUC as well as the quality of the
top ranked recommendations.
6.5 Conclusion
We proposed two approaches, the rank aggregation approach and the popularity-
biased collaborative filtering approach, to exploiting both popularity and similarity for
Twitter user recommendation. The rank aggregation approach combines the ranked
recommendations generated by the popularity-based algorithm and the similarity-
based algorithm. The popularity-biased collaborative filtering approach adapts the
Bayesian personalized ranking method to incorporate popularity. Through experi-
mental evaluation on two real-world datasets, we showed that the rank aggregation
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algorithms can combine the advantages of popularity-based and similarity-based al-
gorithms, and the popularity-biased collaborative filtering algorithms improve upon
the original algorithms in terms of both AUC and P@10.
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CHAPTER VII
REAL-TIME SOCIAL MEDIA EVENT CREDIBILITY
PREDICTION
7.1 Introduction and Related Works
Online social media services like Twitter are widely adopted by people to self-report
activities and stories happening around them [56]. Monitoring social media streams,
e.g., tweets in Twitter, becomes an effective way to detect real-time events and moni-
tor emergent situations [98, 112]. However, social media is also increasingly exploited
to spread rumors and false information, e.g., fake images during Hurricane Sandy
[41].
Automatic methods for assessing event credibility in social media services were
studied in [26], wherein the authors explored various aggregation features given a set
of tweets related to an event, and employed machine learning tools, e.g., Decision
Tree, for predicting event credibility. In [57], the authors also identified other promi-
nent features including temporal, structural, and linguistic features. However, those
features proposed in the above works require almost a complete set of tweets related
to the event, which usually means continuously collecting tweets over a long period
of time, causing significant delays in the prediction task from the time the event first
takes place.
The work in [40] proposed methods for real-time credibility assessment of indi-
vidual tweets, where a semi-supervised ranking model was used to assign credibility
scores to tweets in a user’s timeline based on features derived from single tweets. Since
it only requires the data of each individual tweet without assuming the complete data
of an event, it is able generate results in real time. Another work in [39] studied the
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credibility of tweets during high impact events. But neither of the works addressed
the real-time prediction of event credibility.
The interaction between the social media community and online information has
been studied in many works. Various algorithms were proposed to predict whether a
tweet will be retweeted [90, 107, 121], whether a tweet will be retweeted by a given
user [115, 16], the number of retweets of a tweet [45, 55], and who will retweet a
message in Twitter [66]. The work in [79] investigated the mechanism of credibility
perception by users. It revealed that users are not good at judging information credi-
bility based only on the message content, rather their perceptions are also influenced
by author credentials. However, those works did not consider utilizing the community
interactions towards event credibility analysis.
Streaming processing of tweets was studied in [89, 31, 109]. In [89], the authors
proposed a streaming model of computation for detecting new events from a stream
of Twitter posts. They achieved significant speedup in processing the large volume of
data coming from Twitter. The work in [31] predicted latent user attributes in Twitter
with stream-based classification, and it showed that the bag-of-words classification
model can be decomposed into a series of streaming updates. The work in [109]
applied Bayesian rule update to dynamical models for real-time streaming prediction
of political preferences of Twitter users.
In this chapter, we develop a probabilistic generative model for real-time event
credibility prediction with streaming tweets [134]. The model depicts the generative
process of individual tweets. Tweets related to true and false events are drawn from
different distributions. In addition, the model also captures the interaction between
the social media community and tweets. The research in [74] on information propaga-
tion in Twitter showed that tweets related to false rumors are propagated differently
from tweets of true news because rumors are more likely to be questioned and denied
by the Twitter community.
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Based on the generative model, we propose an online algorithm that updates pre-
diction with streaming tweets. In contrast to offline aggregation analysis that requires
a complete set of tweets related to an event, the proposed algorithm only uses the
currently observed streaming tweets. The algorithm incrementally updates predic-
tion without the need to store or reprocess the past tweets. We conduct experiments
on the dataset of tweets collected from Twitter. The results show that the online
prediction performance quickly approaches that of the batch prediction with only a
few hundred tweets.
7.2 Generative Model
In Twitter, users post messages, also known as tweets, to describe happening events
around them. Previous research in [26] has shown that the tweets related to true
events and false events exhibit different characteristics, which can be exploited for
automatic event credibility analysis. Meanwhile, the social media community interact
with messages by retweeting and favoriting messages. According to the study in [74],
the community interact differently with tweets related to true and false events, as
messages related to false events are questioned and denied more than messages related
to true events.
Our goal is to predict the credibility label of a new event with the relevant messages
collected from the streaming tweets in Twitter. In particular, we hope to predict the
label in real time, that is, to start prediction after observing only a few tweets in
the early stage, rather than wait until collecting a complete set of tweets over a long
period of time. In the following, we introduce a generative probabilistic model that
describes the generative process of tweets related to true and false events as well
as the community interactions, and specify the dependency relationships between
various variables. Using the generative model, we develop a real-time online prediction









Figure 25: Graphical representation of the generative model for event credibility
prediction.
7.2.1 Generative Process
We denote an event in Twitter as e, and use ye to denote its label, ye = 1 if true and
ye = 0 if false. The label ye is modelled by ye ∼ Bernoulli(η), where η can be used
to specify prior knowledge about labels. In this work, we always set η = 0.5, i.e., no
prior information is known. We define a set of messages related to event e as Me =
{m1(e),m2(e), . . . ,mNe(e)}, where Ne is the number of observed messages. Each
message m can be characterized by a set of features represented as θm = [θ1, . . . , θL],
where L is the number of features. The features can be directly extracted from the
individual messages. To model feature vector θm related to true and false events, we
use a mixture distribution f(θ), where
f(θ|ye) = yef1(θ) + (1− ye)f0(θ). (93)
Given the event is true, ye = 1, θm is drawn from the distribution f1(θ), otherwise
θm is drawn from the distribution f0(θ). We use non-parametric density estimation
methods to learn f(θ) from training data.
The community interaction on message m is denoted by rm, rm = 1 for positive
feedbacks and rm = 0 for negative feedbacks. We consider a message receives positive
feedback if the total number of “Retweets” and “Favorites” is greater than a preset
threshold, and negative feedback vice versa. The community feedback rm is modelled
as rm ∼ Bernoulli(pm), where pm depends on both the massage feature θm and event
103




1 + exp{−(wi0 + wi1θ1 + . . .+ wiLθL)}
. (94)
The coefficients wi = [wi0, wi1, . . . , wiL] capture how the community interact with
messages related to true events and false events. Let W = {wi,∀i = 1, 0}. We can
write the probability distribution of rm conditioned on θm and ye as







(1− S(w1,θm))ye (1− S(w0,θm))1−ye
]1−rm
. (95)
The prior distributions for coefficients wi are given by wi ∼ Gaussian(0, λ−1I) for
regularization.
The probabilistic graphical representation of the generative model is provided in
Fig. 25. The notations are summarized in Table 15. We describe the generative
process as follows:
1. Draw wi ∼ Gaussian(0, λ−1I), ∀i ∈ {0, 1}.
2. For each event e:
a) Draw its label ye ∼ Bernoulli(η);
b) For each message m related to event e:
– Draw its feature θm ∼ f(θ);
– Draw its feedback rm ∼ Bernoulli(pm).
7.2.2 Model Learning
Let E = {e1, e2, . . . , eN} represent the set of events. We denote Y = {ye|e ∈ E} as
the set of event labels, M = ∪e∈EMe as the set of relevant messages of all events,
Θ = {θm|m ∈ M} as the set of features of all messages, R = {rm|m ∈ M} as
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Table 15: The notations of the generative model.
N number of events
Ne number of relevant messages for event e
ye label of event e
θm feature vector of message m
rm community feedback on message m
pm parameter of the Bernoulli distribution for rm
wi coefficient vector for sigmoid function S
λ, η prior parameters for wi and ye, respectively
the set of community feedbacks on all messages, and Γ = {η, λ} as the set of hyper
parameters. The joint distribution of the observed data is given by






P (rm|θm, ye,W )f1(θm)yef0(θm)1−ye
× ηye(1− η)1−ye . (96)
Since f(θ) is independent of other variables given ye and θm, we can estimate f(θ)
from the observed data of ye and θm. We apply the non-parametric kernel density
estimation method. Let E1 = {e|ye = 1, e ∈ E} and E0 = {e|ye = 0, e ∈ E}. The











K (θ − θm) , (97)
where K(·) is the kernel function. There are various kernel functions can be used,
e.g., Tophat and Gaussian kernels.
We next estimate the parameter W by maximizing the posterior probability given
the observed data









(1− rm) log(1− S(wi,θm))−
λ
2
w>i wi + c0 (98)
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where c0 is some constant. We employ the numerical Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (BFGS) algorithm [83] to solve for the unique optimal solution.
7.2.3 Online Prediction with Streaming Tweets
Let M
(h)
e denote the observed tweets related to event e during a short period of Th.
The posterior probability of the event label is given by
P (ye|M (h)e ) ∝
∏
m∈M(h)e
P (rm|θm, ye)f(θm|ye)P (ye|η). (99)
At the beginning, we can initialize the parameter η for the prior distribution of ye
with any prior information. We then use the posterior to update the prior for ye,
P (ye|η(h)) = P (ye|M (1)e ,M (2)e , . . . ,M (h)e ). (100)
As we continue to observe new streaming tweets M
(h+1)
e for period Th+1, we compute
the new posterior for ye as
P (ye|M (1)e ,M (2)e , . . . ,M (h)e ,M (h+1)e ) ∝
∏
m∈M(h+1)e
P (rm|θm, ye)f(θm|ye)P (ye|η(h)). (101)
Therefore, the online streaming prediction algorithm does not need to store or re-
process the tweets observed in the past. After each period Th, we can update the
prediction of event label as arg maxP (ye|M (1)e ,M (2)e , . . . ,M (h)e ).
7.3 Experiments
We run experiments on a dataset of tweets collected from Twitter.com, and evaluate
the event credibility prediction performance of the proposed model.
7.3.1 Datasets
7.3.1.1 Collection
A set of events and trending topics were collected from facebook.com, twitter.com,
and snopes.com on a daily basis. Note that snopes.com also provides labels for the
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listed events. For other unlabelled events, we asked 5 annotators to label the events
as true or false. They consulted external resources including major news websites
such as cnn.com and nytimes.com to determine the credibility of events. To reduce
uncertainty in event labelling, we only included the events whose labels were agreed
upon by at least 4 annotators.
For each event, we gathered tweets relevant to the event from twitter.com via
Twitter Search API1. We constructed a query for each event with a group of keywords,
and sent the search request to twitter.com to retrieve tweets contain all keywords in
the query. Each returned tweet contains the tweet text, the author information, and
the number of “Retweets” and “Favorites”. In the experiments, we define a tweet
receives positive feedback if the total count of “Reweets” and “Favorites” is greater
than 1 and negative feedback vice versa. The Twitter Search API only returns tweets
from the past week. In addition, to avoid collecting duplicated tweets, we removed
all retweets.
We limited the maximum number of collected tweets to 500 per event, and also
discarded events with less than 30 tweets. We continued this process for a period
of three months from November 2014 to January 2015 until collected 104 events
consisting of 52 true events and 52 false events. The total number of collected relevant
tweets is 29,345.
7.3.1.2 Features
For each collected tweet, we extract a set of features similar to those discovered in
[26], including the author-based features: registration age, number of posted tweets,
number of followers, number of friends, and friend-follower ratio; the content-based
features: sentiment score, subjectivity score, contains URLs, contains user mentions,
contains question marks, and contains first pronouns. Note that the friend-follower
1https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/search
107
Table 16: Aggregation features for event classification.
Author Average registration age
Average number of posted tweets
Average number of followers
Average number of friends
Content Fraction of messages contain URLs
Average sentiment score
Fraction of messages with positive sentiment
Fraction of messages with negative sentiment
Fraction of messages contain user mentions
Fraction of messages contain question marks
Fraction of messages contain first pronouns
Fraction of messages with positive feedback
ratio is computed as (number of friends + 100)/(number of followers + 100), so as to
smooth the ratio when the number of followers is very small.
The raw values of author features vary over a very wide range. We apply the
transformation F (fa) =
fa
fa+df
to author feature fa, where df is some constant for
each feature. We set df as the median of observed fa values. The transformed feature
values are now in the range of [0, 1].
7.3.2 Batch Prediction Performance
We first evaluate the offline batch prediction performance of the proposed algorithm,
where all collected relevant tweets are used for prediction. We set the prior parameter
for regularization of W as λ = 1, and use Tophat kernel with a bandwidth of 0.4 for
the nonparametric kernel estimator in f(θ).
7.3.2.1 Baselines
The baseline algorithms are the classification algorithms using the aggregation fea-
tures of events as proposed in [26]. We apply the Decision Tree and linear Support
Vector Machine (SVM) methods for this purpose. For those algorithms, we use the
aggregation features presented in Table 16 including the author-based features and
the content-based features, which were shown to have good discrimination power. We
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Table 17: Batch prediction performance for the true and false event classes.
Algorithm
All True Event Class False Event Class
Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score Precision Recall F1 score
Proposed 0.823 0.829 0.826 0.822 0.838 0.820 0.821
SVM 0.771 0.807 0.760 0.763 0.766 0.783 0.765
Decision Tree 0.725 0.735 0.740 0.715 0.764 0.710 0.720
omit some propagation-based aggregation features, e.g., the maximum size of a level
in the propagation tree, because they require the complete set of tweets relevant to
an event in order to reconstruct the tweet propagation tree, but our dataset does
not guarantee such completeness. Also, generating those features often causes much
longer delay since the propagation of tweets takes time.
7.3.2.2 Performance Comparison
We run 10-fold cross validation and report the average results. Table 17 shows the
overall classification accuracy as well as the precision and recall performance of both
the true event and false event classes. The proposed model achieves an overall predic-
tion accuracy of 82.3%, and it outperforms the baseline methods across all metrics.
Therefore, modelling events at the individual message level is a more effective ap-
proach to event credibility prediction when only a subset of tweets related to events
are available.
7.3.3 Online Streaming Prediction
We investigate the online prediction performance of the proposed model with stream-
ing tweets, where the probability of the event label is updated online through (101).
In Fig. 26, we show the online prediction accuracy versus the number of observed
tweets. The performance first improves significantly as the number of tweets in-
creases. The algorithm achieves a quite good accuracy of 78.3% even with only 200
tweets. After the number of tweets reaches around 200 to 300, the performance im-
provement slows down. This is because after the number of past tweets becomes
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Figure 26: Online prediction performance with streaming tweets.
large, a relatively small number of new streaming tweets can only slightly influence
the prediction. Also, as more and more tweets are observed, the accuracy converges
to the limit of the prediction performance of the model. The results confirm that the
online prediction algorithm quickly approaches the prediction accuracy of the batch
prediction with only a few hundred tweets.
7.3.4 Impact of Parameters and Kernels
In the following, we investigate the impact of parameters and density estimation
kernels on the proposed algorithm based on the 10-fold cross-validation results.
7.3.4.1 Impact of Parameter λ
We examine the impact of parameter λ on the proposed model. In Fig. 27, we show
the cross-validation classification accuracy with λ taking different values. We fixed
the density estimation kernel as Tophat with its bandwidth set to 0.4. We can see that
setting λ around 1 achieves the best accuracy performance. As λ becomes too large,
the accuracy decreases, because the excessive regularization on W causes underfitting.
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Figure 27: Impact of parameter λ.



























Figure 28: Impact of density estimation kernels.
7.3.4.2 Impact of Density Estimation Kernel
In Fig. 28, we show the accuracy for various density estimation kernels used in (97),
including Tophat and Gaussian kernels with different bandwidths, while fixing λ as 1.
For the Tophat kernel, setting the bandwidth to 0.4 achieves the best performance,
while for the Gaussian kernel, a bandwidth of 0.2 works best. The best accuracy
performance of the Tophat kernel is slightly better than that of the Gaussian kernel.
When the bandwidth is too large, the performance of both kernels degrades due to
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over-smoothing in the estimated density function. Meanwhile, for the Tophat kernel,
when the bandwidth is too small, its prediction performance dramatically drops due
to under-smoothing. Overall, the Gaussian kernel is less sensitive to the bandwidth
than the Tophat kernel, because the Gaussian kernel is smoother than the Tophat
kernel.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a probabilistic generative model for real-time event
credibility prediction in Twitter-like social media. In contrast to aggregation analysis
techniques that require a complete set of tweets related to events, our model only
needs signals extracted from individual tweets. Using the generative model, we pro-
posed an online streaming prediction algorithm without storing or reprocessing the
past tweets. Through experiments on the Twitter dataset, we showed that the batch
prediction performance of our model outperforms other algorithms based on aggre-
gation analysis, and the online streaming prediction performance quickly approaches
that of the batch prediction with only a few hundred tweets.
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CHAPTER VIII
USER TRUSTWORTHINESS PREDICTION VIA PMRF
8.1 Introduction and Related Works
Online social networks e.g., Facebook and Twitter, are becoming important plat-
forms for making social connections and sharing information. However, due to the
open nature of such social networking platforms, they are inherently vulnerable to
malicious users or spammers who misuse social networks to perform malevolent ac-
tivities [21, 48] such as spamming, phishing, and spreading computer viruses. Hence,
user trustworthiness in social networks has attracted wide interest from both gov-
ernment and industry [103]. Existing works in [106, 117, 60] proposed to predict
user trustworthiness based on user behavior patterns in social networks. They intro-
duced various features extracted from user profiles and user generated social content,
and used them to detect spammers using classification tools from machine learning.
Although such feature-based classification approaches can capture behavioural char-
acteristics of individual users, they ignore the relationships between users.
In most online social networks, users can connect to other people they know or
share common interests. The establishment of bidirectional connections between users
often indicates some degree of similarity in their trustworthiness. In some social net-
works like Facebook, the connecting request initialized by one user requires explicit
approval from the other user before they become connected, and in other social net-
works like Twitter, although users can unilaterally establish directed connections,
e.g., following other people, bidirectional connections are mostly established between
friends who know each other in real life, or between people who share mutual interests.
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Hence, users with close social relationships are more likely to have similar roles in so-
cial networks. For example, the study on the Twitter social network has revealed that
criminal user accounts tend to be socially connected to form a small-world network
[118].
A number of other works utilized the connection patterns in social network struc-
ture. In [23] the authors evaluated user trustworthiness based on the density of
interconnections between users, assigning higher trustworthiness to users with higher
degree of connections. In [15], the authors proposed to use social network characteris-
tics of community formation to learn classification models for identifying spammers.
However, in today’s social networks, there can be a significantly larger number of
malicious users and they can connect to each other to increase their social connec-
tions. Indeed, the authors in [118] examined the Twitter network as a particular case
and found that criminal accounts tend to be socially connected to form a small-world
network.
In [126], a socially regularized matrix factorization model was used to learn latent
user features from social activities for spammer detection in social networks. By
exploiting users’ social relationships, it imposed a social regularization term on matrix
factorization. The latent factor vector of a user should be similar to their connected
users’, since they share similar interests and may perform similar social activities. In
[46], the authors employed social relationships to regularize the least squares model for
spammer classification, where an extra penalty is added to the loss function during
training if two users with close social relationships have different predicted labels.
However, the user’s social relationships are not utilized to predict the label of an
unknown target user. In [101], the authors proposed a social network aided Bayesian
spam email filter, which adjusts the keyword weights based on the social closeness
between the email receiver and sender, as users with high closeness are less likely to
send spam emails to each other.
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In this chapter, we propose a probabilistic model based on Pairwise Markov Ran-
dom Field (PMRF) that takes into account both user features and social relationships
[133]. We use PMRF to express a proper factorization of the joint distribution of users
based on their social relationships. As PMRF can be conveniently represented by a
probabilistic graph consisting of edges and nodes, we can apply the Belief Propagation
(BP) [87] algorithm to exploit the graph structure to perform inference efficiently, and
hence, the complexity of the algorithm grows only linear in the number of users. In
the experiment, we apply the proposed algorithm to predict spammers in the Twitter
datasets, and show that the proposed PMRF model can effectively exploit the social
relationships to significantly improve the prediction performance.
8.2 User Feature-Based Methods
In this section, we briefly introduce how user features are derived and used to predict
user trustworthiness in social networks. As the research results in [60, 117] show, the
different patterns of trusted users and untrusted users can be captured by carefully
designed user features. Generally, the user features are mainly extracted from the
following two major categories of social data:
8.2.0.3 User Profiles
The profiles of trusted users tend to be more complete and verifiable than those of
untrusted users. For example, trusted users usually provide more details of personal
information, such as his professional title and employer, and they may also provide
links to personal webpages, so that other people can actually verify the user’s true
identity in real-life. In addition, the existing time of a trusted user’ account since




Users generate data and disseminate information in online social networks, e.g., post
tweets in Twitter. We can directly look into user generated content to determine if a
user is behaving improperly, e.g., posting spam messages that include phishing URLs.
Also, we can extract certain patterns of users’ posting behaviors, such as the number
of duplicated messages users post. The specific features that are effective depend on
the form of the social network, and need to be designed accordingly.
The basic approach to analyzing user trustworthiness is using the classification
machine learning tools [106, 117, 60], e.g., Support Vector Machine and Decision Tree.
The classifiers are first trained with labelled user data, and given a unknown user they
generate classification results as the predicted user trustworthiness. However, such
classifiers treat each individual user separately from others in social networks, and
ignore the social relationships between users.
8.3 Modelling Trustworthiness on PMRF
In order to exploit the social relationships to improve user trustworthiness prediction,
we formulate the problem as a probabilistic inference problem using a PMRF graphical
model, where the social relationships can be conveniently modeled as edges between
hidden nodes. In addition, the inference in PMRF can be carried out efficiently by
using the BP algorithm.
8.3.1 Probabilistic Problem Formulation
We assume a set U of M users in the social network, U = {1, . . . ,M}. Our goal is to
infer the trustworthiness ru of each user u ∈ U. We model ru as a discrete random
variable, which takes values from a discrete set Γ = {s1, s2, . . . , sL}, |Γ| = L. For
example, with Γ = {0, 1}, we can use 0 and 1 to represent “malicious/untrusted”






Figure 29: Illustration of the PMRF model for user trustworthiness.
by vector θu = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θp] with length p, which can be extracted from the social
data as discussed in Sec. 8.2. Let R = {r1, . . . , rM} denote the set of trustworthiness
variables, and Θ = {θ1, . . . ,θM} denote the set of user features for all users.
To take into account the dependency between users due to social relationships, we
need to jointly model all variables in R. Let P (R|Θ) be the joint posterior distribution
of R, given the observed user features in Θ. Then to compute ru, we infer the
marginal posterior distribution P (ru|Θ) from P (R|Θ). The direct computation can













which is summation over all variables except ru. Obviously, the computational com-
plexity grows exponentially as O(LM). Considering the large number of users in
social networks, (102) is computationally infeasible. In the following, we propose a
PMRF model that properly factorizes the joint distribution P (R|Θ) into local func-
tions according to social relationships between users, and hence we can apply the BP
algorithm to infer P (ru|Θ) efficiently.
8.3.2 Modelling via PMRF
A PMRF consists of hidden and observed nodes [122], in which the statistical depen-
dencies between two connected hidden nodes are represented by compatibility func-
tions, and the dependency relations between the observed nodes and hidden nodes
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are represented by local evidence functions. We model the joint posterior probability
distribution P (R|Θ) in a PMRF G as illustrated in Fig. 29. For each user u, whose
trustworthiness ru needs to be predicted, we assign a hidden node (or variable node),
shown as a hexagon, and we further connect it to an observed node (or feature node),
shown as a circle, which represents the observed features θu of user u. To capture the
dependence among variables induced by social relationships, variable nodes ru and rv
are connected via an edge, if there exists a social relationship between users u and v.
Let E denote the set of all edges between variable nodes. We can express a proper
factorization of P (R|Θ) represented by PMRF G as follows








where Z is a normalization factor, ψuv(ru, rv) is a compatibility function between ru
and rv, and φu(ru|θu) is the local evidence function for ru given θu.
Firstly, we specify the local evidence function φu(ru|θu), which describes the prob-
ability distribution of ru given the observed user feature θu. We can use the output
probability distribution from the probabilistic classifiers. As one example, we use
the Logistic Regression [18] to classify users as spammers (ru = 0) or normal users
(ru = 1), in which the probability of ru = 1 given the observed feature vector θu can
be computed as follows
Preg(ru = 1|θu) =
1
1 + exp{−(c0 + c1θ1 + . . .+ cpθp)}
, (104)
where c = [c0, c1, . . . , cp] is a logistic regression coefficient vector to be learnt from
training datasets, and
Preg(ru = 0|θu) = 1− Preg(ru = 1|θu). (105)
Hence, we can let φu(ru|θu) = Preg(ru|θu).
The compatibility function ψuv(ru, rv) needs to be defined properly to reflect the
influence users u and v have on each other in the social network. Basically, ru and rv
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should be compatible and have similar values if there exists a strong social relationship
between users u and v. In this work, we define ψuv(ru, rv) as





where α > 0 is some parameter that adjusts the influence of one user on his connected
users. Since ru only takes discrete values from Γ, ψuv(ru, rv) can also be explicitly
expressed as
ψuv(ru = si, rv = sj) = qij, (107)
where 0 ≤ qij ≤ 1 and
∑
1≤j≤L qij = 1. We can interpret qij as the probability of
rv = sj given ru = si. A larger qii means users u and v are more likely to have similar
trustworthiness, i.e., ru = rv = si.
8.3.3 Inference Using BP
The PMRF model expresses the factorization of P (R|Θ) into many local functions as
shown in (103), and hence, we apply the BP algorithm to exploit such structure to
efficiently infer the marginal probability distribution P (ru|Θ), ∀u ∈ U. This is one
important computational advantage of PMRF models.
8.3.3.1 BP Algorithm
BP is a message-passing algorithm that operates on probabilistic graphs, where mes-
sages are exchanged between nodes along edges. By exploiting the graph structure,
BP efficiently computes marginal functions from complex global functions of large
number of variables. When the graph has a tree structure, BP computes the exact
results. Even in graphs with loops, we can obtain very good approximate results
by applying the loopy BP algorithm [123], in which the probabilistic messages are
iteratively exchanged between variable nodes until convergence. In this work, since
users in social networks can easily connect to each other to form loops, the proposed
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PMRF model will have loops in many cases, and hence, we need to apply the iterative
loopy BP algorithm.
During each iteration n, at any variable node b, we update the messages sent
to its neighbors. To compute m
(n)
b,a (ra), the message sent from variable node b to
neighbor node a, we compute the product of all incoming messages in last iteration
from its neighbors except the one from node a, and multiply it with the local evidence













where N (b) denotes the set of users who are connected to user b, whose corresponding
variable nodes are connected to rb in PMRF.
After BP converges, the marginal distribution P (ru|Θ) of ru can be computed
according to




The predicted trustworthiness r̂u for user u is given by
r̂u = argmaxru∈ΓP (ru|Θ). (110)
We summarize the BP algorithm in Algorithm 4.
8.3.3.2 Complexity Analysis
The complexity of updating a message using (108) is O(|Γ|K), where K is the average
degree of each variable node on PMRF. In each iteration, each variable node updates
and sends out K messages to its neighbor nodes, and the total number of updated
messages is O(MK). Hence, the overall complexity in terms of multiplications is
O (|Γ|MK2). Note that the proposed algorithm converges quickly, on the average in
10 iterations. Hence, the complexity of the algorithm grows only linear in the number
of users.
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Algorithm 4 BP Algorithm on PMRF
• Initialization. Initialize ma,b(rb) as m(0)a,b(rb) = 1|Γ| , and set iteration counter
n = 1.
• Iterative message-passing until convergence.
(1) In iteration n, at each node b, update m
(n)
a,b (rb) for its neighors N (b) using
Eqn. (108);
(2) n = n+ 1, and repeat step (1) until convergence.
• Compute the marginal probabilities P (ru|Θ) using Eqn. (109);
• Compute the trustworthiness of all users using Eqn. (110).
8.4 Experimental Evaluation
8.4.1 Datasets
We use the Twitter dataset prepared by [117], in which the authors crawled the
real Twitter user profiles and identified spammers that post URL links of malicious
websites, e.g., phishing websites. The dataset includes 1,000 spammers and 10,000
non-spammers (normal users). The crawled data for each user contain the basic user
profile information, e.g., account creation time, the list of followers and followees, and
the 40 most recent Tweets. From the user data we can extract various user features
such as those introduced in [60, 117]. In our experiment, we use the following three
user features in Table 18 that are reported to be very effective in discriminating spam-
mers from normal users. We also extract user relationships using the bidirectional
following connections, i.e., user pairs that follow each other in the Twitter dataset.
Table 18: User features in Twitter dataset
Feature Definition
Account age How long ago the user account was created.
URL rate The average number of posted URLs per tweet.
Reply ratio The ratio of the number of tweets that are replies
to other users to the total number of all tweets.
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Table 19: Classification performance comparison for the spammer and non-spammer
classes.
Algorithm
All Spammer Class Non-Spammer Class
Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score Precision Recall F1 score
Proposed PMRF 0.895 0.891 0.900 0.896 0.899 0.890 0.895
SVM 0.735 0.730 0.745 0.738 0.740 0.725 0.732
Logistic Regression 0.733 0.734 0.730 0.732 0.731 0.735 0.733
Naive Bayes 0.725 0.686 0.830 0.751 0.785 0.620 0.693
8.4.2 Performance Evaluation
In the experiment, we predict the trustworthiness of users by classifying the users into
spammers and non-spammers. To evaluate classification performance, we first create
balanced training data from the dataset. We include all 1,000 spammers of the original
dataset, and randomly sample 1,000 non-spammers. We measure the performance in
terms of overall accuracy as well as the precision, recall, and F1-score metrics for both
spammer and non-spammer classes. For all introduced metrics, the higher the value
the better the performance. However, the individual metric of precision or recall does
not reflect the performance of the algorithms very well by itself, since high precision
may be achieved at low recall, and high recall may be achieved at low precision,
while the F1-score that calculates the harmonic mean of precision and recall is a more
balanced metric.
In the PMRF model, we let ru = 0 to indicate that user u is a spammer and ru = 1
for non-spammer. The compatibility function in (107) is specified by the transition
probability qii = 0.95, ∀i = 0, 1, and qij = 0.05 for i 6= j. In addition, we use the
probabilities computed by the Logistic Regression classifier (104) as φu(ru|θu). We
compare the performance of the proposed PMRF-based algorithm with the following
classification algorithms based only on users features, including:
• Support Vector Machine (SVM): We use the svmtrain() function from the
Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox in Matlab to train a linear support
vector machine classifier;
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• Logistic Regression: To learn the logistic regression coefficients, we use the
multinoimal logistic regression function mnfit();
• Naive Bayes: We train the Naive Bayes classifier using the NaiveBayes.fit()
function.
We split the data such that 80% of users in each class are used for training and
the rest 20% for testing. We summarize the results on the testing data in Table 19.
For all algorithms, we use the same features shown in Table 18. The results show that
our PMRF-based algorithm outperforms other classification algorithms significantly,
and it consistently achieves better performance in all metrics, improving classifica-
tion performance for both spammer and non-spammer classes. This confirms that
online social relationships between users can be utilized for user classification, and
our proposed algorithm effectively exploits such relationships.
For all other classification algorithms, their accuracy results are quite close. Among
them, the SVM classifier has the best accuracy, yet 18% worse than the proposed
PMRF algorithm. Noticeably, all of them classify users individually. They take each
user’s features as input and predict his/her label, disregarding the labels of other
users. This suggests that it is difficult to gain further performance improvement
without taking user relationships into account.
8.4.2.1 Impact of Parameters
We investigate the impact of the compatibility function (107) on classification per-
formance. In the experiment, we always let q00 = q11, so that the effects of the
compatibility function on both spammer and non-spammer classes are identical. In
Fig. 30, we show the overall accuracy of the proposed algorithm with qii increasing
from 0.5 to 1. We can see that when qii = 0.5, the proposed algorithm has the same
performance as that of Logistic Regression, since setting qii = 0.5 means no com-
patibility is imposed on the labels of two connected users, i.e., given the label of a
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TABLE II: Classification performance comparison for the spammer and non-spammer classes.
Algorithm
All Spammer Class Non-Spammer Class
Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score Precision Recall F1 score
Proposed PMRF 0.895 0.891 0.900 0.896 0.899 0.890 0.895
SVM 0.735 0.730 0.745 0.738 0.740 0.725 0.732
Logistic Regression 0.733 0.734 0.730 0.732 0.731 0.735 0.733
Naive Bayes 0.725 0.686 0.830 0.751 0.785 0.620 0.693
























Fig. 2: Impact of the compatibility function on accuracy.
no compatibility is imposed on the labels of two connected
users, i.e., given the label of a user, the other connected user
can have either label, spammer or non-spammer, with equal
probabilities. As qii increases, the accuracy first improves
significantly, but then the performance begins to saturate when
qii is large enough. This is due to several factors, e.g., some
users are not connected to other users and thus changing
compatibility function does not effect their predicted labels,
or some users’ probabilities of labels are strongly dominated
by their individual features.
We also like to note that even though in this experiment
setting qii = 1 seems to provide the best performance, in
general the appropriate value of qii should be chosen based
on the cross-validation results on the datasets. Choosing a
moderate value can reduce the influence of a single user, and
hence only when there are large enough number of users
with identical labels socially connected to a user, his/her
label will be significantly influenced. This can be useful for
some scenarios, e.g., where spammers have tricked some new
non-spammers to connect with them. Also, when the local
evidence φu(ru|θu) computed based on the user feature has
low prediction accuracy, a smaller qii (greater than 0.5) can
reduce false label propagation compared to qii = 1.
D. Impact of Social Relationships
We next examine how the richness of social connections
impacts the proposed algorithm. From the original dataset,
we randomly sample a proportion of the social connections































Fig. 3: Impact of social relationships on accuracy.
between users to generate the required datasets for our ex-
periment. In Fig. 3, we show the accuracy results for vary-
ing percentage of social connections (relative to the original
dataset), under qii = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. As the percentage of
social connections decreases, the accuracy of the proposed
algorithm decreases. When no social relationships can be
utilized, it degenerates to Logistic Regression that classifies
users individually. Comparing qii = 0.9 to qii = 0.7, we also
find that the performance for larger qii is more sensitive to the
richness of social connections.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a probabilistic graphical model
based on PMRF for predicting user trustworthiness in online
social networks, where social relationships between users are
modelled as edges in PMRF. We applied the BP algorithm
to exploit the graph structure to perform inference efficiently.
The computational complexity is linear in the number of
users. In the experiment on the Twitter dataset, we applied
the proposed algorithm to predict spammers, and the results
showed that it outperforms other classification algorithms in
terms of both accuracy and F1 score. Hence, the proposed
algorithm effectively leveraged online social relationships to
improve prediction performance.
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Figure 30: Impact of the compatibility function on accuracy.
user, the other connected user can have either label, pammer r non-spammer, with
equal probabilities. As qii increases, the accuracy first i proves significantly, but then
the performance begins to saturate wh n qii is large enough. This is due to several
factors, e.g., some u ers are not connected to other users and t us changing compat-
ibility function doe not effect their pr dicted labels, or some users’ probabilities of
labels are strongly dominated by their individual features.
We note that even though in this experiment setting qii = 1 seems to provide the
best performance, in general the appropriate value of qii should be chosen based on the
cross-validation results on the datasets. Choosing a moderate value can re uc the
influence of a single user, and hence only when there are large enough number of users
with identical labels socially connected to a user, his/her label will be significantly
influenced. This can be useful for some scenarios, e.g., where spammers have tricked
some new non-spammers to connect to them. Also, when the local evidence φu(ru|θu)
computed based on the user feature has low prediction accuracy, a smaller qii (greater
than 0.5) can reduce false label prop ation compared to qii = 1.
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TABLE II: Classification performance comparison for the spammer and non-spammer classes.
Algorithm
All Spammer Class Non-Spammer Class
Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score Precision Recall F1 score
Proposed PMRF 0.895 0.891 0.900 0.896 0.899 0.890 0.895
SVM 0.735 0.730 0.745 0.738 0.740 0.725 0.732
Logistic Regression 0.733 0.734 0.730 0.732 0.731 0.735 0.733
Naive Bayes 0.725 0.686 0.830 0.751 0.785 0.620 0.693
























Fig. 2: Impact of the compatibility function on accuracy.
no compatibility is imposed on the labels of two connected
users, i.e., given the label of a user, the other connected user
can have either label, spammer or non-spammer, with equal
probabilities. As qii increases, the accuracy first improves
significantly, but then the performance begins to saturate when
qii is large enough. This is due to several factors, e.g., some
users are not connected to other users and thus changing
compatibility function does not effect their predicted labels,
or some users’ probabilities of labels are strongly dominated
by their individual features.
We also like to note that even though in this experiment
setting qii = 1 seems to provide the best performance, in
general the appropriate value of qii should be chosen based
on the cross-validation results on the datasets. Choosing a
moderate value can reduce the influence of a single user, and
hence only when there are large enough number of users
with identical labels socially connected to a user, his/her
label will be significantly influenced. This can be useful for
some scenarios, e.g., where spammers have tricked some new
non-spammers to connect with them. Also, when the local
evidence φu(ru|θu) computed based on the user feature has
low prediction accuracy, a smaller qii (greater than 0.5) can
reduce false label propagation compared to qii = 1.
D. Impact of Social Relationships
We next examine how the richness of social connections
impacts the proposed algorithm. From the original dataset,
we randomly sample a proportion of the social connections































Fig. 3: Impact of social relationships on accuracy.
between users to generate the required datasets for our ex-
periment. In Fig. 3, we show the accuracy results for vary-
ing percentage of social connections (relative to the original
dataset), under qii = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. As the percentage of
social connections decreases, the accuracy of the proposed
algorithm decreases. When no social relationships can be
utilized, it degenerates to Logistic Regression that classifies
users individually. Comparing qii = 0.9 to qii = 0.7, we also
find that the performance for larger qii is more sensitive to the
richness of social connections.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a probabilistic graphical model
based on PMRF for predicting user trustworthiness in online
social networks, where social relationships between users are
modelled as edges in PMRF. We applied the BP algorithm
to exploit the graph structure to perform inference efficiently.
The computational complexity is linear in the number of
users. In the experiment on the Twitter dataset, we applied
the proposed algorithm to predict spammers, and the results
showed that it outperforms other classification algorithms in
terms of both accuracy and F1 score. Hence, the proposed
algorithm effectively leveraged online social relationships to
improve prediction performance.
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Figure 31: Impact of social relationships on accuracy.
8.4.2.2 Impac of Social Relationships
We next examine how the richness of social connections impacts the proposed al-
gorithm. From the original dataset, we randomly sample a proportion of the social
connections between users to generate the required datasets for our experiment. In
Fig. 31, we show the accuracy results for varying percentage of social connections (rel-
ative to the original dataset), under qii = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. As the percentage of social
connections decreases, the accuracy of the proposed algorithm decreases. When no
social r lationships can be utilized, it degenerates to Logistic Regression that classifies
users individually. Comparing qii = 0.9 to qii = 0.7, we also find that the performance
for larger qii is more sensitive to the richness of social connections.
8.5 Co clusion
In this chapter, we proposed a probabilistic graphical model based on PMRF for
predicting user trustworthiness in online social networks, which incorporates both user
features and social relationships. We applied the BP algorithm to exploit the graph
structure to perform inference efficiently. The computational complexity is linear
in the number of users. In the experiment on the Twitter dataset, we applied the
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proposed algorithm to predict spammers, and the results showed that it outperforms
other user feature-based classification algorithms in terms of both accuracy and F1
score. Hence, the proposed algorithm effectively leveraged online social relationships




9.1 Summary of Contributions
In this dissertation, we addressed the challenging social computing problems in rec-
ommender systems and social media information mining which have a large number
of variables as well as complex dependency relationships between those variables. We
constructed proper probabilistic graphical models suitable for the problems and de-
veloped computationally efficient algorithms. The contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We proposed probabilistic graphical models for Collaborative Filtering (CF) rec-
ommender systems. We computed user similarity for the neighborhood CF method
using factor graphs. Then we solved the recommender system problem by model
unknown item ratings on Pairwise Markov Random Fields (PMRFs) incorporating
both user similarity and item similarity. Experimental evaluation results using the
100K MovieLens dataset showed that the proposed algorithms outperformed other
neighborhood methods.
• We proposed a Bayesian network model for social recommendation systems, which
was constructed based on relations between users in social networks. The ex-
perimental results on the Epinions dataset showed that the proposed algorithm
achieved better top-N recommendation performance in terms of recall than both
the random walk based and voting based social recommendation algorithms.
• We proposed a semi-distributed item-based CF approach to privacy-preserving rec-
ommender systems. The architecture was based on factor graphs for computing
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item similarities. Through information-theoretic analysis, we showed that the pro-
posed algorithm effectively preserves user privacy. The experimental results on the
MovieLens dataset demonstrated that the algorithm also achieved superior rating
prediction performance.
• We proposed a factor graph model for jointly detecting spammers in shilling attacks
on CF recommender systems, which exploited the colluding spammers’ collabora-
tive spamming behaviors towards target items. We showed through experiments
that the proposed algorithm significantly improved detection accuracy as the num-
ber of target items increases.
• We proposed a rank aggregation approach and a popularity-biased Bayesian person-
alized ranking approach to exploiting both popularity and similarity for social link
recommendation. Experimental evaluation results on real-world datasets showed
that the proposed algorithms can combine the advantages of popularity-based and
similarity-based algorithms to improve AUC and precision.
• We proposed a probabilistic generative model for real-time event credibility pre-
diction in Twitter-like social media using streaming tweets. Through experiments
on the Twitter dataset, we showed that the batch prediction performance of our
model outperformed other algorithms based on aggregation analysis, and the online
streaming prediction performance quickly approached that of the batch prediction
with only a few hundred tweets.
• We proposed a probabilistic PMRF graphical model for predicting user trustwor-
thiness in online social networks, which incorporated both user features and social
relationships. In the experiment on the Twitter dataset, we applied the proposed
algorithm to predict spammers, and the results showed that it outperformed other
classification algorithms using only features of individual users.
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9.2 Future Research
In this dissertation, the proposed probabilistic graphical models for recommender
systems do not incorporate context information, e.g., time of the day and day of the
week. In many online activities like music listening and movie watching, contexts can
affect user preferences on items. Future research should extend graphical models to
context-aware recommendation by using suitable models like conditional Markov ran-
dom fields. In addition, the proposed recommender system models are for predicting
item ratings, and are evaluated using metrics like root mean squared error. However,
the accuracy of rating prediction does not reflect the relative rankings of items as
seen by a user. Future research should consider ranking metrics for graphical models.
In detection of shilling attacks on recommender systems, the proposed factor graph
model achieves good performance against the Average attacks. In practice, spammers
may launch more complicated shilling attacks that do not follow a simple strategy,
which can be a combination of both push and nuke attacks. Future research needs to
design more robust detection algorithms to deal with more sophisticated attacks.
In social event credibility prediction, we use all observed tweets starting from the
beginning, but ignore the temporal dynamics in information credibility. However, the
tweets appear at the very beginning may be less reliable, whereas later tweets are
likely more accurate as more evidences become available. Future research needs to
take into account such temporal effects to improve the online credibility prediction
algorithm.
In social media user trustworthiness prediction, social connections are modeled
as edges in PMRF models without considering the strength of those connections.
Future research should properly model the connection strength as users may interact
more frequently with some close connections than others. Also, network structure
analysis techniques such as PageRank [84] and SALSA [61] can be used to measure
the importance of connections.
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